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SUMMARY 
The subject of this study is the relationship between 
the Admiralty and the Australian colonies, and 
subsequently the Commonwealth of Australia, from 1881 
to 1913. Of main concern is Admiralty policy; its 
objectives, the way in which it was determined, and the 
factors which shaped it. 
The three decades examined in this study saw 
fundamental changes in the relationship between the 
Admiralty and Australia. Federation and the growth of 
nationalist sentiment encouraged Australian efforts to 
develop a local navy. These efforts were rewarded with 
the establishment of the Royal Australian Navy in 1911. 
This period also saw major changes in Britain's 
strategic and economic circumstances and the decline of 
the Royal Navy relative to the other great navies of 
the world. Students of British naval policy have tended 
to overlook the Admiralty's relationship with colonies 
such as Australia, concentrating on relations with the 
great powers, in particular the naval race with 
Germany. Of those studies which do mention Australia, 
many have emphasized the role developing nationalist 
sentiment in Australia played in changing the 
Admiralty's 	policy 	on 	dominion 	naval 	defence. 
Historians from C.P. Lucas to Donald Gordon have 
implicitly or explicitly criticized Australia for 
pressing for a local navy in the face of cogent 
strategic arguments by the Admiralty. Such criticism, 
however, does not take into account the extent to which 
changes in the Admiralty's position on Australian naval 
defence were initiated by the Admiralty themselves as a 
result of changes in their strategic and financial 
circumstances. While it is acknowledged that developing 
Australian nationalism and Australian efforts to 
establish a local navy did influence the Admiralty's 
thinking on Australian naval defence, this study argues 
that changes in the Admiralty's attitude were primarily 
a response to broader changes in Britain's strategic 
and financial position. 
This study begins in the early 1880s when a series 
of incidents involving the Australian colonies 
highlighted the problems posed for Britain when the 
colonies established their own local naval defence 
forces. The upshot of these incidents was the 1887 
naval agreement. While the 1887 agreement has often 
been linked with the Imperial Federation movement, 
which was active at the time, it is claimed here that 
the agreement was devised by the Admiralty primarily to 
undermine naval development in the Australian colonies. 
As such it formed the basis for future relations 
between the Admiralty and Australia until changing 
strategic and financial circumstances forced the 
Admiralty to rethink their policy of discouraging 
colonial naval forces. 
From the turn of the century the Admiralty's advice 
to Australia on naval matters undergoes frequent, often 
contradictory, changes. This study examines these 
changes in the context of, and as a reflection of, 
Britain's deteriorating strategic and financial 
circumstances 	and 	domestic 	political 	situation. 
Extensive use is made of Admiralty materials, 
especially the internal memoranda of the influential 
Naval Intelligence Department, in order to reveal the 
factors which shaped the Admiralty's Australian policy. 
The Naval Intelligence Department material has been 
little studied in regard to Australian naval defence. 
A major section of this study is devoted to 
examining the 1909 proposal by the Admiralty for the 
establishment of a Pacific Fleet. The Pacific Fleet 
scheme, with its provision for ocean-going colonial 
'fleet units', was a major departure by the Admiralty 
from their policy of discouraging naval development by 
the colonies. It also appears at odds with the 
programme of fleet concentration and rationalization 
which the Admiralty was engaged in at the time. 
Perhaps because of this, and the fact the scheme was 
short-lived, being abandoned by Britain only two years 
after it had first been mooted, it has been ignored by 
historians or dismissed as an aberration not worthy of 
much attention. This study argues that the Pacific 
Fleet sheme was a genuine proposal by the Admiralty to 
reassert British sea power in the Pacific and it shows 
how a series of fortuitous events led the Admiralty to 
believe that a new Pacific Fleet was possible, even in 
the midst of the naval race with Germany. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to explore the factors 
which shaped the Admiralty's attitude to Australian 
naval defence from the early 1880s until 1913 when 
Australia assumed responsibility for the naval defence 
of its own waters. The major events in Anglo-Australian 
relations which form the basic narrative of this study 
are outlined in a number of works, notably those of 
Jose, Lucas and Tunsta11. 1 Of more recent vintage is 
Richard Preston's Canada and 'Imperial Defense' which, 
despite its title, deals with the other dominions as 
well as Canada. 2 The student of Australian defence 
policy is also well served, in particular by the 
pioneering work of Leon Atkinson and, pursuing a 
somewhat different purpose, the excellent recent study 
by Neville Meaney. 3 Admiral Creswell, the leading 
'Arthur W. Jose, Official History of Australia in 
the War of 1914-1918: Vol. IX, The Royal Australian 
Navy, (Sydney, 1928), pp. xv-xlv, C.P. Lucas, The 
Empire at War, Volume I, (London, 1921) and W.C.B. 
Tunstall, "Imperial Defence 1870-1897" and "Imperial 
Defence 1897-1914", The Cambridge History of the 
British Empire, ed. E.A. Benians et. al., (Cambridge, 
1959), Vol. III, pp. 230-254 and pp. 563-604. 
2 .Richard 	A. 	Preston, 	Canada 	and 	'Imperial 
Defense', (Durham, N.C., 1967). 
2 .Leon Atkinson, Australia's Defence Policy: A 
Study of Empire and Nation 1897-1910, (Unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U., 1964). Neville Meaney, A History 
of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901-1923: 
Volume I, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901- 
1914, (Sydney, 1976). 
2 
campaigner in Australia for a national navy and 
subsequent First Naval Member of the Australian Naval 
Board, has been the subject of a biography by Stephen 
Webster. 4 My debt to all these authors must be 
constantly apparent. There is to my knowledge, however, 
no single work devoted to the factors which shaped the 
Admiralty's position on Australian naval defence. 
Indeed the aims and motives of the Admiralty in their 
dealings with Australia have been of only incidental 
concern to historians. The histories of British naval 
policy before the First World War have dealt primarily 
with technological developments and Britain's relations 
with the great powers, especially Germany. They hardly 
mention Australia. Only Donald Gordon has considered at 
length the relationship between the Admiralty and the 
dominions and made wide use of Admiralty materials. 6 
4 .Stephen D. Webster, Creswell, The Australian 
Navalist: A Career Biography, (Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Monash University, 1976). 
6 .Donald C. Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in 
Imperial Defence 1870-1914, (Baltimore, 1965) and "The 
Admiralty and the Dominion Navies, 1902-1914", Journal 
of Modern History, Vol. XXXIII, (December, 1961), pp. 
407-422. Mention must also be made of the recent volume 
by John Bach, The Australia Station: A History of the 
Royal Navy in the South West Pacific 1821-1913,•
(Sydney, 1986). This excellent work, which appeared 
while the present study was in progress, covers the 
full range of the Royal Navy's association with 
Australia though only a short chapter is devoted to 
Australian naval defence. 
3 
In the past writers dealing with Anglo-imperial 
defence relations have concentrated on the growth of 
national feeling in the dominions and their lack of 
enthusiasm for British schemes of 'imperial defence'. 
The dominions generally have been much criticized for 
the supposedly negative effect of their attitude upon 
British defence preparations before 1914. 8 From a naval 
viewpoint Australia has been seen as parochial and 
unco-operative, forcing the Admiralty to adjust its 
policy to meet local wishes with the result that 
imperial naval strength and efficiency was weakened. 
Henry Hall described Australia's attitude to naval 
defence before 1914 as "selfish" and reproached 
Australia for its failure to make full allowance for 
imperial necessities.? A.F. Madden has stated that 
"only under the immediate dynamics of total war 
was dominion particularism prepared to make concessions 
to the 	'associate principle' 	in an undemanding 
fellowship." "National sentiment", W. K. Hancock 
claimed in 1937, "triumphed over imperial sentiment, 
8 .0n this see Preston, op. cit., pp. i-viii. 
7 .Henry Hall, Australia and England: A Study in 
Imperial Relations, (London, 1934), p. 251 and 242. 
8 .A.F. Madden, "Changing Attitudes and Widening 
Responsibilities 1895-1914", Cambridge History of the 
British Empire, ed. E.A. Benians, Sir James Butler and 
C.E. Carrington, (Cambridge, 1959), Vol. III, p. 404. 
4 
supported though it was by the most cogent strategic 
arguments." 
By concentrating upon the growth of dominion 
nationalism and demands from Australia and later Canada 
for separate navies, writers such as Hancock have 
created the impression that dominion feeling was the 
driving force in Anglo-imperial naval relations. "The 
Dominions", A.B. Keith concluded, "wished to have ships 
under their control which they could see and touch, and 
these feelings were facts which would govern events. "' 0  
Even comparatively recent writers have seen dominion 
nationalism as the main factor shaping Admiralty policy 
toward Australia. Donald Gordon, whose works constitute 
the major reference in this field, claimed that the 
1902 naval agreement "foundered on the rocks of 
Australian national feeling", while the Admiralty's 
acceptance of local torpedo boat flotillas in 1907 was 
due to a "recognition of the political realities in 
some of the dominions."" More recently Nicholas 
D'Ombrain has also pointed to the "vocal demand for the 
establishment of separate Dominion navies" as the key 
0 .W.K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth 
Affairs, Vol. I, (London, 1937), p. 37. 
1 °.A.B. Keith, Imperial Unity and the Dominions, 
(Oxford, 1916), p. 333. 
"'D. Gordon, "The Admiralty and the Dominion 
Navies 1902-1914", op. cit., pp. 410-411. 
5 
factor in changing the Admiralty's position on 
colonial naval defence. 12 
The importance these authors have attached to 
dominion feeling in shaping Admiralty policy is 
scarcely surprising. Pressure from the colonies Was 
customarily cited by the Admiralty in their public 
statements as an explanation for changes in their 
position on colonial naval defence. Recently, however, 
the accuracy and completeness of the Admiralty's public 
explanations and justifications has been questioned. 
"Public discussions or even published official 
statements by the Admiralty", Paul Kennedy has noted, 
"did not always represent the true strategy, or only 
represented it in a very one-sided way." 12 Professor 
Kennedy is referring to matters of broad strategy but 
his comment holds true for a number of important 
statements by the Admiralty relating to Australian 
naval defence. This is not to say that dominion feeling 
was not important or did not influence the position 
taken by the Admiralty. This study will argue, however, 
that the role of dominion feeling in influencing 
Admiralty policy has been over-emphasized. Changes in 
12 .Nicholas D'Ombrain, War Machinery and High 
Policy: Defence Administration in Peacetime Britain 
1902-1914, (London, 1973), pp. 226-227. 
12 .Pau1 Kennedy, "Strategic Aspects of the Anglo-
German Naval Race", in Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-
1945: Eight Studies, (London, 1984), p. 145. 
6 
the Admiralty's position on Australian naval defence, 
it is claimed, were often the result of strategic, 
economic and domestic political factors which had 
little to do with the situation in the colonies but 
which were portrayed by the Admiralty as a response to 
colonial demands for public relations purposes. 
Of the factors which shaped the Admiralty's 
attitude to Australian naval defence, one that has been 
noted by a number of writers was the aversion within 
the Admiralty to the development of local naval forces. 
This opposition to local navies has often been 
attributed to the rise of 'blue water' strategic theory 
in the 1890s. 'Blue water' strategy emphasized naval 
concentration for the decisive battle in which the 
command of the sea would be decided. In the view of 
'blue water' theorists local navies were a dilution of 
imperial resources and 'blue water' arguments were 
regularly used by the Admiralty to discourage local 
naval development. In this study, however, it is 
suggested that 'blue water' theory merely reinforced an 
existing prejudice within the Royal Navy. Admiralty 
opposition to the development of local navies, it is 
claimed, can be traced back to the early 1880s when a 
series of incidents highlighted the difficulties 
colonial navies could pose for British foreign policy. 
Perhaps the most important factor shaping the 
Admiralty's position on Australian naval 	defence, 
7 
however, was British naval decline. For much of the 
nineteenth century the Royal Navy had been the 
unchallenged master of the world's oceans. From the 
1890's, however, competition from European powers and 
the rise of the United States and Japanese navies 
outside of Europe began to erode this supremacy. 
Whereas in 1880 Britain possessed as many battleships 
as all the other navies of the world combined, by 1890 
this superiority had shrunk to equality with the next 
two greatest naval powers, the so-called 'two power 
standard', and by 1912 Britain was struggling to 
maintain an adequate measure of superiority over only 
one navy, that of Germany. 14  Faced with a choice of 
either spending vastly more on her navy or accepting a 
gradual contraction of British sea power Britain chose 
the latter." From the point of view of Admiralty-
Australian relations this meant the Admiralty was 
increasingly less able to make concessions to the 
colonies in order to secure objectives such as the 
14 .0n the general decline of British sea power 
before 1914 see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of 
British Naval Mastery, (London, 1976). 
16 .The growth of British expenditure on naval 
defence during this period is shown in Appendix A. It 
should be noted, however, that while contemporary 
economists were alarmed at the growth of British 
defence expenditure the amount Britain was spending on 
defence as a percentage of gross national product, even 
during the heady years of the naval race with Germany, 
was less than Britain was spending in the 1970s and 
1980s. See Philip Pugh, The Cost of Sea Power: The 
Influence of Money on Naval Affairs from 1815 to the 
Present Day, (London, 1986). 
8 
discouragement of local naval forces. The restrictions 
on the movement of subsidized vessels which had been 
accepted by the Admiralty in 1887 could not comfortably 
be condoned in 1902, while the 1902 naval agreement, it 
is argued here, foundered not, as Gordon suggests, 
because of national feeling in Australia but because of 
pressure on the Admiralty from within Britain to 
rationalize their forces in line with moves to contain 
government expenditure on defence. 
While the Admiralty's misgivings at local naval 
development and the impact of British naval decline 
were important in shaping the Admiralty's attitude to 
Australian defence, it was frequently short-term 
considerations, often relating to political concerns in 
Britain, which decided the position the Admiralty 
adopted at any given point in time. The 1887 agreement, 
for example, has often been seen as an upshot of the 
imperial federation movement of the 1880s. In this 
study, however, it is argued that the 1887 agreement 
was primarily an improvised response by the Admiralty 
to the dangers for Britain in the continued expansion 
of colonial navies. Likewise the Admiralty's 
abandonment of its policy of deterring the development 
of colonial navies in 1907 is interpreted here as 
primarily the result of the Liberal government's 
determination to reduce naval expenditure in order to 
meet its promise of increased spending on social 
9 
welfare. In this respect this study supports the 
conclusions of Aaron Friedberg in his recent book The 
Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative 
Decline 1895-1905." Concerned with testing theoretical 
models of national self- assessment against historical 
events, Friedberg argues that the traditional picture 
of Britain's adjustment to deteriorating strategic 
circumstances has overstated the extent to which the 
British leadership was pursuing a coherent and 
calculated policy. Britain's response, he claims, was 
"largely ad hoc and opportunistic." 17 
A major section of this study is devoted to 
examining the 1909 proposal by the Admiralty for the 
establishment of a new British fleet in the Pacific. 
The Pacific Fleet scheme appears at odds with the 
programme of fleet rationalization and concentration 
being undertaken by the Admiralty at the time. Britain 
was engaged in a tense struggle for naval supremacy 
with Germany and 1908 had seen the greatest naval 
crisis in Britain since the 1880s. Perhaps because 
of this, and the fact the scheme was short-lived, being 
abandoned by the Admiralty only two years after it had 
first been mooted, it has been neglected by historians 
or rejected as an aberration not worthy of much 
attention. Richard Preston, for example, suggests that 
17 .Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and 
the Experience of Relative Decline 1895-1905, 
(Princeton, 1988). 
' 8 Ibid, p. 294. 
10 
the Admiralty were never serious about establishing a 
new fleet in the Pacific. He claims that "Asquith and 
McKenna did not understand the strategic issues 
involved" and dismisses the proposal as an Admiralty 
subterfuge with a "concealed motive that fitted in with 
[their] general aim of containing German 
expansion.' 1 ° This study takes the opposite view. The 
Pacific Fleet scheme, it is argued, was a sincere 
attempt by the Admiralty to reassert British sea power 
in an area of great financial and political interest to 
Britain at a time when the renewal of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance was seriously in doubt. It 
shows how in 1909 the Admiralty was under considerable 
pressure from the Foreign, Colonial and War Offices to 
reinforce the Pacific when a series of fortuitous 
events provided a breathing space for the Royal Navy in 
the naval race with Germany and created an opportunity 
for establishing a new fleet in the Pacific. To fully 
exploit this opportunity, however, involved an entirely 
new approach to dominion naval forces. An integral part 
of the Pacific Fleet scheme was the creation of joint 
imperial-colonial navies with personnel circulating 
routinely through the Royal Navy and colonial services. 
This concept of joint imperial-colonial navies, it is 
suggested, was inspired by the efforts of Australian 
prime minister Alfred Deakin to avoid the shortcomings 
of the colonial navies of the 1880s. 
".Preston, op. cit., pp. 398-399. 
1 1 
Among the principal materials consulted for this 
study were documents held in the Public Record Office 
in London, especially those of the Admiralty, Cabinet 
and Colonial Office. The Admiralty Papers form an 
immense collection which, though sifted through by a 
number of students, still contain much important 
material which has been only superficially examined. 
There are, for example, only scattered references in 
the published works to the considerable body of 
material relating to the Admiralty's preparations for 
the 1902 and 1907 colonial conferences. The 1909 
conference and the Admiralty's Pacific Fleet plan have 
attracted even less attention. 
Within the Admiralty materials consulted for this 
study the papers produced by the Naval Intelligence 
Department are on particular importance. Scattered 
throughout the various Admiralty files this material 
has been little used in relation to colonial defence. 
The Naval Intelligence Department had been established 
in 1886 as the 'thinking' department of the Admiralty. 
By 1902, notes Arthur Marder, "no question of any 
greater importance than the, say, change of an article 
of uniform, ... [was] decided upon without the N.I.D. 
having its say."" Along with the Admiralty's 
".Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea 
Power: A History of British Naval Policy - in the Pre-
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905, (London, 1964), p. viii. 
12 
political head (the First Lord of the Admiralty) and 
the its professional head (the First Sea Lord), the 
Director of Naval Intelligence played a key role in 
formulating Admiralty policy. While the Board of 
Admiralty did not always follow the N.I.D.'s advice, 
for example the 1907 proposal that 'P' class cruisers 
be supplied to Australia to train Australian personnel 
in accordance with a request by Alfred Deakin was 
rejected by the First Sea Lord, their recommendations 
and assessments are invaluable in understanding the 
factors which shaped Admiralty policy. 
In Australia documents held by the Commonwealth 
Archives in both Canberra and Melbourne have been 
examined. Inevitably there is a certain duplication of 
material held in Britain and Australia and also in some 
collections of private papers in these countries. In 
this study reference is generally made to documents 
held by Australian archives in preference to the same 
document in Britain. A number of collections of private 
papers have been consulted. In Britain the papers of 
Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge and Admiral Sir Reginald 
Henderson, both held by the National Maritime Museum at 
Greenwich, have been examined. In Australia private 
papers consulted include those of Alfred Deakin, Edmund 
Barton, George Pearce and Lord Tennyson. The last are 
of particular interest because of his close friendship 
13 
with Lord Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty from 
1900 to 1905. 
Use has also been made of a number of well-known 
published collections of private papers including those 
of Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Viscount Esher. The 
thoughts and opinions of people directly or indirectly 
connected with the determination of colonial naval 
policy has also been gleaned from the many articles 
published in contemporary journals such as The 
Nineteenth Century, The United Service Magazine and the 
National Review. Newspapers, in particular The Times 
and leading Australian newspapers such as the Sydney 
Morning Herald and the Age of Melbourne, have also been 
consulted. A detailed examination of newspaper 
opinions, however, has not been made. Extensive 
reference to Australian newspaper opinion is to be 
found in the works of Atkinson and Meaney. 
14 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE CONTAINMENT OF COLONIAL NAVAL ACTIVISM, 1881-1887 
During the 1850s and 1860s Australia's naval defence 
was developed along two distinct lines. Hitherto 
Australia's security had rested almost entirely upon 
the world-wide power of the Royal Navy. From 1862, 
however, the self-governing colonies were encouraged to 
"undertake the main responsibility of providing for 
their own internal order and . . to assist in their 
own external defence." The Royal Navy was still 
charged with protecting the empire against invasion, 
but the colonies were now expected to assist in this 
task by securing their ports to deter enemy raids and 
providing safe harbours for British shipping. 
Under the Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865 the 
governments of the self-governing colonies were 
empowered to provide and man vessels of war and also to 
raise volunteer forces to form part of the Royal Navy 
Reserve which had been established in 1859. 2 While the 
"Resolution of the House of Commons, G.B.P.D., 
Series 3 Vol. CLXV, p. 1060, 4 March 1862. 
2 .G.B.P.D., Series 3, Vol. CLXXVIII, p. 272, 27 
March 1865. See also B. Knox, "Colonial Influence on 
Imperial Policy, 1859-1866: Victoria and the Colonial 
Naval Defence Act 1865", Historical Studies: Australia 
and New Zealand, Vol. XI, (November, 1963), pp. 61-79. 
15 
Admiralty continued to have some misgivings about the 
possession of 	warships 	by colonial governments, 
especially as the status of such vessels in 
international law was unclear, they gave general 
approval to the establishment of small colonial navies 
for harbour and coastal defence. The Admiralty had 
appreciated the use during the Maori wars in New 
Zealand of the Victorian sloop Victoria, and the 
existence of colonial harbour defence vessels had the 
advantage of freeing Royal Navy ships for wider 
service. 3 
This benign attitude to the establishment of local 
naval forces was to change. A series of incidents in 
the early 1880s highlighted the difficulties that 
autonomous colonial navies could pose to Britain. The 
Admiralty came to see local navies as a means by which 
Britain's control over imperial policy-making could be 
undermined as well as a source of friction between 
themselves and the colonial governments. These concerns 
were to influence the Admiralty's attitude to 
Australian naval defence for the next two and a half 
decades. Indeed the Admiralty's concern at the 
development of colonial navies was such that they were 
prepared to surrender some of the freedom they had 
3 .Bach, op. cit., pp. 178-179. 
16 
traditionally 	possessed 	over 	the 	movement 	and 
disposition of their ships in order to contain the 
expansion of the colonial navies. 
While the 1865 Naval Defence Act enabled the Australian 
colonies to supplement their coastal fortifications 
with 'floating defences', it was the Royal Navy which 
remained the first line of defence. In 1881 a meeting 
of colonial premiers in Sydney declared that the Royal 
Navy squadron in Australian waters was inadequate. The 
upsurge of tensions in Europe and the spread of 
imperial rivalries to the Pacific, bringing with it the 
possibility of war close to Australian shores, had led 
the colonies to re-examine the basis of their defence. 
They had grounds for complaint. The squadron was a 
motley collection of mostly antiquated wooden vessels 
which the Admiralty admitted was incapable of 
undertaking any major naval operation against an 
enemy. 4 Indeed only six months before the colonial 
premiers met in Sydney the commander of the squadron, 
Commodore J.C. Wilson, had complained to the Admiralty 
that the ships under his command were incapable of 
providing any real protection for Australian maritime 
4 .Admiralty to Colonial Office, 2 November 1871, 
P.R.O., Adm 1/6197. 
17 
trade, 	being 	too 	slow 	and 	lacking endurance. 5 
"Considering the large Imperial interests involved", 
the Inter-Colonial conference declared, the 
strength of the Australian squadron should continue to 
be the exclusive charge of the Imperial Government, and 
that the strength of the Australian squadron should be 
increased." 
In London the Colonial Office denounced the 
resolution while the Admiralty ignored the call for 
more ships to be sent to Australia.' The 1870s had been 
characterized by disinterest among the British public 
in the Royal Navy. Furthermore many informed observers 
believed that technological changes had lessened the 
importance of sea power to Britain and the empire's 
defence. The naval estimates had remained largely 
static throughout the decade and the Admiralty was 
under pressure to effect economies. Gladstone, who had 
returned to power in April 1880, advocated a policy of 
naval concentration •in European waters largely because 
5 .Wilson to Admiralty, 22 June 1880, P.R.O., Adm 
1/6538. 
6 .N.S.W., Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative 
Assembly, 1880-81 session, Vol. I, No. 143, "Inter-
colonial Conference. Minutes of Proceedings of the 
Inter-colonial Conference held at Sydney, January, 
1881", pp. 342-343. 
".Lord Kimberley, Colonial Secretary, to Governor 
of Victoria, 11 May 1881, P.R.O., Adm 1/6538. 
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of the economies this would allow.° In presenting the 
Naval Estimates in 1881, G.O. Trevelyan, Financial 
Secretary to the Admiralty, outlined with a certain 
irritation the "incessant" calls upon the navy by 
the outlying empire.° In such circumstances the 
Admiralty's disregard of Australian demands for a 
strengthening of the Australian squadron was to be 
expected. 
The Admiralty's indifference to Australian concerns 
over their security was soon to change. On 4 April 1883 
H.M. Chester, acting on behalf of the government of 
Queensland, raised the British flag at Port Moresby and 
claimed the eastern half of the island of New Guinea 
for the British empire." The Queensland annexation of 
eastern New Guinea had been made to forestall rumoured 
German moves to seize the territory. Viewing with alarm 
the encroachment of European powers in the south west 
Pacific the Australian colonies believed the occupation 
8 .Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial 
Defence, p. 56. 
e.G.B.P.D., Series 3, Vol. CCLIX, pp. 1392-1393, 18 
March 1881. 
".G.B.P.P., 1883 session, Vol. XLVII, Cd. 3617, 
"Further Co-respondence in Regard to New Guinea", R. 
Thompson, Australian Imperialism in the Pacific: The 
Expansionist Era 1820-1920, (Melbourne, 1980), and M. 
Jacobs, "The Colonial Office and New Guinea, 1874- 
1884", Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand, 
Vol. V, (May, 1952), pp. 106-118. 
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of eastern New Guinea was essential to preserve their 
security. 
In annexing eastern New Guinea, however, the 
Queensland government had acted without imperial 
approval. The Queensland premier, Thomas McIlwraith, 
hoped to present Britain with a fait accompli." In 
London the Queensland action caused consternation for 
it undermined Britain's control of imperial foreign 
policy and complicated relations with Germany at a time 
when German goodwill was seen as vital to Britain's 
international diplomacy." Despite the support of New 
South Wales, Victoria and South Australia and offers to 
meet the cost of administration, the Queensland 
proposal to incorporate eastern New Guinea into the 
empire was rejected.I 3 
''Thompson, op. cit., p. 52. 
".Britain's 	relations 	with 	Germany 	were 
complicated by the problem of Egypt. Ostensibly a part 
of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt had been declared bankrupt 
in 1876 and financial control was taken over by Britain 
and France. Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 after a 
nationalist uprising had led to a collapse of order. 
With France and Russia putting pressure on Britain to 
leave Egypt, the Gladstone government needed the 
support of the German led Triple Alliance (Germany, 
Austria-Hungary and Italy) on the International debt 
Commission in order to secure a majority vote in favour 
of necessary reforms of Egyptian finances. A.J.P. 
Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, 
(Oxford, 1977), pp. 286-290. 
13 .Lord Derby, Colonial Secretary, 	to Palmer, 
Governor of Queensland, 11 July 1883, Cd. 3617, op. 
cit., p. 208. 
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While Britain's stand over New Guinea was deplored 
by the Australian colonies, in London the Queensland 
action was seen as highlighting the dangers naive 
colonial governments motivated by purely local concerns 
could pose to Britain's relations with the great 
powers. The Queensland action had demonstrated that in 
certain circumstances colonial governments were 
prepared to act in defiance of their constitutional 
limitations. In the case of New Guinea no long term 
harm had been done. Queensland was forced to surrender 
control of New Guinea and an agreement was eventually 
worked out with Germany whereby the territory was 
divided between the two empires. But the prospect of 
similar incidents in the future, perhaps with more 
serious consequences, frightened the British 
authorities. "It is well understood", the Queensland 
government was bluntly informed, 
that 	the 	officers 	of 	the 	colonial 
government have no power or authority to 
act beyond the limits of their colony and 
if this constitutional principle is not 
carefully observed serious difficulties 
and complications must arise." 
14 .Ibid. My italics. The claim that Queensland had 
no constitutional power to annex territory to the 
empire without the prior sanction of the imperial 
government in London was challenged by Premier 
McIlwraith who argued that it was "contrary to the 
whole history of colonial acquisition". His claims, 
however, were not supported by legal opinions sought by 
the Colonial Office. On McIlwraith's argument see A. 
Todd, Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies, 
(London, 1894), p. 251. For a selection of British 
legal opinion on this matter see D.P. O'Connell and A. 
Riordan ed., Opinions on Imperial Constitutional Law, 
(Sydney, 1971), chpts. X and XI. 
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From a naval viewpoint the Queensland action 
fuelled Admiralty misgivings over the development of 
autonomous_ colonial navies. To the Admiralty the 
possession of fighting ships by such manifestly 
irresponsible governments as that of Queensland could 
only increase the likelihood of Britain being severely 
embarrassed, or, even, worse, being drawn into an 
unwanted war. This was certainly the view of Commodore 
J.E. Erskine. As commander of the Royal Navy's 
Australian squadron Erskine was the Admiralty's most 
important source of information on matters Australian. 
Referring to the Queensland annexation of eastern New 
Guinea in a letter to the Admiralty dated 13 August 
1883 Erskine warned: 
I cannot but doubt the expediency or the 
prudence of creating in Australia a number 
of independent naval forces, nominally 
established for defensive purposes, but 
which might be used in a direction which 
would not only tend to embarrass the 
Colonial Authorities, but which might lead 
to Imperial complications. 16 
Nor were Erskine's fears without justification. Both 
Queensland and Victoria vaguely saw their fledgling 
coastal defence forces as the foundation of more wide-
ranging navies. 16 Moreover Alfred Deakin, a leading 
16 .Erskine to Admiralty, 13 August 1883, P.R.O., 
Adm 116/68. 
16 .G. Liik, External Threats as a Factor in 
Australian Politics, 1870-1900, (Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Sydney, 1971), pp. 231-232. 
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Victorian politician and future Australian prime 
minister tells us that in 1888 the inner cabinet of the 
Victorian government, hearing of French plans to seize 
the New Hebrides, decided to forestall them by 
"despatching a detachment of the Victorian permanent 
military forces in a swift steamer with orders to hoist 
the British flag and keep it flying." 17 
The dangers in permitting the development of 
autonomous local navies appeared all the greater 
because of the rapid expansion these navies were under-
going. Their calls for an increased Royal Navy presence 
disregarded, a Russian war scare early in 1882 had 
persuaded the Australian colonies to take matters into 
their own hands and expand their own naval forces. 
Indicating an increasingly irrational concern in the 
colonies at their vulnerability the Melbourne Age had 
claimed that a Russian squadron on a goodwill tour of 
Australia was planning to launch an attack on the 
colonies. The admiral commanding the Russian squadron, 
the Age reported, had signalled St. Petersburg that the 
Australian colonies were "without any serious means of 
defence" and that Melbourne was "at our mercy by 
surprise . 18 In the public outcry which followed the 
17 .A. Deakin, The Federal Story: The Inner History 
of the Federal Cause 1880-1900, ed. J.A. La Nauze, 
(Melbourne, 1963), pp. 24-25. 
' 8 Melbourne Age, 23 March 1882. 
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Victorian government acquired two new gunboats, the 530 
ton Victoria and the 360 ton Albert. Two sister vessels 
to the Albert, the Gayundah and Paluma, were ordered by 
Queensland, while South Australia, with Spencer and St. 
Vincent Gulfs to defend, purchased the 960 ton gunboat 
Protector which boasted the formidable armament of one 
8-inch and five 6-inch guns." 
Apart from the possibility that they might be used 
by the colonial governments in defiance of their 
constitutional limitations the burgeoning colonial 
.navies were a cause of concern to the Admiralty in 
another way. Under the Naval Defence Act of 1865 
colonial warships were available for service in the 
Royal Navy in an emergency. This provision had remained 
untested until, early in 1884, the Victorian government 
offered its new gunboats Victoria and Albert and the 
torpedo boat Childers, which were enroute to Melbourne, 
to the Admiralty for active service in the Red Sea 
where naval operations were being undertaken in support 
of the army fighting in the Sudan. 
The Victorian vessels had already been at the 
centre of one controversy. On the instructions of the 
Victorian Agent-General in London they had left 
Macandie ed. The Genesis of the Royal 
Australian Navy, (Sydney, 1949), p. 26; C. Jones, 
Australian Colonial Navies, (Canberra, 1986), pp. 56- 
66. 
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Spithead flying the White Ensign rather than the Blue 
Ensign authorized by the Admiralty. The Admiralty were 
angered at this attempt by the Victorian vessels to 
masquerade as ships of the Royal Navy. Legal opinion 
sought by the Admiralty confirmed that without specific 
authority from the British parliament a self-governing 
colony had no power to operate warships on the high 
seas. The Victorian warships would have to sail to 
Melbourne 	as 	merchant 	vessels." 	The Admiralty 
instructed the naval commander at Gibraltar, the ships 
first port of call, to see that the White Ensigns were 
immediately hauled down." With Victoria now offering 
the ships for active service with the Royal Navy the 
First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Astley Cooper Key, became 
concerned at the lack of "a carefully established legal 
basis" for such co-operation. 	"The matter", 	Key 
stressed, "is one of importance in view of the 
extension of the naval defences of the Australasian 
Colonies." 22 
Admiral Key's concern at the expansion of the 
colonial naval forces was further increased by an offer 
20 -Law Office to Admiralty, 8 February 1884, cited 
in O'Connell and Riordan, op. cit., pp. 178-179. 
21 Admiraltymemorandum, "The Naval Forces of the 
Colony of Victoria and the General Question of the 
Status of Colonial Ships of War", 1884, P.R.O., Adm 
1/6719. 
22 -Admiral Key, First Sea Lord, to Lord Northbrook, 
First Lord of the Admiralty, 27 February 1884, Ibid. 
25 
in October 1884 by the Queensland government of the 
gunboat Gayundah for service with the Royal Navy 
squadron on the Australia Station." Claims by the 
Queensland premier, Sir Samuel Griffith, that this 
would "confer upon the ships and their officers a 
larger prestige and influence" 24 suggest that the main 
concern was to enhance the status of the Queensland 
government rather than provide genuine assistance to 
the Royal Navy. The Admiralty, however, already 
perturbed at the rise of colonial naval activism and 
the problems it created, had no intention of 
encouraging further naval initiatives by the colonies. 
Indeed Key must have been aghast at Queensland governor 
Lord Musgrave's claim that the offer of the Gayundah 
would lead to a flurry of similar offers from the other 
colonies. "In a very short time", Musgrave predicted, 
there could be "five or six, if not more" colonial 
warships operating with the Royal Navy in Australian 
waters. 26 
There were two aspects to Key's concern at the 
expansion of the colonial navies. The first, as we have 
22 .Griffith to Musgrave, 23 October 1884, P.R.O., 
Adm 1/6784. 
24 .Ibid. See also Liik, op. cit., p. 249. 
25 .Musgrave to Derby, 25 October 1884, P.R.O., Adm 
1/6784. 
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seen, was the unclear position of colonial warships in 
international law and the possibility that they might 
be used by the colonial governments beyond the limits 
of their constitutional authority. The second was the 
opportunity provided by the 1865 Colonial Naval Defence 
Act for colonial warships, with their less experienced 
and proficient crews, to serve in the Royal Navy. In 
rejecting the offer of the Gayundah for service in the 
Australian Squadron Admiral Key referred to the "many 
difficulties" which must arise from colonial vessels 
operating alongside regular Royal Navy ships." In a 
memorandum, "Naval Defence of Our Colonies", Key 
elaborated these concerns. Small navies, he pointed 
out, had difficulty in keeping abreast of the latest 
technological developments, while colonial seamen, many 
of whom were reservists, had little opportunity to 
practice important skills such as signalling which were 
vital for effective co-operation at sea. Moreover the 
incorporation of colonial vessels in the Royal Navy was 
made difficult because regulations concerning 
discipline were not uniform and the relationship of 
colonial officers to officers of the Royal Navy was 
unclear. Would, for example, a colonial officer with a 
merchant navy rank have seniority over officers of the 
2 e.Derby to Musgrave, 17 November 1884, P.R.O., Adm 
1/6784. Key to Northbrook, 5 May 1885, P.R.O., Adm 
1/6784. 
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Royal Navy and if so could a colonial officer with 
virtually no fleet experience take command of a British 
squadron in wartime?" 
The solution Key proposed to these difficulties was 
the virtual annexation of the colonial navies by the 
Royal Navy. Described by one authority as "an 
essentially conservative man [whose] mind 
instinctively recoiled from large and general questions 
to take refuge in detail"" Key outlined a scheme 
whereby all colonial naval vessels, down to the 
smallest torpedo boat, would be taken over by the 
Admiralty and maintained as part of the Royal Navy. The 
colonial governments could decide what vessels they 
required and would be expected to continue to pay for 
their construction and maintenance. The ships 
themselves, however, would be manned by Royal Navy 
personnel and be under the command of the Commander-in-
Chief Australia Station." 
Key defended his scheme in terms of cost and 
efficiency. "It is evident", he explained, "that no 
27 Key memorandum, "Naval Defence of Our Colonies", 
28 October 1884, P.R.O., Adm 116/68. 
26 .N.A.M. Rodger, "The Dark Ages of the Admiralty, 
1869-1885: Peace, Retrenchment and Reform, 1880-1885", 
Mariner's Mirror, No. 2, (May, 1976), p. 125. 
".Key memorandum, 28 October 1884, op. cit. 
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system of local naval defence which any Colony can 
provide would be so efficient and reliable at the same 
cost as that now proposed." 3 ° The leading authority on 
the 1887 naval agreement, Meredith Hooper, has pointed 
out that Key was "proposing an addition to the 
Australian squadron at no cost to the admiralty."" It 
is clear, however, that Key's primary objective was the 
disestablishment of the colonial navies rather than the 
improvement of Australia's naval defences. Under Key's 
proposals the existing colonial warships would be taken 
over by the Royal Navy. As many of these vessels were 
new there was little likelihood of any increase or 
upgrading of Australian naval defence beyond what 
already existed. Moreover Key was quite clear about his 
objective. If his plan was adopted, he claimed, "all 
the difficulties which have been shown to exist in the 
maintenance of a purely colonial force would vanish." 32 
That the possibility of colonial warships being used in 
a way which endangered Britain's control of imperial 
foreign policy was foremost in his mind is evidenced 
from an article he published following his retirement 
30 .Ibid. 
"—Meredith Hooper, "The Naval Defence Agreement of 
1887", The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
Vol. XIV, (April, 1968), p. 56. 
32 .Key memorandum, 28 October 1884, op. cit. 
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from the Royal Navy. In this article Key referred 
directly to the danger that colonial navies could 
"involve [Britain] in troublesome diplomatic 
correspondence with foreign Powers." 33 If his scheme 
were implemented, he reiterated, "a remedy would thus 
be found for all the difficulties which are inherent in 
the organization of separate colonial squadrons 
independently of the Royal Navy." 34 
That 	the 	Admiralty's 	initiative 	to 	re-examine 
Australian naval defence after 1884 was due mainly to 
the growing difficulties posed by colonial naval 
activism is important in understanding the subsequent 
negotiations with the Australian colonies and the naval 
agreement reached with them in 1887. The task of 
implementing Key's plan was given to the newly 
appointed Commander-in-Chief Australia Station, Rear 
Admiral George Tryon. Described by Alfred Deakin as "a 
man of large mind, large frame and admirable tact" 35 
Tryon possessed those qualities of sociability and 
33 .A. Cooper Key, "Naval Defence of the Colonies", 
The Nineteenth Century, Vol. XX, (August, 1886), p. 
289. 
34 .Ibid. 
36 .Deakin, op. cit., p. 19. 
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diplomacy which made him an ideal envoy for the 
Admiralty." Indeed Tryon appears to have been 
especially chosen for his diplomatic skills. Prior to 
his appointment to the Australian command Tryon had 
served as Secretary to the Admiralty a position where 
his negotiatory skills would have been readily apparent 
to his superiors. His appointment to Australia also 
coincided with the raising of the Australia Station to 
a rear admiral's command. As the size of the squadron 
was not increased this can only be interpreted as a 
move to facilitate Tryon's appointment. 
In Australia Tryon was to prove a popular figure. 
His ability, imposing presence and cheerful personality 
made him a friend and confidant of many important 
people. Upon arriving at Sydney in January 1885, 
however, Tryon soon discovered that Key's plan had 
little chance of succeeding. While Key had worked out a 
scheme which would have solved the difficulties of 
colonial navies from the Admiralty's point of view he 
had not considered the feelings of the colonies. The 
colonial governments were opposed to any plan which 
took away their authority over vessels which they owned 
and for which they were paying the maintenance. As the 
governor of Victoria, Sir Henry Loch explained, there 
was "too much colonial jealousy and too much pride in 
".C.P.P. Fitzgerald, Life of Vice Admiral Sir 
George Tryon K.C.B., (Edinburgh, 1897). 
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looking upon what they had created (for the present) to 
willingly efface themselves by handing over control of 
the local naval defence force to the Admiral of the 
Station." 37 
Faced with colonial resistance Tryon's response was 
to modify Key's plan and advocate a three tiered system 
of naval defence. His ideas were set out in a 
memorandum to Sir Henry Loch dated 27 March 1885. Under 
Tryon's scheme the local navies were to be retained as 
an adjunct to the fixed harbour defences. However, 
Tryon explained, it was not coastal attack that the 
colonies need fear, but rather attack on their maritime 
trade. Such an attack, he stated, "would have a more 
disastrous effect on the welfare of the country than 
ever could be produced by the heaviest bombardment." 88 
Defence against this form of attack could not be 
provided from within the colonies. It required a full-
time professional force which could only come from the 
imperial navy. As Tryon explained: 
if we are to have efficient vessels to 
capture 	cruisers, 	they 	must 	have 
thoroughly efficient crews, trained and 
37 -Loch to Stanley, Colonial Secretary, 7 August 
1885, quoted in Hooper, op. cit., p. 57. 
88 -Tryon to Loch, 27 March 1885, P.R.O., Adm 
1/6785. 
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inured to the sea and well practiced in 
their vessels .... I see no way, in 1885, 
of securing efficiency save by making such 
vessels bona fide men-of-war, on the same 
footing in every respect as all Her 
Majesty's ships in commission." 
Thus the wisest move the colonies could make, Tryon 
argued, would be to subsidize a force of Royal Navy 
warships, additional to the existing squadron, for the 
specific purpose of protecting floating trade in 
Australian waters." 
By raising the danger enemy cruisers would pose to 
Australian maritime trade Tryon succeeded in shifting 
the concern of the colonial leaders away from purely 
coastal defence and from the naval forces they had 
themselves established. Tryon's proposals, however, 
were a major deviation from the scheme he had been sent 
to Australia to introduce. The troublesome colonial 
navies would remain under colonial control. In a letter 
to the Admiralty on 8 July 1885 Tryon set out the 
reasons behind his change to the plan. "A somewhat more 
intimate acquaintance with the existing facts", he 
explained, "made me come to the conclusion that it was 
impractical to propose to make radical changes in the 
forces that already exist. "41 The colonies, he 
40.  Ibid. 
"—Tryon to Admiralty, 8 July 1885, P.R.O., Adm 
1/6785. 
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, continued, "are very confident of themselves" and "will 
not accept from us that which they can well do, in 
their opinion, themselves." 42 Key's plan for an 
Admiralty take-over of the existing colonial navies 
would not be accepted and there was no point in 
pursuing it further. 
While Tryon accepted that the disestablishment of 
the colonial navies was impractical because of the 
damage it would do to Anglo-colonial relations, his 
underlying motivation remained the same as Admiral 
Key's - the containment of colonial naval activism. 
First hand experience of the colonies had only served 
to confirm in Tryon's mind the need to discourage the 
continued expansion of the colonial navies and in 
particular their acquisition of ocean-going warships. 
In ships such as the South Australian Protector 
colonial governments already had a degree of sea-going 
capability and Tryon believed that unless the Admiralty 
acted quickly it was "certain" that further ocean-going 
vessels would be acquired." "I do not think that 
anyone who is acquainted with the Colonies", he stated, 
"will not recognize that it is desirable to at all 
events defer the day when each Colony will have its own 
42 .Ibid. 
42.Ibid. 
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sea-going vessels. If we can but delay that, it may 
never happen, otherwise the day is not far off. 44 
While Tryon wanted to discourage the acquisition of 
ocean-going warships by the colonies he supported the 
continuation of the colonial navies in the coastal and 
harbour defence role. This has led to Tryon sometimes 
being described as an advocate of Australian naval 
development. Captain William Creswell, the Director of 
the Commonwealth's naval forces, claimed in 1906 that 
the "first establishment of the Australian Naval Forces 
was marked by the constant encouragement of such great 
officers as Sir George Tryon. .46  This view has been 
accepted by some historians." Support for this claim 
has primarily been based on the tentative suggestion in 
Tryon's memorandum to Sir Henry Loch that "the officers 
and others of such ships [of the auxiliary squadron] as 
are not in active commission could be well employed to 
instruct the Reserve Forces and Volunteers [of the 
44 .Ibid. 
45 .C.P.P., 1906 session, -Vol. II, No. 44, "Report 
of the Director of Naval Forces for the Year 1905", p. 
11. 
48 For example G. Hermon Gill, "The Australian 
Navy: Origins, Growth and Development", Royal 
Australian Historical Society Journal and Proceedings, 
Vol. XLV, (November, 1959), p. 147. 
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colonial navies]" 47 and a subsequent letter by Tryon 
to Sir Samuel Griffith in which he stated that: 
It is not a mere subsidized force that 
will do what is wanted. It is not only 
money that is required to produce 
effective forces but it is the personal 
service of our countrymen all over the 
world. It is blood rather than gold that 
is the basis of every true force, and to 
awaken the true spirit, the Government of 
each Colony should manage, as far as 
possible, their local forces in time of 
peace. 48 
This statement, however, must be seen in the context of 
Tryon's acceptance of the impracticality of Key's plan 
to totally abolish the colonial navies. Tryon's 
correspondence with the Admiralty shows quite clearly 
that he in no way favoured a wider role for the 
colonial navies. Rather, having concluded that the 
colonies would never surrender control of their 
existing naval forces to the Admiralty, Tryon had 
provided for their continued existence while 
simultaneously diverting colonial interest (and money) 
toward a sea-going force firmly under the Admiralty's 
command. 
Despite the subtlety of Tryon's plan to limit 
colonial naval development by 	diverting 	colonial 
47 •Tryon to Loch, 27 March 1885, P.R.O., Adm 
1/6785. 
48 .Tryon to Griffith, October 1886 quoted in 
Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 236. 
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interests and resources into an Admiralty-controlled 
squadron he was perhaps fortunate that a change of 
government in Britain in June 1885 had led to the 
replacement of Admiral Key as First Sea Lord." Even in 
retirement Key remained convinced that all colonial 
vessels should be brought under Admiralty control." 
The new First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord George 
Hamilton, and Key's successor as First Sea Lord, 
Admiral Sir Arthur Hood, however, were receptive to 
Tryon's arguments. Salisbury's minority government, 
dependent upon the opportunist votes of Parnell's Irish 
Home Rulers and on the verge of war with Russia, was in 
no position to risk alienating the colonies by foisting 
upon them an unpopular scheme of naval defence. On 9 
September 1885 Key's proposals were officially replaced 
by a new scheme which substantially followed Tryon's 
ideas." 
In their new plan the Admiralty proposed a force of 
five cruisers and two torpedo boats - Tryon had 
suggested six cruisers and eight torpedo boats - to 
".Until 1884 it was customary for the entire Board 
of Admiralty to resign when a general election took 
place. 
s o. Key, op. cit. 
"—Admiralty memorandum, "Local Defence and the 
Protection of Floating Trade in the Waters of the 
Australian Colonies", 9 September 1885, P.R.O., Adm - 
116/69. 
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serve as an additional strength in Australian waters 
specifically for the protection of floating trade. The 
cost of maintaining these ships was to be borne by the 
colonies as was the initial cost of constructing them. 
A period of ten years was suggested as the length of 
any agreement at the end of which the vessels would 
become the property of the colonial governments." That 
the colonies would eventually own the ships should not, 
however, be seen as indicating Admiralty support for 
the establishment of a joint colonial navy in the 
longer term as has sometimes been suggested. Rather it 
is clear from comments by Lord Hamilton at the 1887 
colonial conference that the Admiralty anticipated an 
extension of the agreement at the end of the ten year 
period. By the end of the ten years the ships would 
need to be replaced, leaving the way open for a renewal 
of the agreement with new vessels." Moreover the 
Admiralty's opposition to colonial navies was clearly 
spelt out in their instructions to Tryon. "The object 
of Her Majesty's government", they stressed, "was to 
62. Ibid. 
63 •G.B.P.P., 	1887 session, Vol. 	LVI, Cd. 	5091, 
"Colonial Conference 1887: Proceedings and Papers of 
the Colonial Office", p. 43. 
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encourage an extension of the Imperial navy rather than 
separate colonial navies." 54 
The most important feature of the plan was the 
acceptance by the Admiralty of the limitation of the 
ships to the waters of the Australia Station. Tryon, 
appreciating that no scheme would be acceptable to the 
colonies unless it gave them some say over the 
deployment of the ships for which they were paying, had 
incorporated in his March 1885 proposals the provision 
that: 
At no time will the vessels be removed 
from the waters of Australia without the 
sanction of the governments of the 
colonies. 55 
Tryon was aware of the strategic objections that could 
be raised against limiting the vessels in this way but 
it was in his view justified by the pressing need to 
find a politically acceptable solution to the problems 
of colonial naval activism. "The days of restricting 
the action of these Colonies to the three mile limit of 
their waters", he warned the Admiralty, "is fast 
54 .Admiralty memorandum, "Local Defence and the 
Protection of Floating Trade in the Waters of the 
Australian Colonies", 9 September 1885, P.R.O., Adm 
116/69. 
55 .Tryon to Loch, 	27 March 1885, P.R.O., Adm 
1/6785. 
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passing away. "68  Moreover the ships, Tryon argued, 
would be a valuable addition to the imperial force in 
Australian waters which were woefully inadequate for 
the task of protecting Australian maritime trade, while 
in the event of war "there is no reason why they [the 
colonies] would not offer them for general service as 
they did the [Sudan] contingent." 57 
The Admiralty's acceptance of limitations on their 
freedom to move their ships was, however, an important 
concession. As Professor Gordon has pointed out it was 
an idea totally "subversive to the mobility essential 
to the effective use of sea power" 58 and, even more 
than the eventual financial arrangement, was to be 
bitterly regretted by the Admiralty in the future. 
Nevertheless it should not be seen as reflecting "an 
uncertain grasp of strategy"" by the Admiralty but 
rather as an indication of the importance they attached 
to overcoming the problems posed by continued colonial 
naval expansion. In the final analysis the Admiralty 
accepted Tryon's argument that it was preferable to 
58 .Tryon to Admiralty, 8 July 1885, P.R.O., Adm 
1/6785. 
57 .Ibid. 
• 58 .Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial 
Defence, p. 86. 
"-Ibid, p. xi. 
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have a handful of subsidized vessels confined to 
Australian waters than have ocean-going warships 
acquired by the colonies in which, Sir Henry Loch had 
warned in August 1885, "there are many men who 
would not hesitate under certain circumstances, to 
despatch them to seize Samoa, the New Hebrides or any 
other place or island on which they had set their 
desire."'" 
The Admiralty, having approved the general thrust 
of Tryon's proposals, instructed him to continue 
negotiations with the colonies." Tryon's initial 
memorandum, however, had received a mixed reception 
from the colonial governments. At one extreme Sir 
Alexander Stuart, the premier of New South Wales, the 
home base of the existing imperial squadron and the 
colony with the most to gain from any increase in its 
strength, supported a direct and unconditional subsidy 
to the Royal Navy to provide additional protection. 
"Separate Colonial Navies or even a combined Colonial 
Navy", Stuart wrote, * I or fragmentary Imperial 
Navies designed for defence of individual Colonies .... 
".Loch to Stanley, 7 August 1885, P.R .0., CO 
808/65. 
"—Admiralty to Tryon, 27 November 1885, P.R.O., 
Adm 1/6874. 
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never can be very efficient."'" On the other hand there 
remained in Victoria and Tasmania a residue of feeling 
that the cost of improving Australia's sea-going 
defences should be borne entirely by Britain." 
Despite diversity of colonial feeling as to the 
appropriate means, all believed the Australian squadron 
should be strengthened. Accordingly on 24 December 1885 
Tryon drafted a second memorandum to the premiers 
outlining in point form the latest proposals by the 
Admiralty. His efforts at arranging a formal meeting of 
colonial leaders, however, encountered many 
difficulties. In particular his activities aroused the 
anger of the colonial governors. The governors were the 
traditional link between the colonies and Whitehall, 
correspondence from the premiers passing through the 
governors to the Colonial Secretary in London who, if 
necessary, could raise their concerns before the 
British Cabinet. But having a senior officer located in 
Australia gave the Admiralty both a independent source 
of information on the situation in the colonies and an 
opportunity to circumvent the standard channels of 
".Stuart memorandum, 	"Naval 	Defence of the 
Colonies", 3 June 1885. Correspondence on Tryon's 27 
March 1885 memorandum is contained in P.R.O., Adm 
116/68. See also Liik, op. cit., pp. 270-274. 
"".Ibid. 
42 
communication with the colonial governments. The 
governors resented this undermining of their status and 
authority. The negotiations Tryon was undertaking, Sir 
Henry Loch complained to London, were "outside the 
range of ordinary departmental questions, and cannot be 
satisfactorily settled as between the Admiralty only 
and the several Governments. "84 	Tryon also found the 
instability of the colonial governments and their 
jealousy and suspicion of each other a handicap in 
reaching an agreement." 
Unable to convene a formal conference of colonial 
leaders, Tryon did arrange an informal meeting of the 
New South Wales, Victorian and Queensland premiers 
aboard his flagship, H.M.S. Nelson, in Sydney on 26-27 
April 1886. It became apparent at this meeting that the 
colonies' main objection to the Admiralty's proposals 
concerned cost. Letters from the governments of 
Tasmania and Western Australia indicated they were 
prepared to pay only the maintenance and interest cost 
of the proposed squadron, not the complete construction 
costs as had been stipulated by the Admiralty. The New 
South Wales and Queensland premiers supported this 
".Loch to Lord Granville, Colonial Secretary, 30 
April 1886, P.R.O., Adm 116/69. Hooper, op. cit., p. 
62. 
".Tryon to Admiralty, 17 March 1886, ibid. 
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view. As a way of overcoming the difficulty the New 
South Wales premier, Sir Patrick Jennings, suggested 
that the colonies pay five per cent on the capital cost 
of the vessels which would remain the property of the 
Admiralty at the end of the agreement."' This proposal 
was eventually accepted by the other colonies with the 
exception of Victoria. The Victorian premier, Duncan 
Gillies, insisted that the imperial government should 
bear all the capital costs. Gillies argued that British 
as well as colonial interests would benefit from the 
increased naval forces and that it was an imperial duty 
to provide for the defence of what was predominantly 
imperial trade." 
Though the failure of the Nelson meeting to reach a 
universally acceptable agreement was disappointing 
Tryon had gone a long way toward achieving the 
Admiralty's underlying aims. While the colonies were 
not prepared to pay the complete capital costs of the 
proposed ships, Victoria not being prepared to 
contribute anything to the capital costs, they had all 
accepted the principal that they should assist to some 
extent in strengthening the imperial forces on the 
""Tryon to Admiralty, "Result of Meeting of 
Premiers on board H.M.S. Nelson at Sydney, April 26 and 
27, 1886", 3 May 1886, Cd. 5091, op. cit., Appendix E, 
pp. 229-230. 
67.Ibid. 
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station and in doing so had lost interest in expanding 
their own naval forces. This was sufficient for the 
Admiralty. In August 1886 they decided to accept the 
New South Wales proposal that the colonies pay the 
maintenance costs of the vessels and five per cent 
interest on the cost of construction. Tryon's successor 
in Australia, Rear Admiral Henry Fairfax, was 
instructed to be ready to continue negotiations on this 
basis and was told that reaching an agreement with the 
colonies was of the "utmost importance"." Before 
Fairfax could begin negotiations, however, it had been 
decided in London to hold a conference of colonial 
representatives in conjunction with Queen Victoria's 
Jubilee. Discussions with the Australasian colonies 
would continue there. 
Most discussion of Australia's naval defences during 
1885 and 1886 had taken place between the colonial 
governments 	and 	the 	Admiralty 	through 	their 
representative in Australia, Admiral Tryon. The 
Colonial Office had played only a peripheral role, at 
times to the annoyance of the colonial governors. 
Having become acquainted with political realities in 
".Admiralty to Fairfax, 25 February 1887, Cd. 
5091, op. cit., p. 29. 
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the colonies, Tryon had discarded the Key proposals and 
developed instead a plan to interpose a third line of 
defence between the colonial navies and the imperial 
squadron. While this left the troublesome colonial . 
navies under colonial control, Tryon's underlying 
objective remained the same as the Admiralty - the 
containment of colonial naval activism. 
In developing his proposal for an auxiliary 
squadron subsidized by the colonies Tryon had 
introduced the principle that the colonies should 
contribute toward the cost of their oceanic defence. 
The idea that the colonies should contribute toward 
their wider defence, rather than just the protection of 
their ports and harbours, however, was not new. In 1881 
a former commander of the Australian squadron, Rear 
Admiral Anthony Hoskins, had suggested a colonial 
subsidy as a way of strengthening the Royal Navy in 
Australian waters." That the wealthier colonies "might 
not unreasonably be called upon to assist in some 
degree in the naval defence of the Empire" had also 
been a recommendation of the Royal Commission into 
imperial defence set up under Lord Carnarvon in 1878. 7 ° 
°°.Minute of a meeting with Rear Admiral Hoskins at 
the Colonial Office, 11 August 1881, P.R.O., CO 537/93. 
70 .Cd. 5091, op. cit., p. 315, Gordon, The Dominion 
Partnership in Imperial Defense, p. 64. 
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Moreover colonial contributions to the defence of the 
wider empire was an aim of the influential Imperial 
Federation League. Established in 1884 to promote 
closer ties between Britain and the colonies, it had 
been the Imperial Federation League which had first 
advanced the idea of a colonial conference in London to 
discuss imperial problems." With the moving of the 
discussions on Australian naval defence to London in 
1887 the Admiralty's primary objective of containing 
colonial naval activism became obscured in the wider 
ambitions of the imperial federationists. 
At the opening of the conference the Colonial 
Secretary, Sir Henry Holland, revealed the Admiralty's 
willingness to accept the New South Wales offer to pay 
the maintenance costs of the proposed auxiliary 
squadron plus five per cent on the cost of 
construction." Though this was described as a "great 
financial concession" the problems which had beset the 
meeting aboard H.M.S. Nelson continued to hamper the 
negotiations. The Victorians remained opposed to paying 
71 .0n the reasons behind the calling of the 1887 
colonial conference and the role played by the Imperial 
Federation League see J. Tyler, The Struggle for 
Imperial Unity 1868-1895, (London, 1938), pp. 112-114 
and J. Kendle, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 
1887-1911: A Study in Imperial Organization, (London, 
1967), pp. 5-8. 
72 .Cd. 5091, op. cit., p. 30. 
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any of the capital costs of the ships. "The Colony of 
Victoria", Alfred Deakin explained, ".... would be loth 
to regard this proposal in the light of a bargain."'" 
Victoria, Deakin argued, had already spent a great deal 
on the defence of her harbours, from which British 
trade benefited, and she was offering to contribute 
toward the maintenance costs of the new ships. To be 
asked to pay capital charges as well was "a heavy 
burden to make upon Australian taxpayers."'" 
The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord George 
Hamilton, responded to Deakin's arguments -by claiming 
that the Admiralty had already made major concessions 
to the colonies. In particular the Admiralty had agreed 
to limitations on their power to move the ships. 
Technological changes, he claimed, had increased the 
speed with which naval forces could be concentrated and 
this had benefited the weaker naval powers. "It is a 
very great advantage to the Imperial Navy", he 
explained, "to be able at a moment's notice to 
concentrate in whatever position they are threatened." 
The acceptance of limitations on the movement of the 
ships: 
73 ./bid, p. 35. 
74 ./bid, p. 37. 
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deprives the Admiralty of a very great 
power over the vessels which they would 
otherwise have to move them to any other 
part of the world." 
Hamilton also defended the Admiralty's request that 
the colonies make some contribution toward the 
construction costs of the ships by explaining that they 
regarded the arrangement as an ongoing one, likely to 
be renewed with new vessels at the end of the proposed 
ten year period. "Our idea", he stated, 
was that if the colonies would pay a 
certain proportion of the expenditure, say 
five per cent, we at the end of ten or 
five years, when the arrangement had to be 
reconsidered, would be ready to replace 
any vessels which were not up to modern 
requirements with new vessels and thus 
keep the colonies supplied with the most 
efficient vessels of modern warfare. 7 ° 
Furthermore, Hamilton explained, there were domestic 
political reasons for requesting colonial assistance 
toward the construction of the ships. The naval 
estimates had increased in recent years and there would 
be less opposition in parliament to approving the 
additional funds needed for the construction of the 
ships if they were seen as being a co-operative venture 
with the colonies." 
75 .1bid, p. 43. 
7 °./bid, p. 42. 
77 ./bid. 
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Despite 	Hamilton's 	claims 	that 	substantial 
concessions had already been made to the colonies and 
therefore that the request for some assistance toward 
the construction cost of the ships was not 
unreasonable, further concessions were made by the 
Admiralty. While they felt "bound to adhere" to a five 
per cent depreciation charge they agreed to cover all 
additional expenses liable to be incurred by the 
squadron in wartime. The Admiralty also agreed to 
replace any ships lost through accident. Previously 
they had wanted to share these costs with the 
colonies. 78 More importantly the Admiralty agreed to 
fixed upper limits being placed on the amount of the 
colonial contribution, both for the maintenance costs 
and for the five per cent depreciation allowance. These 
limits, Hamilton pointed out, were of considerable 
value to the colonies because "if we do not reach the 
maximum you get the benefit, and if we exceed it, you 
get the benefit also."'" The limits were £91,000 for 
the maintenance costs and £35,000 for the depreciation 
allowance. 
Under the final agreement, reached on 25 April, the 
colonies would pay an annual subsidy of £126,000 for 
78 -Ibid, p. 299. 
""Ibid, p. 306. 
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which the Admiralty would provide a squadron of five 
cruisers and two torpedo boats as an additional force 
in Australian waters. The ships of this 'Auxiliary 
Squadron' as it was to be known were not to leave the 
waters of the Australia Station without the commanding 
admiral having first obtained the consent of all seven 
colonial governments which were party to the 
agreement." Two cruisers and one torpedo boat were to 
be kept in reserve at Sydney with reduced crews. No 
provision was made in the agreement for the training of 
colonial seamen aboard the squadron as Tryon had 
intimated in his initial negotiations with the 
colonial governments. The subject of training colonial 
seamen was not raised during the conference. The 
Admiralty, however, did agree to make eight cadetships 
for training in England available to the colonies each 
year. 
As the 1887 agreement has sometimes been presented 
as primarily a financial arrangement sought by Britain 
as a way of relieving the burden of naval defence on 
her taxpayers it is worthwhile considering the 
financial aspects in detail. The cost estimates for the 
".The seven colonies were New South Wales, 
Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, 
Western Australia and New Zealand. The Australia 
Station extended from latitude 10 degrees South to the 
Antarctic circle and from longitude 75 degrees East to 
170 degrees West. It thus enclosed the New Hebrides, 
Fiji and Samoa as well as a large part of the Indian 
Ocean. See map. 
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agreement were based on the provision of Archer class 
cruisers and Rattlesnake class torpedo boats. It had 
been vessels of these types which had been suggested in 
the Admiralty's memorandum of 9 September 1885. The 
Archer class cruisers were 1,770 ton vessels with an 
armament of six 6-inch guns and a crew of 176. The 
Rattlesnake class torpedo boats displaced 550 tons, 
carried four 14-inch torpedo tubes and had a crew of 
66. 	The cost of an Archer class 	cruiser was 
approximately £106,486 and a Rattlesnake class torpedo 
boat £46,729. 81 Thus the total cost of the proposed 
force of five cruisers and two torpedo boats would be 
£625,888. The five per cent annual depreciation charge 
would amount to £31,294, just below the £35,000 limit 
accepted by the Admiralty. However the ships that were 
eventually built for Australian service were not the 
vessels upon which the agreement had been costed. 
Rather they were of later classes, significantly larger 
than the Archers and Rattlesnakes and commensurately 
more expensive. The five cruisers sent to Australia 
were of the Pearl class, 2,572 ton ships carrying eight 
4.7-inch guns and with a crew of 217. The torpedo boats 
were of the Sharpshooter class, 735 ton vessels with 
81 .Source for the ship specifications is Conway's 
All the World's Fighting Ships 1860-1905, (Greenwich, 
1979), Archer class cruisers p. 81, Rattlesnake class 
torpedo boats p. 88. Costs from Macandie, op. cit., p. 
40. 
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five 14-inch torpedo tubes and a crew of 91. The total 
cost of the squadron was £853,977 which would have 
raised the depreciation charges to £42,698, though of 
course the colonies only paid the agreed maximum of 
£35,000. 82 
The Admiralty probably chose to order Pearl and 
Sharpshooter class ships for service in Australia 
because these classes happened to be under construction 
for the Royal Navy at the time. It was recognized by 
both parties that the ships of the squadron would have 
to be specially built. The agreement was not to take 
effect until the first ships arrived in Australian 
waters and a request by Alfred Deakin that the 
Admiralty install a stopgap fleet until the new one was 
built was rejected on the grounds that there were no 
ships available." The last Archer class cruiser had 
been completed in 1887. Having proved poor sea boats 
the Archer class had been replaced in the dockyards by 
a new design, the Pearl class, which had better sea-
keeping and improved protection. Whether these ships 
were substantially more expensive to maintain than the 
Archers and Rattlesnakes is not known but in view of 
their larger size and greater complements it seems 
82 .Ibid, Pearl class cruisers p. 82, Sharpshooter 
class torpedo boats p. 89. Costs, Macandie p. 44. 
82 -Cd. 5091, op. cit., p. 301. 
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likely. At the conference the Admiralty announced their 
intention to substitute Pearl and Sharpshooter class 
vessels for the ships originally recommended but, 
though they knew this would result in Britain bearing a 
greater proportion of the costs than had been planned, 
they made no attempt to raise the limits of the 
colonial subsidy. This indicates that the financial 
aspects of the arrangement were less important to the 
Admiralty that sealing an agreement with the colonies 
quickly. The Admiralty also promised to strengthen the 
Royal Navy forces in Australian waters irrespective of 
the new agreement. This further suggests that relieving 
the burden on British taxpayers was not their prime 
concern. The Inter-Colonial conference in 1881 had 
requested an increase in the strength of the imperial 
squadron, the cost to be borne by Britain. Under the 
1887 agreement the colonies received just such an 
increase as well as an additional force for which they 
paid less than half the cost. 
It might be claimed that Britain was prepared to 
accept a generous arrangement with the Australian 
colonies in the hope that this would encourage the 
other colonies to contribute toward the upkeep of the 
Royal Navy. The 1879 Carnarvon Royal Commission had 
recommended that the wealthier colonies should 
contribute toward the cost of imperial defence and the 
1887 agreement has sometimes been seen as an outcome of 
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the Carnarvon Commission's recommendations." Later 
proponents of imperial federation did present the 1887 
agreement as evidence of the willingness of the 
colonies to bear some of the burden of the general 
defence of the empire. Leading imperial federationist 
Sir George Clarke, for example, claimed that the 1887 
agreement was "the first practical recognition .... of 
an obligation on the part of the Colonies depending on 
commerce to contribute to the maintenance of H.M.'s 
Navy". 86 Meredith Hooper, while noting that the 
agreement was a discouragement to the development of 
colonial navies, also stresses its role as a propaganda 
statement for imperial federation." This view appears 
to have stemmed from remarks made by Sir Henry Holland 
at the opening of the conference. While any discussion 
of political federation had been discounted in the 
initial invitations," in a meeting at the Colonial 
Office immediately prior to the conference Holland had 
84 .For example Tyler, op. cit., p. 121 and W.C.B. 
Tunstall, "Imperial Defence 1870-1897", The Cambridge 
History of the British Empire, ed. E.A. Benians et. 
al., (Cambridge, 1959), Vol. III, pp. 236-238. 
86 .G. Clarke, Imperial Defence, (London, 1897), pp. 
187-188. 
88 .Hooper, op. cit., pp. 73-74. 
87 .Circular despatch by Edward Stanthorpe, Colonial 
Secretary, 25 November 1886, Cd. 5091, op. cit., p. 
510. 
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indicated that he hoped the prospective naval agreement 
would be: 
a starting point of a new policy - the 
first step toward a federation for 
defence, which will not only add strength 
to the Empire but tend to bind its members 
in closer union." 
Likewise in his opening address at the conference 
Holland claimed that he was "most anxious to try to 
come to some arrangement which is just and equitable in 
itself and which . may be an example and an 
inducement to other Colonies to follow."'" 
Holland, however, does not appear to have fully 
understood the nature of the negotiations which had 
been conducted in Australia by Admiral Tryon. An 
enthusiastic supporter of the imperial federation 
movement, Holland had only recently been appointed 
Colonial Secretary. His hope that the agreement might 
be "the first step toward a federation for defence" was 
quickly dispelled. The colonial governments were not 
offering to provide a contribution to general imperial 
defence or in any way assume responsibility for the 
defence of wider imperial interests. Rather they were 
88 .Holland memorandum, "Proposed Increase in the 
Australasian Squadron. Remarks on Discussion held at 
the Colonial Office, April 5, 1887", Cd. 5091, op. 
cit., pp. 256-258. 
89 .Ibid, p. 31. 
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concerned with providing additional protection for 
their own interests in the cheapest and most efficient 
way possible - by hiring it from Britain. Queensland 
premier Sir Samuel Griffith sought to make this 
perfectly clear by insisting that the payments the 
colonies were to make be set down in the agreement as 
representing actual expenditure on the ships, not a 
fixed annual sum. Any suggestion that the colonies were 
making a general contribution to imperial defence, 
Griffith stressed, would provoke a bitter reaction in 
Australia. He explained: 
The difference in principle between the 
two modes of arriving at the amount to be 
contributed would be that in the one case 
the colonies would be paying for the ships 
which were specifically appropriated to 
them. The amount they would be paying 
might be the same, but the way outside 
people would regard it would be very 
different. There are many people who would 
entertain a very strong objection to 
making a contribution to the Imperial 
Government of anything in the form of a 
subsidy, although the same people, in the 
event of it being proposed to pay for 
services rendered by the Admiralty to the 
Australian governments would have no 
objection to pay anything reasonable for 
them." 
Despite Holland's imperial federationist rhetoric at 
the beginning of the conference the principle of 
colonial contributions to general imperial defence was 
not debated and no similar arrangements with other 
colonies were entered into, or even discussed. 
""Ibid, p. 306. My italics. 
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While the colonial delegates were clear that they 
were not subsidizing general imperial defence the 
Admiralty's acceptance of the limitation of the 
squadron to Australian waters indicates that they also 
looked upon the agreement as a specific purpose 
arrangement not intended as a model for agreements with 
other colonies. Though the Carnarvon Royal Commission 
had recommended that the colonies be asked to 
contribute toward the cost of the Royal Navy the notion 
that contributions should give the relevant colonies a 
voice in the disposition and movement of particular 
ships had been specifically rejected." Indeed the 
Admiralty had themselves strongly opposed such an idea 
in their submission to the commission." Yet the 
Admiralty had never opposed the restriction of the 
ships to Australian waters in the negotiations with the 
Australian colonies. Richard Preston's claim that the 
Admiralty "twisted and turned in every direction" to 
avoid the localization of the ships does not stand up 
to close scrutiny." The Admiralty were quick to resist 
any attempt by the colonies to retain one or more ships 
in a particular port but the limitation of the squadron 
°' Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial 
Defence, pp. 64-65. 
".Admiralty to H. 	Jekyll, 30 December 1881, 
P.R.O., Adm 1/6538. 
"'Preston, op. cit., p. 103. 
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to Australian waters had been a basic element of 
Tryon's 27 March 1885 proposals and had been accepted 
by the Admiralty in their scheme of 9 September 1885. 
No proposals had been put before the colonial leaders 
which did not specify the localization of the ships to 
Australian waters. At the colonial conference the 
Admiralty's acceptance of the localization of the ships 
was clearly stated by Lord Hamilton. "Our idea", he 
told the colonial delegates, 
was that this squadron should be always 
kept in Australian waters and go round 
from one capital to another; therefore ... 
[the ships] would be constantly in view of 
the different colonies, and would never, 
so to speak, leave Australasian waters." 
The Queensland attempt to annex eastern New Guinea 
without imperial approval and a series of incidents 
involving colonial warships in the early 1880s 
convinced the Admiralty that the problems created by 
colonial navies far outweighed their benefits. It was a 
feeling that was to influence Admiralty thinking on 
Australian defence down to 1914. With the colonial 
navies already in existence, however, the Admiralty was 
faced with the problem of how to contain colonial naval 
".Cd. 5091, op. cit., p. 157. 
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activism without causing a rift with the colonial 
governments. The solution advanced by Admiral Tryon and 
accepted by the Admiralty was to create an additional 
force in Australian waters partially supported by the 
colonies. The 1887 agreement was thus a specific 
solution to a particular local problem. Though the 
imperial authorities were aware of the value of the 
agreement as a precedent for securing wider colonial 
participation in imperial defence, it was the 
agreement's discouragement of colonial naval 
development and in particular the acquisition by the 
colonies of ocean-going warships, which was its 
principal attraction to the Admiralty. 
In order to secure an end to colonial naval 
ambitions, however, the Admiralty had conceded the 
right of those colonies which contributed to the 
maintenance of Royal Navy vessels to have some control 
over their movement and disposition. This had been done 
though the Carnarvon Royal Commission had recommended 
against it and in the face of accepted strategic 
principles. The Admiralty were aware of the objections 
to allowing limitations upon the movement of their 
ships but felt that such a major concession was 
justified in view of the wider political considerations 
at stake. Moreover in the context of Britain's global 
naval situation in the early 1880s the limitation of a 
small number of cruisers to the waters of the Australia 
60 
Station was not a serious handicap to the Admiralty. 
Unfortunately soon after the 1887 agreement came into 
effect Britain's naval position began to deteriorate 
and with it the Admiralty's capacity to make 
concessions to the colonies in order to discourage 
their development of local navies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE VINDICATION OF THE ADMIRALTY'S POLICY, 1887-1901 
The Australian Auxiliary Squadron arrived at Sydney on 
5 September 1891. It was a unique creation. Never 
before had the Admiralty agreed to their ships being 
limited to one part of the world. Symbolizing the 
localization of the squadron the ships had been given 
distinctively local names: Mijdura, Ringarooma, 
Wallaroo, Katoomba and Tauranga for the cruisers and 
Boomerang and Karakatta for the torpedo boats. In the 
previous chapter it has been argued that the principal 
motivation behind the 1887 naval agreement, at least so 
far as the Admiralty was concerned, had been the desire 
to limit the growth of the colonial navies. It had been 
. to prevent the acquisition of ocean-going warships by 
the colonies that the Admiralty had accepted the 
restriction of their ships to the waters of the 
Australia Station. The Admiralty must have been 
delighted by the success of their efforts. Not only 
were the colonies deflected from their course of 
acquiring ever larger and more powerful warships but 
the existing colonial navies went into decline. With 
the arrival of the Auxiliary Squadron in Australia and 
the diversion of £126,000 a year from their exchequers 
to the Royal Navy the incentive for naval development 
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in the colonies waned. In 1893 the South Australian 
gunboat Protector was taken out of active service and 
in 1895 the Victorian gunboats Victoria and Albert were 
put up for sale. The last warship built for a colonial 
navy, the Victorian torpedo boat Countess of Hopetoun 
was completed in 1891. 
With the decline of the colonial navies the 
possibility of the Royal Navy having to co-operate with 
inferior local navies, which had so concerned Admiral 
Key, diminished. It was a bonus for the Admiralty. 
Though the naval agreement provided a continuing 
purpose for the colonial navies in the coastal and 
harbour defence role, the Admiralty made no effort to 
encourage or promote colonial efficiency in this area. 
Their satisfaction at the demise of the local navies 
was thinly concealed. Henry Feakes, who served in the 
early Commonwealth naval forces and later rose to the 
rank of rear admiral in the Royal Australian Navy, 
records that the British admirals commanding on the 
Australia Station treated the remnant colonial navies 
with "a studied neglect and indifference broken only at 
long intervals by unofficial visits of inspection by 
request."' 
1 .H.J. Feakes, White Ensign - Southern Cross: A 
Story of the King's Ships of Australia's Navy, (Sydney, 
1951), pp. 93-94. 
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Even the limitations the naval agreement placed on 
the movement of the Auxiliary Squadron do not initially 
appear to have been a serious handicap to the 
Admiralty. The limitations did fly in the face of 
accepted strategic principles but a committee of naval 
officers established in 1889 to investigate the limits 
of British naval stations considered that naval 
operations connected with the defence of Australia or 
Australian trade were most likely to take place within 
the waters of the station. "All the important 
considerations involved in England being at war with a 
Foreign Power possessing a Navy", the committee 
reported, 
centre around the continent of Australia 
itself and would so far acquire a local 
character that operations would be 
conducted in Australian waters. 2 
While 	suggesting 	that 	if 	"the defence 	of 	the 
[Australian] colonies was sufficiently secured" the 
excess of naval forces might be used to support the 
China squadron, the committee recommended that the 
general limits of the station "cannot be altered with a 
view to any strategic advantage." 
2 ."Report of the Committee Appointed by the Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty to Consider and Report 
on the Limits of Naval Stations Abroad", 1889, P.R.O., 
Adm 1/7039. 
2 .Ibid. 
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While the decline of the colonial navies following the 
arrival in Australia of the Auxiliary Squadron seemed 
at first to confirm the value of the naval agreement to 
the Admiralty, its enthusiasm for it was dulled by 
difficulties arising over the direction of the 
squadron. Though the vessels were not to leave the 
waters of the Australia Station without the consent of 
the colonial governments, within this (very extensive) 
area they were totally under the control of the admiral 
commanding on the station. Indeed they were completely 
integrated with the other Royal Navy forces in 
Australian waters. Even before the vessels arrived in 
Australia, however, their movement within the confines 
of the station had become the subject of political 
interference. 
On 4 June 1891, as preparations for the arrival of 
the ships in Australia were being completed, the 
Colonial Office wrote to the Admiralty requesting the 
early visit of the squadron to all the major colonial 
ports. The Colonial Office was particularly concerned 
that the squadron visit Queensland where the naval 
agreement had yet to be ratified by the parliament. 
Justifying Sir Samuel Griffith's concern at the 
colonial conference the agreement had attracted 
criticism in Queensland as a 	backdoor method of 
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bringing about imperial federation. 4 The Colonial 
Office hoped that a visit by the ships would assist the 
passage of the naval agreement through the Queensland 
parliament and generally promote imperial feeling. Sir 
Robert Meade, Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, 
explained: 
If the Board of Admiralty are able to 
carry out this programme [of visits by the 
squadron to each of the colonies] it will 
give great satisfaction to the respective 
Colonies and while strengthening the 
determination of those which have already 
contributed, will largely assist in 
securing the adhesion of Queensland to the 
joint arrangement. 5 
While assenting to the Colonial Office's request the 
Admiralty were irritated at this outside interference 
in the running of the squadron. "Australia", an 
exasperated First Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Richard Vesey 
Hamilton) minuted, "will now, I hope, leave us alone to 
pay some attention to other colonial affairs .... they 
have been irrepressible in season and out of season." 
4 .0n opposition in Australia to the naval agreement 
see R.A. Shields, "Australian Opinion and the Defence 
of the Empire: A Study in Imperial Relations 1880-
1890", The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
Vol. X, (April, 1964), pp. 48-50. 
5 .Colonia1 Office to Admiralty, 4 June 1891, 
P.R.O., Adm 1/7077. 
°.Minute by Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton, 
First Sea Lord, 19 June 1891, P.R.O., Adm 1/7077. 
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Admiral Hamilton's hopes were not to be realized. 
In 1892 the Colonial Office again interceded with the 
Admiralty, this time in response to complaints from 
South Australian premier Sir John Downer that his 
colony rarely saw the ships toward which they were 
contributing.' The Colonial Office wrote to the 
Admiralty in December: 
Lord Ripon [the Secretary of State for 
Colonies] feels sure that it will be the 
desire of their Lordships to make such 
arrangements as will prevent any Colony 
from having reason to complain that she 
does not receive her fair share of visits 
from the ships of the Squadron, towards 
the strengthening of which she, in common 
with the others, has contributed. 8 
The Colonial Office wrote again in March 1893, on this 
occasion stressing the value of the agreement as an 
example of colonial co-operation: 
I need not point out how important it is 
that nothing should occur which might make 
the Colonies reluctant to continue their 
contribution to the Squadron .... Lord 
Ripon trusts therefore that the Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty will 
7 .Lord Kintore, Governor of South Australia, to 
Lord Ripon, 22 October 1892, P.R.O., Adm 1/7112. 
8 .Colonial Office to Admiralty, 19 December 1892, 
P.R.O., Adm 1/7112. 
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impress upon the Commander-in-Chief the 
high value attached by Her Majesty's 
Government to the renewal of the 
agreement.° 
Once more the Admiralty yielded to the Colonial 
Office's request. Admiral Nathaniel Bowden-Smith, who 
was commanding on the Australia Station, was instructed 
to ensure regular visits were made by the squadron to 
each of the colonial capitals." Bowden-Smith, however, 
claimed that Downer was manoeuvring to have one of the 
ships permanently stationed in South Australia and he 
warned the Admiralty that a proprietorial attitude had 
developed in the colonies toward the vessels or "our 
ships" as they had become known." 
Bowden-Smith's claims were corroborated by the 
colonial governors. The governor of Victoria, Lord 
Brassey, saw the persistent claims upon the squadron by 
the colonial governments as the major objection to the 
agreement. Brassey, who was a former civil lord of the 
Admiralty and widely acknowledged expert on naval 
arfairs, wrote to the Colonial Office that, "the 
agreement subjects both the Admiralty and the Admiral 
°.Colonial Office to Admiralty, 7 March 1893, 
P.R.O., Adm 1/7112. 
1 °.Admiralty to Bowden-Smith, 7 March 1893, P.R.O., 
Adm 1/7112. 
".Bowden-Smith to Admiralty, 31 October 1892, 
P.R.O., Adm 1/7112 
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in command on this station to unreasonable demands for 
the presence of ships of war in every colonial 
port."Moreover, Brassey warned, the agreement "would 
create opposition in time of war to the withdrawal of 
the ships, although to be used more effectively 
for offensive defence elsewhere. 1 2 
While the Admiralty were prepared to accommodate 
colonial feeling by arranging regular visits by the 
ships to the colonial capitals, there was no question 
of their consenting to vessels being allocated to the 
defence of individual ports. At the colonial conference 
the Admiralty had stressed that "each colony cannot 
have one of the ships, but they are to be confined to 
Australian waters..." The squadron was primarily for 
the protection of Australian trade and its dispersal 
among the various colonies would completely undermine 
its effectiveness in this role. The Admiralty was only 
prepared to bend strategic principles so far. Their 
total opposition to the piecemeal distribution of 
vessels to protect local centres was spelt out in the 
report of the Harrington Royal Commission in 1890. "It 
is essential", the Admiralty had argued, that 
absolute freedom of action shall be left to the Naval 
12 .Brassey to Colonial Office, 1 June 1897, P.R.O., 
CO 537/94. 
13 .Cd. 5901, op. cit., p.41. 
70 
Commander in time of war and that this freedom of 
action would be impaired by any 	regulations 	or 
understandings involving the retention of certain ships 
at certain stations in order to aid in their military 
defence. "14 Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, who succeeded 
Bowden-Smith in Australia, made his position on 
colonial interference in the direction of the squadron 
clear upon taking up his command in 1895. Writing to 
Lord Spencer (First Lord of the Admiralty) he stated: 
The only good way of dealing with the 
local authorities is to firmly refuse to 
permit them to have any say as to the 
disposition or management of the squadron. 
They understand firmness: they do not 
understand concession which they always 
take to be weakness." 
Ironically, at the same time as colonial demands on 
the Auxiliary Squadron were causing concern to the 
Admiralty the 1887 agreement was assuming increased 
importance in Britain as a precedent for colonial 
participation in imperial defence. In March 1891 
14 .G.B.P.P., 	1890 	session, 	Vol. 	IX, 	Cd. 	5979, 
"Preliminary and Further Reports of the Royal 
Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Civil and 
Professional Administration of the Naval and Military 
Departments and the Relations of those Departments to 
Each Other and to the Treasury", p. vi. 
16 .Bridge to Spencer, 20 May 1895, Spencer Papers 
quoted in L. Trainor, "British Imperial Defence Policy 
and the Australian Colonies, 1892-96", Historical 
Studies, Vol. XIV, (April, 1970), p. 206. 
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leading imperial federationist, naval authority and 
member of parliament Sir John Colomb had called for the 
self-governing colonies to shoulder a greater part of 
the burden of defending the empire. Speaking in the 
House of Commons, Colomb had drawn attention to the 
large 	disparity 	between 	British 	and 	colonial 
expenditure on naval defence. This was despite the 
increased wealth of the colonies and the expansion of 
their maritime commerce. "Although the Revenue of the 
United Kingdom", Colomb explained, 
has only increased by one and a half 
times, the Revenue of the outlying Empire 
has increased five fold; and while the sea 
trade of the Mother Country which the Navy 
has to protect has in the same period 
increased only five times, the sea trade 
of the outlying Empire, which the Navy has 
also to protect, has increased twenty 
times." 
Colomb reflected growing concern in Britain at the 
escalation of the naval estimates. Fears of a coalition 
between France and Russia, Britain's traditional 
rivals, had led to massive increase in naval 
expenditure. Under the Naval Defence Act of 1889 
£21,500,000 had been set aside for the virtual 
reconstruction of the Royal Navy. Eight first-class 
le.G.B.P.D., Series 3, Vol. CCCL, p. 1950, 2 March 
1891. 
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battleships, two second-class battleships, nine large 
cruisers, twenty-nine small cruisers, four gunboats and 
eighteen torpedo-gunboats were to be built." Moreover 
the Naval Defence Act 	had 	established 	the 	so- 
called'two-power standard', a yardstick against which 
the strength of the Royal Navy could be measured. The 
Royal Navy, Lord Hamilton (the First Lord of the 
Admiralty) stated, "should be on such a scale that it 
should at least be equal to the strength of any two 
other countries."" 
With greater attention being paid to Britain's 
naval defences and with the government committed to a 
'two-power standard' for the Royal Navy the naval 
estimates began to spiral upward. Whereas in 1885 naval 
expenditure had been only £11.4 million or 12.8% of 
government expenditure, by 1890 it had jumped to £15.3 
million or 16.8% of the budget and by 1897 it was £22.2 
million or 20.2% of annual government expenditure." 
Not that this escalation was solely due to the need to 
'.Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, p. 
143. 
18 .G.P.P.D., Series 3, Vol. CCCXXXIII, p. 1171, 7 
March 1889. On the history of the 'two-power standard' 
see E.L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy, 
(London, 1964), Appendix II, pp. 455-473. 
19 •B. Mitchell and B. Leave, Abstract of British 
Historical Statistics, (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 397-398. 
See Appendix A. 
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counter naval development by Britain's European rivals. 
Increases in the cost of warships also added to the 
growth of the naval estimates. The late nineteenth 
century was a 'period of rapid advancement in naval 
technology and each successive class of battleships or 
cruisers was larger and more 	expensive 	than its 
predecessor. H.M.S. Devastation, for example, completed 
in 1874 and the world's first mastless battleship, cost 
£361,438. H.M.S. Dreadnought, 	completed six years 
later, cost £614,739. The Royal Sovereign, lead ship of 
class of seven first-class battleships authorized 
under the 1889 Naval Defence Act, cost the British 
taxpayer £913,986. 20 
In their efforts to tap the resources of the 
colonies as a way of relieving the defence burden 
on British taxpayers imperial federationists 
misrepresented the 1887 agreement. To the advocates of 
an imperial Kriegsverein the agreement represented a 
willingness on the part of the Australasian colonies to 
contribute toward the general upkeep of the Royal Navy. 
The 1887 agreement Sir George Clarke claimed, "was the 
first practical recognition .... of an obligation on 
20 .0. Parkes, The British Battleship 1860-1950: A 
History of Design, Construction and Armament, (London, 
1966), passim. 
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the part of the Colonies depending on commerce to 
contribute to the maintenance of H.M.'s Navy." 21 "What 
we have lately done", Lord Brassey wrote in regard to 
the 1887 agreement prior to his becoming governor of 
Victoria, "is a happy augury for the future. At no 
distant date the question of taking further concerted 
action must come up for consideration." 22 
Nor was this view of the 1887 agreement confined 
to imperial federationists such as Clarke and Brassey 
who were on the periphery of power. It was to be found 
at the heart of the Conservative government which 
assumed office in 1895. In opening the 1897 colonial 
conference the new Secretary of State for Colonies, 
Joseph Chamberlain, claimed that in 1887 Australia had 
"offered voluntarily a contribution in aid of the 
British Navy besides taking her full share of her 
military defences." 22 In believing the 1887 agreement 
indicated a willingness on the part of the Australasian 
21 •G. Clarke, Imperial Defence, (London, 1897), pp. 
187-188. 
22 .T. 	Brassey, 	"Imperial Federation for Naval 
Defence", The Nineteenth Century, Vol. XXXI, (January, 
1892), p. 93. See also The Papers and Addresses of Lord 
Brassey, ed. A. Loring and R. Beadon, (London, 1895). 
23 .G.B.P.P., 	1897 session, Vol. 	LIX, Cd. 	8596, 
"Proceedings of a Conference between the Secretary of 
State for Colonies and the Premiers of the Self-
Governing Colonies at the Colonial Office, London, June 
and July 1897". This is a precis of the proceedings, 
A.A.0.(C), CP103/12/B1 contains the unpublished minutes 
which are cited hereafter as Minutes Colonial 
Conference 1897. 
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colonies to assist in the general maintenance of the 
Royal Navy, however, federation enthusiasts in Britain 
were mistaken. While Henry Holland had spoken at the 
beginning of the 1887 conference of his hope that an 
agreement could be reached which might pave the way for 
future defence federation the colonial representatives 
had made it clear they regarded the agreement purely as 
a means of providing additional defence for Australia. 
As we have seen in chapter one, they had strenuously 
disassociated themselves from any suggestion that they 
were making a general contribution to the Royal Navy. 
Sir George Clarke, after a period in Australia as 
governor of Victoria, admitted his earlier 
understanding of the agreement was in error. "When 
later I came fully to understand Australian sentiment", 
he wrote of the 1887 agreement in his autobiography, "I 
saw it could not endure. "2 4 
As some imperial federationists were mistaken in 
believing that the 1887 agreement reflected Australian 
willingness to assist in the wider defence of the 
empire, so some also misunderstood the Admiralty's 
motives behind the agreement. Writing in The Nineteenth 
Century magazine, Lord Brassey suggested, as an 
alternative to cash subsidies, that the colonies might 
24 .Lord Sydenham of Combe (Sir George Clarke), My 
Working Life, (London, 1927), p. 73. 
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prefer to "add to the naval forces which they have 
already created for harbour defence. They may build 
ironclads for coast defence, and cruisers to give 
protection to trade converging upon their ports from 
across the seas." 25 Brassey went even further. "The 
burden of increased expenditure on ships", he argued, 
".... would be borne more cheerfully if the privilege 
were conceded of flying the white ensign on board the 
public vessels of the colonies. The privilege has been 
too long withheld in deference to red-tape objections 
and professional prejudices."" 
Brassey's suggestions did not take into account the 
complex legal and political problems connected with 
independent colonial fleets and were based on a 
mistaken view of the value of the agreement to the 
Admiralty. The principal advantage of the agreement to 
the Admiralty was its diversion of the Australian 
colonies away from their course of acquiring ever 
larger and more powerful warships. The Admiralty had no 
wish to see a resurgence of colonial naval development 
and all the problems it had caused in the 1880s. Nor 
did they want a proliferation of arrangements similar 
to the 1887 agreement. No other colonies possessed 
navies or felt threatened from the sea and so no 
25 .Brassey, op. cit.. p. 93. 
""Ibid, p. 94. 
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similar 	arrangements 	had 	been 	concluded. 	A 
proliferation of similar agreements would tie up the 
Royal Navy, 	reducing operational 	flexibility and 
undermining the Admiralty's power to concentrate naval 
forces against an enemy. "We must be careful", Lord 
Hamilton warned those calling for greater contributions 
from the colonies, 
not so to earmark the contributions from 
the Colonies as to imply that they are too 
small, without considering that local 
contributions are generally associated 
with control. Local control is 
incompatible with that mobility which our 
Fleet in wartime should possess." 
The importance of naval mobility had become the 
subject of popular discussion following the publication 
in 1890 of Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea 
Power Upon History. Command of the sea, Mahan asserted, 
was achieved through the concentration of naval forces. 
"It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys 
.... that strikes down the money power of a nation", he 
declared, "it is the possession of that overbearing 
power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it 
or allows it to appear only as a fugitive." 28 For fleet 
27 .G.B.P.D., Series 3, Vol. CCCL, p. 1963, 2 March 
1891. 
28 .Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power 
Upon History 1660-1783, (London, 1890), p. 138. 
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concentration to 	be effected, 	however, 	it was 
imperative that the naval high command have absolute 
freedom over 	the movement of all 	their ships. 
Arrangements such as the 1887 agreement which 
restricted the Admiralty's control over the movement of 
particular ships were anathema in such a philosophy. 
Mahan's writing were widely read, especially in 
Britain where, through distilling the lessons of 
history, he appeared to offer the key to Britain's 
continued global pre-eminence. "Mahan", Arthur Marder 
has written, "became practically the naval Mohammed of 
England."" Nevertheless Mahan's ideas on sea power 
were not new. Many of his ideas had been anticipated in 
Britain in the 1870s and 1880s by writers such as the 
Colomb brothers, Philip and John, who founded the so-
called 'blue water school' of naval thought." Nor was 
the Admiralty ignorant of these principles before the 
publication of Mahan's work as has sometimes been 
suggested as an explanation for their acceptance of the 
restrictions of the 1887 agreement. As we have seen the 
importance of fleet concentration had been emphasized 
29 .Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, p. 47. 
30 .0n Philip Colomb 	see D.M. 	Schurman, 	The 
Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval 
Strategic Thought, 18674914, (London, 1965), pp. 16-35; 
on John Colomb see ibid, pp. 1-15. 
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by Lord Hamilton at the 1887 colonial conference." The 
Admiralty had entered the 1887 agreement fully aware of 
the strategic objections to limiting the movement of 
the Auxiliary Squadron. 
It was not the publication of Mahan's works so much 
as changes in the balance of global naval forces which 
underlined the importance of strategic mobility to 
Admiralty in the 1890s. In 1896 the Director of Naval 
Intelligence (Captain Lewis Beaumont) warned that 
British naval policy "must be reconsidered from the 
point of view that 'Certain Changes' have established 
new conditions." 32 At the heart of the problems 
outlined by Captain Beaumont was the Franco-Russian 
Alliance, formally concluded in August 1891. Together 
the French and Russian navies were nearly equal in 
strength to the Royal Navy. Also the rapprochement of 
Russia and Turkey meant that Britain could no longer 
count on Turkish assistance to prevent the Russian 
Black Sea fleet entering the Mediterranean to threaten 
British communications through the Suez Canal. Moreover 
both France and Russia had embarked on expanded naval 
programmes. In 1891 France had announced her intention 
31 .Cd. 5091, op. cit., p. 42. 	See above Chapter 1, 
p. 44. 
31 .D.N.I. memorandum, "Memorandum on Naval Policy", 
28 October 1896, reproduced in Marder, The Anatomy of 
British Sea Power, Appendix IV, pp. 578-580. 
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to spend £37,000,000 over the following ten years 
replacing no less than eighty-two obsolescent vessels 
with new ships, including ten new battleships. Russia 
too had moved to upgrade her fleet, in particular her 
Black Sea fleet, which had implications for Britain's 
position in the Mediterranean." 
The pressure for strategic freedom created by the 
changed balance of naval power was reflected in a 
• memorandum on "The Principles of Colonial Defence" 
produced by the Colonial Defence Committee in 1896. The 
Colonial Defence Committee had been established in 1885 
as a committee of the Colonial Office to advise and co-
ordinate the colonies on defence matters. From its 
inception it became a stronghold of 'blue water' 
strategic ideas and constantly emphasized the 
importance of sea power as the basis upon which the 
security of the empire rested. The committee's first 
secretary, Sir George Clarke, had been greatly 
influenced by the writings of 'blue water' theorists 
such as Sir John Colomb and Alfred Mahan. "It became my 
ambition", he later wrote in a reference to Mahan, "to 
develop a school of thought in regard to the broad 
aspects of national defence and security, founded upon 
the teaching of the past." 34 
33 .Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, pp. 
162-163. 
34 .Sydenham of Combe, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 
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In their memorandum the Colonial Defence Committee 
stressed the necessity for the Admiralty to have "the 
absolute power of disposing of their forces in the 
manner they consider most certain to secure success." 35 
The Admiralty, the C.D.C. claimed, had "accepted the 
responsibility of protecting all British territory 
abroad against organized invasion from the sea. "38 
Absolute protection, however, could not be guaranteed. 
"It is recognized", the C.D.C. explained, " . that 
H.M.'s ships, engaged in hunting out and destroying the 
squadrons of the enemy, may not be in a position to 
prevent the predatory raids of hostile cruisers on 
British ports." Nevertheless there could be no question 
of purely local defence. "The Admiralty", it was 
stated, "object to limit the action of any part of 
[their forces] .... to the immediate neighbourhood of 
places which they consider may be more efficiently 
protected by operations at a distance." 37 
At the 1897 colonial conference the strategic 
principles outlined in the C.D.C's memorandum were 
translated into an attack on the 1887 naval agreement. 
The opening shots against the naval agreement were 
35 .C.D.C. memorandum, "The Principles of Colonial 
Defence", 19 May 1896, P.R.O., Cab 8/1. 
3 °.Ibid. 
37.Ibid. 
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fired by Captain Lewis Beaumont. Though Director of 
Naval Intelligence, Beaumont was present at the 
conference in his capacity as a member of the Colonial 
Defence Committee. Asked by Joseph Chamberlain (the 
Secretary of State for Colonies) to comment on the 
naval agreement, Beaumont criticized the restrictions 
on the operations of the Auxiliary Squadron and the 
principle that contributions gave the colonies the 
right to decide the movement and disposition of 
particular ships. "The objection", Beaumont claimed, 
if I may give my opinion on that point, as 
I have no instructions, the objection 
certainly is the restriction to the use of 
the ships and a general desire that there 
appears to be that the contribution should 
entitle Colonies to have ships in their 
waters both in peace and probably in 
war 38. 
Beaumont's criticism of the naval agreement brought 
forth a storm of protest from the Australian premiers. 
Chamberlain's belief that the naval agreement 
represented a willingness on the part of the Australian 
colonies' to contribute to general imperial defence was 
dispelled. The Auxiliary Squadron, New South Wales 
premier George Reid explained, was a part of Australian 
defence, separate "altogether of Imperial naval defence 
of the Empire as a whole."" Sir George Turner of 
38 .Minutes Colonial Conference 1897, p. 55. 
38 .Ibid. 
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Victoria gave voice to the fears of all the premiers 
when he stated: 
What we are afraid of is this: we are 
afraid of being in this position. Suppose 
a war broke out, these vessels might be 
taken away altogether from Australia and 
used to ,attack the enemy's commerce in 
another part of the world leaving us 
defenceless after we had paid a very large 
sum. That is our fear." 
Despite assurances by Beaumont and Chamberlain that the 
Admiralty had accepted responsibility for protecting 
the empire from invasion and mention of the writings of 
Mahan and the importance of fleet concentration, the 
Australian premiers were intractably opposed to any 
relaxation of the limitations on the movement of the 
Auxiliary Squadron. Indeed not only were they against 
the lifting of the limitations for fear Australia would 
be left without naval protection, but they were 
concerned that without operational restrictions on the 
ships the Australian subsidy would appear to be a 
contribution to general imperial defence. This was 
politically unacceptable. Reid, echoing Sir Samuel 
Griffith ten years before, explained that any 
contribution to general imperial defence would "meet 
with a tremendous outburst .... that would do more harm 
than good." Australians were concerned only with their 
4 °-/bid, p. 57. 
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local defence and while, as Reid continued, "if war 
threatened [they] would be ready to vote any amount and 
go by the thousand to fight for the old country" in 
peacetime the defence of the empire at large was seen 
as a British responsibility. 41 
With the Australian premiers angered by the 
suggestion that changes should be made to the naval 
agreement the First Lord of the Admiralty (George 
Goschen) and the First Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Frederick 
Richards) appeared before the conference. Goschen tried 
to allay Australian concern. "The declarations which 
have been made by some of the colonial leaders", he 
explained, "have convinced me as to the difficulties 
which would beset other methods of colonial 
contribution." 42 While admitting that the colonial 
subsidy fell a long way short of the cost of operating 
the squadron Goschen assured the premiers that the 
Admiralty were "content to abide by the existing 
agreement." Indeed he refuted claims that the Admiralty 
wanted the operational restrictions on the squadron 
removed. The Admiralty's requirements in regard to the 
ships, he asserted, had been misunderstood. Goschen 
referred specifically to a speech by the Duke of 
Devonshire in 1896. The Duke of Devonshire, who was 
41 .Ibid, pp. 60-62. 
42 -/bid, p. 140. 
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Chairman of the Standing Defence Committee of the 
Cabinet, had quoted at length the Colonial Defence 
Committee's memorandum "The Principles of Colonial 
Defence" and had emphasized the Admiralty's claim to 
the absolute freedom over the disposition of their 
forces. 43 "If it has been said", Goschen explained, 
that we want to have the full and free 
disposal of our ships, this certainly as 
far as my own policy and that of the 
present Board is concerned, does not mean 
that we claim to withdraw the ships built 
under our agreement with the Australasian 
Colonies and send them to the Cape or to 
China, but rather that we desire freedom 
so to manage the ships as best to protect 
that zone and that sphere to which they 
belong. 4 4 
Goschen's statement that the Admiralty were happy 
with the 1887 agreement and did not want the 
operational restrictions on the Auxiliary Squadron 
removed was opposite to the claims of his Director of 
Naval Intelligence. What was the real feeling in the 
Admiralty? Captain Beaumont's criticisms of the 
agreement have generally been regarded as an abortive 
bid by the Admiralty to obtain full strategic control 
43 .The Duke of Devonshire's speech, made at the 
Guildhall on 3 December 1896, is reported in The Times, 
4 December 1896. 
44 .Minutes Colonial Conference 1897, p. 142. 
86 
over their forces. 45 However there had been no decision 
by the Admiralty to press for changes to the naval 
agreement in 1897. Indeed the Admiralty does not appear 
to have anticipated discussion of the naval agreement 
in 1897. There are few documents in the Admiralty 
Papers relating to the 1897 conference, a marked 
contrast to the bulky file associated with the naval 
discussions in 1902. The agreement, after all, was not 
due to expire until 1901. Moreover in 1896 in a letter 
to the governor of Queensland (Lord Lamington) which 
was endorsed by the Admiralty, Joseph Chamberlain had 
urged discussion of the agreement be discouraged. Sir 
Hugh Nelson, the premier of Queensland, was calling for 
the abandonment of the agreement and the diversion of 
colonial funds back to the development of local 
defences." Discussion of the agreement, Chamberlain 
had told Lamington, "might tend to commit them [the 
Australian colonies] finally to the views at present 
held by Sir Hugh Nelson." 47 
45 .See Atkinson, op. cit., pp. 51-53. 
"'Sir Hugh Nelson, Premier of Queensland, to Lord 
Lamington, Governor of Queensland, 20 August 1896, 
P.R.O., Adm 1/7299. 
47 .Chamberlain to Lamington, December 1896, P.R.O., 
Adm 1/7299. For Admiralty approval of this letter see 
Admiralty to Colonial Office, 30 December 1896, P.R.O., 
Adm 1/7299. 
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While the Admiralty does not appear to have 
expected the limitations on the operation of the 
Auxiliary Squadron to be raised at the colonial 
conference and had not prepared a case for their 
removal there is no doubt they would have preferred 
that there were no restrictions. Speaking after the 
conclusion of the conference Goschen commended an offer 
by Cape Colony of financial assistance to the Royal 
Navy with no restrictions or limitations on the 
Admiralty's authority. "The best plan to assist the 
power of the British Navy, the best plan to defend the 
Colonies", he claimed, "is to leave an entirely free 
hand to the central authorities which organize Imperial 
Defence. 4 8 Nevertheless the objection to the 
limitations was based largely on principle. While 
changes in the global naval situation had underlined 
the importance of fleet mobility the position had not 
yet been reached where the restrictions on the 
Auxiliary Squadron were a serious handicap to Admiralty 
strategy. Despite the emphasis by Mahan and other 'blue 
water' writers on fleet concentration the Royal Navy 
was still a very dispersed force. Of its battleships, 
the most important vessels in terms of fleet 
48 .Speech at the St. George's Club, 10 July 1897, 
reported in The Times, 12 July 1897. Cape Colony had 
offered to provide a cruiser for the Royal Navy. This 
was subsequently converted into an annual grant of 
£30,000. 
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concentration, 	the 	largest 	number, 	eleven, 	were 
stationed in the Mediterranean. A further eight 
belonged to the Channel Fleet and eleven second-class 
ships were attached to the Home Fleet. Three, however, 
were based in the Far East and a battleship was also 
allocated to both the American (West Indies) and Cape 
squadrons. Cruisers and smaller vessels were even more 
widely scattered." 
If the limitations on the Auxiliary Squadron were 
not yet so inconvenient as to make their removal 
imperative, there were also substantial reasons to 
continue the agreement regardless of the restrictions. 
The cancellation of the agreement would inevitably have 
led to a renewal of colonial naval development and the 
Admiralty had no more desire to see this than they had 
in 1887. Furthermore, though the Australian premiers 
were adamant that the naval subsidy was not a 
contribution to general imperial defence, from 
Britain's point of view it still embodied an important 
principle. Beneath the Queensland premier's calls for 
the abandonment of the naval agreement was the belief 
that the colonies should concern themselves only with 
their coastal and harbour defences. All other defence 
4 °.Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval 
Mastery, p. 206. 
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was a British responsibility." Clearly this was not a 
sentiment that a British government hoping to secure 
greater assistance from the colonies would want to 
encourage. The naval agreement at least demonstrated 
that the colonies were prepared to assist Britain in 
the defence of joint interests such as Australian 
maritime trade. Prior to 1887 this had not been the 
case. As Chamberlain had explained in 1896; "The 
present payment toward the Navy is a distinct proof 
that the Australian Colonies have no desire to avoid a 
form of contribution solely because it also contributed 
to the welfare of the United Kingdom."" 
The imperial authorities were still hopeful that 
the other colonies could be persuaded to contribute to 
naval defence. The offer of assistance from Cape Colony 
- gave further encouragement to this hope. At the end of 
the conference Goschen invited Canada to enter into 
negotiations with the Admiralty." In explaining the 
Admiralty's continuing support for the naval agreement 
".Sir Hugh Nelson, Premier of Queensland, to Lord 
Lamington, Governor of Queensland, 20 August 1896, 
P.R.O., Adm 1/7299. 
61 .Chamberlain to Lord Lamington, December 1896, 
P.R.O., Adm 1/7299. 
62 .hrinutes Colonial Conference 1897, p. 140. 
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Goschen referred to the example of colonial assistance 
it afforded. "I value the principle", he stated, 
which is involved in the contribution of 
the Colonies to the Navy which was settled 
some years ago and I think it would be a 
great pity and a retrograde step if such 
ties as have been established were to be 
cut." 
Finally the 1887 agreement was of value to Britain 
because it encouraged reliance upon the Royal Navy. The 
possibility that the larger colonies might separate 
from the empire was an ongoing concern of British 
officialdom. It had been publicly described by 
Chamberlain in 1895 as "the greatest calamity that 
could befall us." 54 The common dependence of the 
colonies upon the Royal Navy for defence was seen as a 
unifying factor, binding the colonies to Britain. This 
role of the navy uniting the geographically scattered 
colonies was emphasized by Chamberlain in his opening 
speech to the colonial conference. "Nothing", he had 
warned, "would be more suicidal or more fatal than any 
of those great groups of colonies to separate 
themselves in the present stage from the protecting 
forces of the mother country." 55 
63 .Ibid. 
64.  Speech at a dinner on the completion of the 
Natal railway, London, 6 November 1895 in Joseph 
Chamberlain, Foreign and Colonial Speeches, (London, 
1897), p. 77. 
55 .Minutes Colonial Conference 1897, p. 4. 
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While the Admiralty were prepared to continue the 
naval agreement without change until its expiry in 1901 
they were concerned at the belief in Australia that the 
ships were for local defence. As we have seen above the 
Admiralty had been subject to repeated requests from 
the colonial governments in the early 1890s for visits 
by warships to the various capital cities. This had led 
to complaints from the admiral commanding on the 
station that the colonial governments were trying to 
tie the ships down to port defence. In 1896 this issue 
had re-emerged when the governors of Victoria, New 
South Wales and Queensland had all written to London 
expressing concern at the belief in the colonies that 
the ships were for local defence."' "There is in all 
the Colonies", New South Wales governor Lord Hampden 
had claimed, "a very general belief that the 
'Agreement' gives their governments the right to claim 
the assistance of the Squadron in performing purely 
local duties, in no sense Naval." 57 
At the colonial conference Captain Beaumont, while 
criticizing the limitations on the Auxiliary Squadron 
""Lord Lamington, Governor of Queensland, to 
Colonial Office, 20 August 1896. Lord Hampden, Governor 
of New South Wales, to Colonial Office, 26 March 1897. 
Lord Brassey, Governor of Victoria, to Colonial Office, 
1 June 1897. P.R.O., CO 537/94. 
57 .Lord Hampden to Colonial Office, 26 March 1897, 
P.R.O., CO 537/94. 
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in general terms, had also distinguished between the 
waters of the Australia Station as set down in the 1887 
agreement and the colonial perception of Australian 
waters." It was this difference, Goschen subsequently 
claimed when he appeared before the conference, that 
had led to the misunderstanding of the Admiralty's 
requirements. While the ships were to operate within 
the waters of the Australia Station there could be no 
question of the Admiralty "hugging the shore"; of ships 
being allocated to the defence of a particular colonial 
port. "We must rely upon the localities themselves", he 
explained, "for the defence of these ports, while on 
our part we undertake that no organized expedition 
should be directed against any part of Australia."" 
The Australian premiers agreed that the division of the 
squadron among the colonial capitals would undermine 
the effectiveness of the force and leave Australian 
trade exposed to attack. They also accepted that the 
Admiralty had the right to use the ships in the islands 
of the western Pacific. Under the naval agreement this 
area was within the Australia Station but the use of 
the ships among these islands and especially in 
Samoa had elicited complaints from the colonial 
""Minutes Colonial Conference 1897, p. 56. 
""Ibid, p. 141. 
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governments." A resolution was passed declaring "that 
the statement by the First Lord of the Admiralty with 
reference 	to 	the 	Australian 	Squadron 	is 	most 
satisfactory, and the Premiers of Australasia favour 
the continuation of the Australian Squadron under the 
terms of the existing agreement." 8 I 
The experience of the 1890s vindicated the 1887 naval 
agreement from the Admiralty's point of view. There 
were some difficulties, notably the attempts by the 
colonies to have the ships dispersed among the various 
colonial ports, but on the whole the agreement achieved 
its objectives. Naval development by the Australian 
colonies ceased and the existing colonial navies 
declined. The events of the 1890s, however, also 
revealed a flaw in the Admiralty's policy. In seeking 
to contain naval development by one group of colonies 
the Admiralty had supported the creation of a 
subsidized 'Auxiliary Squadron' restricted in its 
operations to one area. As the balance of world naval 
forces shifted to the disadvantage of Britain the lack 
".Ibid, p. 57. In 1893 there had been complaints 
in the N.S.W parliament about the use of a cruiser 
belonging to the Auxiliary Squadron to remove King 
Mustafa from Samoa. See Trainor, op. cit., p. 207. 
"—Minutes Colonial Conference 1897, p. 148. 
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of strategic flexibility this involved became more 
serious. Moreover the growth of the naval estimates led 
to greater demands in Britain for the colonies to bear 
a larger share of the cost of naval defence. The 1887 
agreement was mistakenly applauded by supporters of the 
imperial federation movement as an example of colonial 
willingness to help. But the 1887 agreement had never 
been intended as a model for wider colonial 
participation in imperial defence and with relatively 
fewer ships the Admiralty could not afford to enter 
into further agreements which limited their strategic 
flexibility. 
The misunderstanding of the 1887 agreement by the 
supporters of the imperial federation movement caused 
particular embarrassment for Britain at the 1897 
colonial conference. Joseph Chamberlain's comments on 
the agreement reflected a woeful lack of preparation on 
the part of the Colonial Secretary and his department. 
Even a cursory review of the records of the 1887 
conference would have been sufficient to show that the 
naval subsidy did not represent a willingness by the 
Australians to assist in the general defence of the 
empire. Moreover Chamberlain's calling upon Captain 
Beaumont to speak on the naval agreement without 
warning or instructions from the Admiralty, indicated 
a serious lack of inter-departmental co-operation. In 
95 
the short term at least, however, the Admiralty learnt 
from the experience. The 1902 colonial conference was 
to see detailed preparations by the Admiralty, with 
carefully defined objectives and extensive 
documentation to support their case. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE POLITICS OF NAVAL DECLINE, 1900-1903 
Upon taking up the Australia command in December 1900 
Admiral Sir Lewis Beaumont was instructed that "it is 
desirable, in the opinion of their Lordships, that the 
present restriction to the employment of the vessels of 
the Australian Squadron elsewhere than in Australian 
waters should be removed from the existing agreement, 
or should be omitted in a new one."' This was a 
substantial change from the Admiralty's position only 
four years earlier. At the 1897 colonial conference the 
First Lord of the Admiralty (George Goschen) had 
declared that the Admiralty were happy to continue the 
naval agreement as it was and had denied reports that 
the Admiralty wanted the limitations on the operation 
of the Auxiliary Squadron removed. Goschen's statement 
was now regarded by the Admiralty as unfortunate and a 
complication to future negotiations with Australia. 2 
The new First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord Selborne) 
believed the limitations on the movement of the 
Auxiliary Squadron were a "cardinal defect" of the 1887 
'Admiralty to Beaumont, 6 December 1900, P.R.O., 
Adm 1/7611. 
2 .N.I.D. memorandum, "Interim Report on Future 
Relations of the Commonwealth with the Royal Navy", 
1900, P.R.O., Adm 1/7514. 
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agreement 	which had to 	be avoided 	in any new 
arrangement. 3 "Under no circumstances", he told the 
Board of Admiralty in May 1902, "will I consent to an 
arrangement by which the hands of the Admiralty would 
be tied in respect of the orders they might wish to 
give to such ships at the outbreak of war. I would 
rather forego any contribution from Australia and New 
Zealand than consent to this." 4 
What had caused this dramatic shift in the 
Admiralty's position in the space of only four years? 
"This change", Donald Gordon explains, "stemmed mainly 
from the growth of the 'blue water' school of thought 
in the Royal Navy with its emphasis on the 
concentration of power for a decisive clash at sea... 6 
It is a view that has been tacitly accepted by other 
writers.° Such an interpretation, however, relies 
mainly upon the public pronouncements of the Admiralty, 
and the Admiralty's public statements did not always 
give a true, or at least complete, picture of the 
factors which shaped their policy. The publication of 
3 .Selborne memorandum, 20 May 1902, P.R.O., Adm 
1/7611. 
4 .Ibid. 
°.Donald Gordon, "The Admiralty and the Dominion 
Navies, 1902-1914", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 
XXXIII, (December, 1961), p. 409. 
6 .See for example Preston, op. cit., p. 302. 
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Alfred Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 
in 1890 and The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French 
Revolution and Empire two years later had done much to 
promote 'blue water'ideas among both the general public 
and the navy. But as we have seen above the Admiralty 
had been aware of the importance of fleet concentration 
and strategic mobility when they had accepted the 
restrictions on the operation of the Auxiliary Squadron 
in 1887. What made the position different in 1902 was 
that Britain's naval situation had changed. 
For much of the nineteenth century the Royal Navy 
had been the unchallenged master of the world's oceans. 
Britain was able to maintain both a fleet strong enough 
to ensure superiority in European waters and provide 
naval forces scattered around the globe to protect her 
overseas empire and worldwide commercial interests. 
During this period, writes Professor Lloyd, "British 
sea power exercised a wider influence than has ever 
been seen in the history of maritime empires."' From 
the 1890s, however, competition from European powers 
and the rise of the United States and Japanese navies 
outside of Europe began to erode this supremacy. The 
October 1896 memorandum on naval policy by the Director 
of Naval Intelligence referred to in the previous 
chapter was an early warning within the Admiralty that 
7 .C• Lloyd, The Nation and the Navy; A History of 
Naval Life and Policy, (London, 1961), p. 223. 
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Britain's naval position had deteriorated since the 
introduction of the 'two power standard' in 1889. 8 The 
full impact of this deterioration, however, was not 
appreciated by the Admiralty until 1901. "In a matter 
of less than a year, between the months of January and 
September 1901", Aaron Friedberg notes in his recent 
study of British decline, "Admiralty officials came to 
the conclusion that past policies and, to a certain 
extent, past ways of thinking about the naval balance 
would have to be modified." More than a newfound 
appreciation of 'blue water' strategic ideas, this new 
assessment of Britain's naval position was to have a 
decisive influence upon the Admiralty's position at the 
1902 colonial conference. 
The recognition of British naval decline within the 
Admiralty coincided with the appointment of Lord 
Selborne as First Lord of the Admiralty. A 
comparatively young man for a First Lord, he was only 
forty-one at the time of his appointment in November 
1900, Selborne had no experience of naval 
administration. Nevertheless he was to prove an able 
administrator with a gift for detail and a mind 
8 •D.N.I. memorandum, 	28 October 1896, 	see above 
p. 79. 
8 .Friedberg, The Weary Titan, p. 152. 
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receptive to new ideas." Within a year of Selborne's 
appointment the Admiralty conceded that Britain had 
lost command of the sea in the western Atlantic. 
Britain could not compete with the burgeoning naval 
power of the United States and the supremacy of the 
United States Navy in the waters of North America was 
accepted." Britain's position in Far Eastern waters 
was the next concern. Here Russian imperialism was 
threatening to bring about the partition of China. 
Traditionally the dominant western power in China, 
Britain had important trading interests to consider. 
However by 1901 the Royal Navy's presence in Far 
Eastern waters had fallen below the combined forces of 
France and Russia let alone the rapidly expanding navy 
of 	Japan. 	The British Foreign Secretary, 	Lord 
Lansdowne, noted that while Britain's naval forces in 
the Far East were equivalent to 170,000 tons, those of 
Russia were equivalent to 120,000 tons, France 80,000 
tons and Japan 200,000 tons.I 2 Moreover while the 
British squadron was superior to the Russian forces in 
overall tonnage the Royal Navy had fewer armoured 
ships; only four battleships and two armoured cruisers 
1 °.Marder, 	The Anatomy of British Sea Power, 
p. 392. 
II.K. Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in 
North America, 1815-1908, (London, 1967), p. 338. 
12 Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald, British minister 
at Pekin, 16 December 1901, B.D., Vol. II, No. 116, p. 
103. 
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in comparison with Russia's five battleships and six 
armoured cruisers." 
In September 1901 Selborne spelt out to his cabinet 
colleagues the difficulty of the Royal Navy's position 
in the Far East. A strengthening of the Royal Navy's 
forces to equal those of France and Russia, still 
considered the leadingenemy powers, Selborne 
explained, could only be achieved by seriously 
weakening British fleets closer to home. "It would 
leave us with little or nothing more than a bare 
equality of strength in the Channel and Mediterranean", 
he warned, "and a bare equality at the heart of the 
Empire is a dangerous risk. "14 One solution would have 
been to further expand the Royal Navy. But in 1901 the 
war in South Africa was at its height and the defence 
budget had sky-rocketed to an extraordinary 62.5% of 
total government expenditure. Rather than the usual 
surplus the annual budgets showed massive deficits, 
approximately £53 million in 1901." Though the navy 
accounted for less than a quarter of defence spending 
in 1901 the Admiralty was under considerable pressure 
from the Treasury to reduce the estimates. The 
Admiralty, Lord Selborne was told by the Chancellor of 
".Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, p. 
429. 
".Selborne memorandum, "British Naval Policy in 
the Far East", 4 September 1901, P.R.O., Cab 37/58. 
".Mitchell and Leave, op. cit., p. 398. 
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the Exchequer, would have to "cut its coat according to 
its cloth."" 
The solution proposed by Selborne was for Britain 
to enter into an alliance with Japan. "Great Britain", 
he explained, "would [then] be under no necessity of 
adding to the number of battleships on the China 
Station, and at least would be in a position to 
contemplate the possibility of shortly establishing a 
small margin of superiority in reserve at home, [while] 
the number of cruisers could be reduced on the station 
and increased on other stations where badly 
required."" 
The alliance between Japan and Britain was signed 
on 30 January 1902. Limited to the "extreme east" it 
provided that in the event of a war involving either 
Great Britain or Japan the other party would "maintain 
a strict neutrality and use its efforts to prevent 
other Powers from joining in hostilities against its 
Ally."" Only if a second power entered the war would 
either party be obliged to come to the assistance of 
""Sir Michael Hicks Beach, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, to Selborne, quoted in Friedberg, The Weary 
Titan, p. 161. 
".Selborne memorandum, "British Naval Policy in 
the Far East", 4 September 1901, P.R.O., Cab 38/58. 
"."Anglo-Japanese Agreement", 30 January 1902, 
B.D., Vol. II, No. 125, pp. 114-118. 
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the other. From the naval point of view the most 
important aspects of the agreement were contained in an 
accompanying secret diplomatic note. Britain and Japan 
agreed to "maintain, so far as may be possible, 
available for concentration in the waters of the 
Extreme East a naval force superior to that of any 
third Power."" The vagueness of this secret obligation 
was due to the insistence of the Admiralty. Having 
supported the alliance as a way of relieving the 
pressure on their fleets the Admiralty did not wish to 
be committed to maintaining a fixed number of ships in 
the Far East." Indeed, though the number of British 
battleships in Far Eastern waters remained at four, two 
cruisers were removed in 1902 despite a strengthening 
of the Russian fleet there." 
The secret provisions of 	the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance exercised a decisive influence upon the 
Admiralty's position on a new naval agreement with 
Australia and New Zealand at the 1902 colonial 
conference. Surprisingly the importance of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance to the naval discussions in 1902 has 
19 .Ibid. 
20 .1. 	Nish, 	The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: 	The 
Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907, (London, 
1966), p. 214. 
21 .Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, p. 
431. 
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not been emphasized in the standard treatments of the 
colonial conference. Neither Gordon nor Preston mention 
the secret provisions of the agreement. 22 Though the 
level of naval forces Britain was committed to maintain 
in the Far East was not clearly defined there is no 
doubt that the Admiralty were obliged to maintain a 
certain naval force "available for concentration" in 
China waters. The Admiralty interpreted this as 
including British vessels stationed anywhere in the 
Pacific. This was made clear in April 1903 when Japan 
raised the question of the British naval forces in the 
Far East, suggesting they were not commensurate with 
the undertaking contained in the secret diplomatic 
notes. The words "available for concentration", Lord 
Selborne explained in reply, had been very carefully 
chosen and were meant to include ships maintained on 
the Australia, Pacific and East Indies Stations as well 
as China." 
From the Admiralty's point of view the secret 
provisions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance made it 
imperative their squadron based in Australia was free 
22 .See Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial 
Defense, pp. 144-148 and Preston, op. cit., pp. 299- 
302. Atkinson does suggest a connection between the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Admiralty's position at 
the 1902 colonial conference but without access to 
Admiralty documents is unable to substantiate this. 
Atkinson, op. cit., p. 209. 
23 .Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, pp. 
432-433. 
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to be concentrated in China waters. The limitation of 
the squadron to the Australia Station, as had been 
accepted in 1887, would certainly have led to Japanese 
protests that the ships could not be included in an 
assessment of British forces "available for 
concentration in the waters of the Extreme East". This, 
in turn, would have obliged the Admiralty to increase 
the number of ships in the Pacific thereby defeating 
the purpose of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The crucial 
role this consideration played in determining the 
Admiralty's attitude at the 1902 colonial conference is 
evidenced by the Admiralty's willingness to accept the 
restriction of their Australian based forces to an area 
encompassing the Australia, East Indies and China naval 
stations. This decision was taken at an informal 
meeting of Admiralty officials on 21 April 1902. At 
this meeting, called to discuss the Admiralty's 
position at the forthcoming colonial conference, it was 
decided to request complete freedom over the operations 
of all their ships. If pressed by Australia and New 
Zealand, however, it was agreed that the restriction of 
the ships to the Australia, East Indies and China 
stations would be acceptable. 24 Such a concession, 
while continuing the principle that colonial subsidies 
implied a measure of colonial control, would still 
24 Admiralty 	memorandum, 	"Colonial 	Naval 
Contribution", 28 April 1902, P.R.O., Adm 1/7611. 
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enable the ships to be concentrated in China waters and 
therefore recognized as part of Britain's commitment 
under the terms of the alliance with Japan. 
A further indication of the importance of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance to the Admiralty's position on 
a new naval agreement with Australia and New Zealand is 
the way the subsidy requested by the Admiralty at the 
conference was calculated. With the Admiralty under 
pressure to contain its expenditure, Selborne had 
resolved to press for greater subsidies from the 
colonies. "The principle on which I propose to 
proceed", he declared, "is to prepare a scheme in which 
the Admiralty will ask from Australia and New Zealand a 
substantial proportion of what . [they] ought to 
give." 25 This initially translated into a an annual 
payment of £367,000, £309,515 to come from Australia, 
or is 7 1/2d per head of population." The Director of 
Naval Intelligence (Admiral Sir Reginald Custance) had 
based this figure on the naval force Britain was 
required to maintain in the Far East under the terms of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Admiral Custance had 
calculated that Britain would need to keep four 
battleships and twenty-five cruisers in the Pacific 
25 .Selborne memorandum, 20 May 1902, P.R.O., Adm 
1/7611. 
26 .D.N.I. memorandum, "The British Naval Force in 
the Eastern Seas", June 1902, P.R.O., Adm 1/7611. 
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region. "It would be advantageous now", he stressed, 
"to draw a portion of this great force from the 
principal parts of the Empire in the east, viz, 
Australia and New Zealand. As the struggle for maritime 
supremacy becomes more acute it will be absolutely 
necessary to do so in the future." 27 
While the Admiralty had decided to press for 
greater subsidies at the colonial conference Selborne 
admitted that he was "prepared to take eventually 
whatever Australia and New Zealand are prepared to 
offer. “28  Ensuring freedom to concentrate their ships 
in China waters was the Admiralty's first priority in 
negotiations with the Australasian colonies. If the 
Australians and New Zealanders would not accept an 
agreement which gave this freedom to the Admiralty then 
there would be no agreement. After this, however, 
reaching an arrangement of any kind with the colonies 
was the next priority. Selborne was not prepared to let 
differences between Britain and the colonies over the 
amount of the subsidy get in the way of an agreement 
being signed. There were a number of reasons for this. 
From the point of view of imperial relations an offer 
of assistance from the colonies, no matter how small, 
27 .Ibid. 
28 .Selborne memorandum, 20 May 1902, P.R.O., Adm 
1/7611. Selborne's italics. 
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could not be rejected. As the Naval Intelligence 
Department had pointed out in 1900 Britain's commitment 
to the defence of the empire and the need to protect 
British interests in Australia necessitated some 
warships being stationed in Australian waters whether 
they were subsidized by the Commonwealth or not. The 
refusal of a contribution from the Australian 
government could only harm the imperial connection." 
A new naval agreement, continuing Australia's 
reliance upon the Royal Navy for protection, was also 
important as the linch-pin of the Admiralty's strategy 
to prevent the development of an independent Australian 
navy. The political and diplomatic objections to such a 
development had lost none of their relevance in the 
seventeen years since Admiral Tryon had been sent to 
Australia. The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Walter Kerr, 
could see only disaster in the construction of an 
Australian navy. "I foresee great friction and 
disagreeables", he wrote in 1902, "if it ever comes 
about."" Moreover the desire for larger subsidies from 
the colonies to help ease the growing defence burden on 
Britain reinforced the arguments against local navies. 
29 .N.I.D. memorandum, "Interim Report on Future 
Relations of the Commonwealth with the Royal Navy", 
P.R.O., Adm 1/7514. 
".Kerr memorandum, 1 April 1902, P.R.O., Adm 
1/7514. 
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The colonies were not likely to provide more money for 
the Royal Navy if they had navies of their own to fund. 
While tapping the resources of the colonies as a way of 
reinstating British power and relieving British 
taxpayers was to prove an illusion, in 1902 many in 
Britain saw it as the empire's only long-term hope. 
"The Colonies", Secretary of State for War H. Arnold 
Foster wrote to Selborne in February 1902, "should be 
induced to contribute men and money to relieve the 
immense strain upon the U.K. . It seems scarcely 
possible to hold any other view than the formation of 
separate Navies would be a calamity."" 
While the Admiralty were re-shaping their Far Eastern 
strategy the federation of the Australian colonies and 
the impending expiry of the 1887 naval agreement had 
given encouragement to supporters of a local naval 
force in Australia. On 1 March 1901, exactly two months 
after the promulgation of the Australian Commonwealth, 
the federal government assumed responsibility for 
Australian defence. Under section 69 of the 
constitution the Commonwealth took control of the naval 
and military forces of the former colonies. The 
"—Arnold Foster to Selborne, "Colonial Navies - 
Colonial Contributions", 12 February 1902 quoted in 
Meaney, op. cit., p. 81, f.n. 
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colonial navies were in a parlous condition. No 
colonial warships had been commissioned since 1891 and 
the few ships that remained were obsolete. The most 
capable vessels in the newly formed Commonwealth Naval 
Forces, the ex-South Australian gunboat Protector, had 
been completed in 1884. To the officers and supporters 
of the former colonial navies federation seemed to have 
come only just in time. 
At the colonial conference in London in 1897 a 
proposal for the establishment of an Australian branch 
of the Royal Navy Reserve had been tabled by South 
Australian premier Charles Kingston. The plan, however, 
failed to gain the support of the other colonial 
leaders and had been dropped. 32 The First Lord of the 
Admiralty, George Goschen, had subsequently announced 
that Britain was willing to pay suitably qualified 
Australian reservists the standard retainer of £7 19s 
8d a year. But, Goschen stressed, the Admiralty would 
neither provide the ships necessary for the training of 
the reservists nor meet the additional expenditure 
which would be necessary to attract Australians to a 
reserve scheme. 33 As the wages out of •port for seamen 
in Australia were £6 per month, far above the retainer 
offered by the Admiralty, a naval reserve scheme would 
32 .11finutes Colonial Conference 1897, pp. 122-124. 
33 .The Times, 28 July 1898. 
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require substantial 	subsidies 	from 	the colonial 
governments to attract suitable men. These were not 
likely to be forthcoming. 34 
In 1899 a meeting of colonial naval officers was 
convened in Melbourne by the Victorian Secretary for 
Defence (Captain Robert Muirhead Collins) to consider 
the practicability of establishing a branch of the 
Royal Navy Reserve in Australia. After examining the 
situation they admitted that the Admiralty's conditions 
effectively ruled out an Australian branch of the Royal 
Navy Reserve. Nevertheless the colonial naval officers 
believed that a distinctive Australian naval force 
could still be created. The colonial naval officers 
argued that if the existing colonial naval expenditure, 
about £65,000 per year, was combined with the annual 
subsidy of £126,000 toward the upkeep of the Auxiliary 
Squadron, it would be possible to provide for the 
maintenance of a fleet of five second-class cruisers in 
Australian waters and for the raising and maintaining 
of a reserve to man them." "When the Auxiliary 
Squadron was first established", they claimed, ".... it 
was generally understood, in Australia at any rate, 
that the ships would form a means of drilling and 
34 .Macandie, op. cit., p.61. 
1901-2 session, Vol. II, No. 27, "Report 
of the Conference of Naval Officers Assembled at 
Melbourne, Victoria, to Consider the Question of Naval 
Defence for Australia", p. 7. 
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training Australian seamen." This expectation, however, 
had never been realized and consequently there had been 
no advance in Australia's ability to undertake a share 
in her sea defence. If the present policy of hiring 
naval protection from Britain was not changed, the 
colonial naval officers pleaded, in "twenty or fifty 
years hence Australia's ability for sea defence - for 
self-defence - will be as to-day and as it was ten 
years ago. "30 
To support their case the colonial naval officers 
drew attention to the increasing naval power of France, 
Russia and Japan in the Pacific. "In the event of a 
European combination of such strength as to occupy the 
attention of the British fleets", they warned, "the 
continuance of a policy which in no way advances 
Australian ability for sea defence might have 
disastrous consequences." 37 This plan, however, was 
dependent upon the benevolent support of the Admiralty. 
It assumed that Britain would provide, free of cost, 
the five cruisers on which the Australian reservists 
would train. But Admiralty policy for nearly two 
decades had aimed at discouraging Australian naval 
development. Despite initial suggestions that the 
Auxiliary Squadron might be used to train Australian 
30 .Ib i d. 
37.Ibid. 
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reservists no provision for this had been made in the 
naval agreement. Moreover following the 1897 colonial 
conference George Goschen had made it clear that 
Australians could not expect the Admiralty to bear 
additional expenditure as a sop to local sentiment. "We 
cannot go on increasing the enormous naval expenditure, 
and at the same time take special measures for the 
colonies", he told a deputation from the British Empire 
League, "unless we see some disposition to meet us 
half-way, and to bear at least a share of the 
expenditure that we incur." 38 
No public response to the colonial naval officers' 
proposals was made by the Admiralty. The proposals did, 
however, receive coverage in The Times newspaper and a 
lengthy and scathing criticism of them was published. 
The proposals of the conference of colonial naval 
officers, The Times declared, were "inadequate, 
inconsequent and altogether inadmissible." 39 There 
could be, The Times argued, "no such thing as naval 
defence for Australia regarded as something distinct 
from the whole Empire on the seas." According to The 
Times the only additional protection Australia required 
beyond that provided by the British fleet was harbour 
defences. "Properly speaking", The Times explained, 
38 .The Times, 28 July 1898. 
39 .Ibid, 9 October 1899. 
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"this is not naval defence at all. It is local defence, 
rather military than naval in character against certain 
minor forms of naval attack."" 
Though The Times' article did not claim to 
represent official Admiralty opinion the views it 
expressed were shared by the Admiralty. In 1900 the 
Admiralty instructed Admiral Beaumont to actively 
discourage naval development by Australia. Plans for 
the establishment of a naval reserve in Australia were 
described as impractical. "Owing to the inherent 
difficulties of assimilating the pay and service at 
sea, in a ship of war, of Colonial seamen with those of 
the Royal Navy", Beaumont was told, "the Admiralty do 
not at present see any way of giving practical effect 
to . the formation of an Australian Royal Navy 
Reserve." 41  Harbour protection was the only area where 
the Admiralty could see any direct participation by 
Australians in their naval defence. "The most suitable 
direction in which the Naval aspirations of the 
colonies can be met and turned to use", the Admiralty 
advised Beaumont, "is in such local harbour defence as 
they may think necessary. 4 2 
40 .Ibid. 
41 .Admiralty to Beaumont, 6 December 1900, P.R.O., 
Adm 1/7611. 
42 .Ibid. 
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Beaumont followed his instructions diligently. An 
ideal opportunity came in 1901 when he was asked by 
Prime Minister Edmund Barton to advise the Commonwealth 
on the best method of instituting a system of naval 
defence for Australia. Barton suggested that the 
organization which might best suit Australia was a 
system of naval brigades at the various ports, each one 
receiving regular training at sea. 43 Beaumont 
disregarded this suggestion. Instead he recommended the 
federal government "should take no part in the creation 
or maintenance of naval reserves or State Naval Forces, 
which experience has shown cannot be utilized in a 
manner at all commensurate with their cost, or assist, 
except within too narrow limits, in the defence of the 
Commonwealth. "44 Beaumont reinforced his recommendation 
by submitting that, should the Commonwealth choose to 
embark on a naval programme, a force of at least two 
first-class cruisers of around 8,000 tons and six 
second-class cruisers of around 6,000 tons would be 
necessary to provide an adequate naval defence for 
1901-2 session, Vol. II, No. A 12, "Copy 
of a Minute by the Right Honorable the Prime Minister 
to His Excellency the Governor-General Asking His 
Excellency to Obtain from His Excellency the Admiral 
Commanding on the Australian Naval Station a Statement 
of his Opinions on the Subject of the Naval Defence of 
the Commonwealth of Australia", p. 3. 
44 .C•P•P., 1901-2 sesion, Vol. II, No. Al2, "Copy 
of a Letter from His Excellency Rear Admiral Beaumont 
in Reply to a Request to Assist in Instituting a System 
of Naval Defence for the Commonwealth of Australia", 16 
July 1901, p. 4. 
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Australia." This was a far more powerful fleet than 
was currently in Australian waters and was stronger 
even than the squadron later provided by the 
Admiralty." The cost of establishing such a fleet was 
considerable. The capital cost of the cruisers would be 
approximately £3,500,000 with a further £100,000 for 
depots and stores while the maintenance bill would be 
in the order of £1,000,000 a year." 
Expenditure of this magnitude, as Beaumont knew, 
was far beyond the capacity of the Commonwealth. In his 
letter to the admiral, Barton had emphasized the need 
for financial restraint. "The question of funds", he 
had explained, "is one that cannot of course be ignored 
and, therefore, it becomes desirable that the greatest 
amount of good should be obtained at the smallest 
possible cost. "48 Under section 87 of the constitution 
46 .Ibid, p. 3. 
46 .The 1901 naval force in Australian waters, apart 
from harbour defence craft and gunboats, consisted of 
one first-class cruiser and obsolete third-class 
cruisers. The squadron provided by the Admiralty under 
the terms of the 1902 naval agreement comprised one 
first-class cruiser, two second-class cruisers and five 
third-class cruisers. 
47 .Minute by Sir John Forrest, 	Minister for 
Defence, 15 March 1902 contained in C.P.P., 1903 
session, Vol. II, No. 2, "Papers Relating to a 
Conference between the Secretary of State for Colonies 
and the Prime Ministers of the Self-Governing Colonies, 
June to August, 1902", p. 1020. 
1901-2 session, Vol. 	II, No. A 12, 
Barton to Governor General, 	10 June 1901, 	op. cit., 
p. 3. 
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the Commonwealth was obliged to return three-quarters 
of its revenue from customs and excise duties - its 
major source of revenue - to the states for a period of 
ten years." Barton had suggested in his letter that 
financial considerations alone meant that there would 
probably be some objection to the establishment and 
maintenance of a large permanent naval force."'" 
Beaumont must have felt confident that any hopes Barton 
had for creating an Australian navy would be shattered 
by his assessment. 
Beaumont's tactic of discouraging the development 
of a local navy by recommending a force far beyond the 
Commonwealth's financial resources, however, almost 
came unstuck. In September 1901 Captain William 
Creswell, the leader of the navalist movement in 
Australia, submitted to the government a proposal for 
the establishment of an Australian navy "by progressive 
steps during a fixed course of years, each forward step 
and addition to the federal naval strength to be met by 
a reduction in the contribution to the Imperial 
Government, finality being the taking over by Australia 
".J. 	Quick 	and 	R. 	Garran, 	The Annotated 
Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, (Sydney, 
1901), pp. 824-825. 
".C.P.P., 	1901-2 session, Vol. 	II, No. A 12, 
Barton to Governor General, 10 June 1901, op. cit., p.3 
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of the protection of her own floating trade." 51 
Creswell's scheme has been discussed elsewhere and need 
only be outlined here. 52  Its most important feature was 
that it did not rely upon the goodwill of the 
Admiralty. Experience had led Creswell to conclude that 
no scheme for an Australian navy was going to receive 
support from that quarter. "Discouragement and 
aloofness", he wrote in 1901, "have been the constant 
attitude of the Imperial authorities towards naval 
development in every Australian colony." 52 Australia, 
Creswell suggested, should initially purchase only a 
single cruiser for training purposes, adding a further 
ship every two or three years until by 1909 there would 
be a squadron of four vessels. An annual appropriation 
of £350,000, Creswell postulated, would be sufficient 
to cover the costs of such a programme. This, he 
argued, out of the 1901 defence budget of £850,000 was 
51 .C.P.P., 1901-2 session, Vol. II, No. 52, "Report 
by Captain Creswell on the Best Method of Employing 
Australian Seamen in the Defence of Commerce and 
Ports", p. 3. 
52 .Discussion of Creswell's 1901 proposals can be 
found in S. Webster, Creswell, The Australian Navalist: 
A Career Biography, (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Monash 
University, 1976), Atkinson, op. cit. and Meaney, op. 
cit. 
52 .Macandie, op. cit., p. 87. 
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a moderate proportion in a country only liable to 
naval attack." 54 
Creswell's proposals gained considerable support. 
Of Australia's major newspapers the Brisbane Courier, 
Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney Argus, Melbourne Age and 
Adelaide Register all approved of his scheme." The 
Admiralty marshalled their resources in opposition. 
Admiral Beaumont sent a devastating critique of the 
plan to the Minister for Defence Sir John Forrest. The 
force proposed by Creswell, Beaumont argued, would not 
provide an adequate defence for Australian trade; only 
a full-time professional force could do that. 
Furthermore, Beaumont questioned the modest 
appropriations Creswell claimed his scheme would 
involve. "It appears to me", he told Forrest, "that 
every one of the estimates given is too low and that as 
the system depends for its success upon the gradual 
training of a body of Officers and men proceeding 
concurrently with the acquisition of the material in 
Ships, Stores and Armament, it will cost a great deal 
more than has been shown and will, for a great many 
years, be unequal to its task." 56 
64.  "Report by Captain Creswell on the Best Method 
of Employing Australian Seamen in the Defence of 
Commerce and Ports", op. cit., pp. 4-7. 
55 .Meaney, op. cit., p. 79. 
55 .Beaumont to Forrest, n.d., R.A.N.A., 185i. 
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At a personal level the Admiralty harnessed the 
support of Britain's vice-regal representatives in 
Australia. This avenue had already been used by Lord 
Selborne. In March 1901 he had written to his friend 
Lord Tennyson, the governor of South Australia, 
criticizing a proposal by Captain Creswell for a local 
naval force. Giving an early indication of his concern 
at Britain's position in the Far East, Selborne urged 
Tennyson to use his influence to persuade Australians 
to assist Britain in the maintenance of the China 
Squadron rather than developing their own navy. 
"Australia", he wrote, "should aim at adding to the 
real strength of the Imperial fleet in China waters. 
She should either provide herself or give us the means 
to provide ships capable of keeping the sea, and of 
meeting the powerful cruisers of France and Russia 
whether in China or Australian waters."" Faced with a 
new proposal by Captain Creswell the governor general 
(Lord Hopetoun) also used his influence to undermine 
the supporters of a local Australian navy. "I know what 
their feeling is", he told Edmund Barton in August 
1901, "they dread the idea of imperial subsidized ships 
being withdrawn from Australian waters and concentrated 
in some other perhaps remote part of the world .... but 
they are apt to forget .... that it is always possible, 
".Selborne to Tennyson, 2 March 1901, Tennyson 
Papers, N.L.A., Ms479 S3. 
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nay probable, that the best means of defending the 
waters of Australia may be to seek out and destroy the 
enemy's fleets in the channel or the Mediterranean or 
in China."" Moreover Hopetoun questioned whether those 
sections in Australia calling for a national navy were 
fully aware of the magnitude and expense of such an 
undertaking. "Those who talk glibly about a fleet of 
second-class cruisers for the Commonwealth", he warned 
the Prime Minister, "hardly appreciate or wilfully 
ignore the huge cost of such an undertaking."" 
The British efforts to undermine the proposals for 
a local naval force in Australia were successful. With 
the Commonwealth's finances restricted by the 
constitution the Barton government's first priority was 
to keep a tight rein on expenditure. Admiral Beaumont's 
estimates of the size and cost of an Australian navy 
were an effective deterrent to the Barton government 
embarking on a naval programme. "It is quite out of the 
question", Barton told the parliament in August 1901, 
"for the Commonwealth to engage in the building of a 
sufficient navy to protect her shores."" Barton based 
this statement on the figures that had been supplied by 
""Hopetoun to Barton, 2 August 1901, Barton 
Papers, N.L.A., Ms51 S1/811. 
""Hopetoun to Barton, 29 April 1902, Barton 
Papers, N.L.A., Ms51 S1/479. 
".C.P.D., 1901-2 session, Vol. 	III, p. 3600, 9 
August 1901. 
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Beaumont. "It would probably cost £4,000,000 for the 
construction and equipment alone", he claimed, "... The 
Commonwealth is not likely to undertake any such outlay 
as this." 8 ' Though this figure was subsequently 
disputed by Captain Creswell the British doubts about 
the cost of Creswell's proposals served to confirm 
Barton's feeling that a continuation of the subsidy 
arrangement was the most economically expedient course 
for his government to take. 
In April 1902 the Admiralty began the preparation of 
their submissions to the 1902 colonial conference. No 
official statement on Australian naval defence had been 
made by the Admiralty since Goschen had been called to 
speak to the colonial premiers in 1897. After their 
embarrassing experience at that conference the 
Admiralty had pursued their objectives in regard to 
Australia through indirect channels. Admiral Beaumont's 
advice to Edmund Barton had been couched in terms of a 
private assessment. Barton was unaware that Beaumont 
had been instructed by the Admiralty to discourage the 
development of an Australian navy. 
The task of preparing the Admiralty's case for the 
colonial conference was given to the Director of Naval 
123 
Intelligence, Admiral Sir Reginald Custance. Custance, 
however, was given precise instructions by the First 
Lord as to what he was to do. 	It had already been 
decided at an informal meeting at the Admiralty on 21 
April 1902 that the term "defence" should not be used 
in any future agreement." In a memorandum in May 1902 
Selborne expanded further upon his instructions. 
Essentially 	Selborne 	had 	three 	distinct 	though 
interrelated objectives." These can be summarized in 
order of priority as: 
1. Ensuring that any new naval agreement 
with Australia and New Zealand allowed the 
ships to be concentrated in China waters in 
order to meet the secret requirements of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 
2. Deterring the development of local naval 
forces by the colonies. 
3. Securing increased financial contributions 
from the colonies. 
The First Sea Lord explained the ideal outcome for the 
Admiralty more bluntly. "An enlarged contribution", he 
stated, "unfettered by conditions, is what we would 
prefer."'" 
62 .Admiralty 	memorandum, 	"Colonial 	Naval 
Contribution", 28 April 1902, P.R.O., Adm 1/7611. 
68 .Selborne memorandum, 20 May 1902, P.R.O., Adm 
1/7611. 
".Kerr memorandum, 1 April 1902, P.R.O., Adm 
1/7514. 
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Custance was told to prepare a memorandum for the 
colonial conference which could serve as a foundation 
from which the Admiralty could press their objectives. 
Selborne had a very clear idea of the direction he 
wanted the discussions at the conference to take. After 
the memorandum had been tabled, the First Lord 
explained, "the second stage in the proceedings will be 
to answer the question we want to elicit from them, 
'what do you propose'?"" Custance was told that 
separate answers should be drafted for each of the 
three colonial groups; Australia and New Zealand, 
Canada and South Africa. "In the case of the 
Australians", •Selborne instructed, "you should commence 
by saying 'If it is desired to maintain on the 
Australian Station such a squadron as was discussed 
between Sir John Forrest and Sir Lewis Beaumont it will 
amount to so much and cost so much, then proceed 
exactly according to the existing Memorandum."'" For 
the other colonies, where there was no existing 
agreement, Selborne suggested that Custance outline the 
strength of the squadrons the Admiralty was currently 
maintaining in their waters and propose a financial 
subsidy calculated in the same way as for Australia and 
New Zealand." 
66 .Selborne to Custance, 13 June 1902, P.R.O., Adm 
1/7611. 
66 .Ibid. 
"-Ibid. 
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Information from Australia suggested that Custance 
had been given a difficult task. The Australian 
government, Admiral Beaumont had informed London in 
November 1901, was certain to insist on some say over 
the movement and disposition of particular ships in 
return for a financial subsidy. Moreover, Beaumont 
warned, in his opinion Australia would not accept the 
removal of subsidized ships from Australian waters in 
wartime. Despite assurances to the contrary from Barton 
and Forrest, Beaumont believed that public feeling 
would lead an Australian government to insist on 
subsidized warships remaining in Australian waters as 
long as there was any threat from strong vessels of the 
enemy." This was a marked contrast to the claims of 
Admiral Tryon, who, it will be recalled, had supported 
his case in favour of the Admiralty accepting operation 
restrictions on subsidized ships with the argument that 
the colonial governments were likely to put the vessels 
at the Admiralty's disposal in the event of war." 
Custance's task was all the more difficult because 
the Admiralty's objectives were as much motivated by 
British political considerations as they were by naval 
requirements. The restrictions the 1887 agreement had 
".Beaumont to Admiralty, 14 November 1901, P.R.O., 
Adm 1/7514. 
".See above pp. 37-38. 
126 
placed on the operation of the Auxiliary Squadron were 
now seen as a serious handicap to naval operations. But 
it was the alliance with Japan which made it imperative 
for the Admiralty to be able to concentrate their 
Australian based forces in China waters. Likewise, 
Admiralty opposition to the development of colonial 
coastal defence forces was founded upon a belief that 
such navies would be a source of friction between the 
colonies and the mother country and a concern that 
irresponsible colonial governments might use these 
forces in a way which jeopardized British foreign 
policy. Moreover the establishment of colonial navies 
would make it more difficult for Britain to secure 
financial subsidies from the colonies and the British 
government was eager for colonial subsidies as way of 
relieving the burden of naval defence upon British 
taxpayers. 
The problem for Custance was that the political 
considerations shaping the Admiralty's position at the 
1902 conference could not be explained to the colonial 
governments. The naval provisions of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance were a closely guarded secret and were not 
revealed until after the First World War. Nor was any 
British prime minister going to tell his Australian 
counterpart that the Commonwealth could not develop a 
local navy because in the 'view of the British 
government Australians were too irresponsible and 
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unreliable to be entrusted with their own fighting 
ships. Such candour could only damage the imperial 
relationship. A method had to be found to secure the 
Admiralty's objectives 	without 	revealing 	to 	the 
colonies the Admiralty's deeper motives. 
The solution adopted by Custance was to use 'blue 
water' strategic principles to argue that only a 
single, centrally-controlled navy subsidized by the 
colonies could provide adequate security for the 
empire. In a document entitled "Memorandum on Sea Power 
and the Principles Involved in it", Custance used 
historical anecdotes to illustrate the principles of 
'blue water' strategy. "The command of the sea", he 
claimed, "is determined by the result of great battles 
at sea, such as Salamis, Actium, Lepanto, those which 
led up to the defeat of the Armada, and those between 
the Dutch and English in the 17th century, in which 
each side concentrated his whole available force for 
the decisive struggle."" For concentration to be 
effected a single, all-powerful authority was 
essential: 
The immense importance of the principle of 
concentration and the facility with which 
ships can be moved from one part of the 
world to another points to the 
necessity of a single navy, under one 
control, by which alone concerted action 
".Admiralty, "Memorandum on Sea Power and the 
Principles Involved in it", June 1902, contained in 
C.P.P., 1903 session, Vol. II, No. 2, "Papers Relating 
to a Conference between the Secretary of State for 
Colonies and the Prime Ministers of the Self-Governing 
Colonies, June to August, 1902", Appendix IV, p. 48. 
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between 	the 	several 	parts 	can 	be 
assured." 
In keeping with his instructions Custance dismissed the 
very idea of naval 'defence'. "In the foregoing 
remarks", he explained, "the word 'defence' does not 
appear. It is omitted advisedly because the primary 
purpose of the British Navy is not to defend anything, 
but to attack the fleets of the enemy and by defeating 
them to afford protection to British Dominions, 
shipping and commerce."'" 
Having outlined the arguments for unfettered, 
centralized control Custance laid out the Admiralty's 
case for larger colonial subsidies. The naval estimates 
for 1902-3, he explained, amounted to £31,255,500 or 
about 15s ld per head of the population of the United 
Kingdom. In contrast Australia's expenditure on naval 
defence averaged only 10 3/4d per head of population 
and New Zealand's 6 1/2d while Canada spent nothing on 
naval defence. About one quarter of British trade, 
however, "which it is the ultimate object of the Navy 
to protect", was not directly connected with the United 
Kingdom. Rather it was trade carried out by the 
colonies, either among themselves or with foreign 
countries." The implication was clear. The taxpayers 
of the United Kingdom were subsidizing the protection 
of colonial trade which in no way benefited them. 
71 ./bid, p. 49. 
72 . /bid. 
72 ./bid, p. 50. 
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Custance's memorandum is one of the best known and 
most frequently quoted of all Admiralty papers. It has 
been cited in the past as a summary of the Admiralty's 
thinking on imperial naval strategy. As we have seen, 
however, the memorandum was produced with a set of 
clearly defined objectives in mind. These objectives 
were related to the negotiation of a new naval 
agreement with Australia and New Zealand and were as 
much political as strategic in nature. The document 
must not be divorced from these narrow politcal aims. 
In the document a great deal is made of the 
principle of fleet concentration. It is because of the 
need to concentrate forces for the decisive battle, 
Custance argues, that the central authority must have a 
totally free hand in the movement and disposition of 
their ships. No mention is made, however, of the degree 
of concentration that would be necessary in war. Not 
every ship would be involved. "The geographical 
conditions and the varied interests of the maritime 
powers", Custance states, "prevent such complete 
concentration in modern times as was practicable in the 
past."'" Moreover, Custance, explains, "it is 
battleships chiefly which will have to be concentrated 
74 ./bid, p. 48. 
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for the decisive battle, and arrangements with this 
object must be made during peace."'" The Australian and 
New Zealand prime ministers could have been forgiven 
for asking how this related to them. There were, after 
all, no battleships stationed in Australian waters. 
An example of how the Admiralty's pronouncements at 
the conference were tailored toward securing their 
specific objectives while being put forward as a 
general explanation of naval policy is afforded by the 
treatment of local defence. As he had been instructed 
Custance had spurned the use of the word "defence" in 
his memorandum. "To use the word defence would be 
misleading", he had claimed, "because the word carries 
with it the idea of a thing to be defended, which would 
divert attention to local defence instead of fixing it 
on the force from which attack is to be expected."" At 
the conference Selborne elaborated on this. "The real 
problem", he declared, 
which this empire has to face in the case 
of a naval war is simply and absolutely to 
find out where the ships of the enemy are, 
to concentrate the greatest possible force 
where those ships are and to destroy those 
ships."'" 
78 .Ibid, p. 49. Custance's italics. 
77 .The complete minutes of the 1902 colonial 
conference, as with that in 1897, were never published. 
They are contained in A.A.0.(C), CP103/12/B2 hereafter 
cited as Minutes Colonial Conference 1902. 
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From such claims it might be expected that at the 
outbreak of war every ship would immediately assume the 
offensive without any provision for local defence. 
This was certainly the thrust of Selborne's argument to 
the colonial leaders for he continued: 
there can be no localization of naval 
forces in the strict sense of the word. 
There can be no local allocation of ships 
to protect the mouth of the Thames, to 
protect Liverpool, to protect Sydney, to 
protect Halifax. If we make any such 
attempt of the kind we should only be 
inviting disaster." 
These claims, 	however, were purely for colonial 
consumption and did not give a true indication of 
Admiralty policy. For political reasons alone the 
Admiralty was not likely to send the Royal Navy on an 
expedition against the fleets of the enemy, perhaps on 
the other side of the world, leaving the coasts and 
ports of Britain totally undefended. Barely three 
months earlier, in a confidential document on the coast 
defence of the United Kingdom, the Admiralty had 
declared that: 
It is a fundamental principle of Admiralty 
policy that sufficient force shall at all 
times be maintained in home waters to 
ensure command of those seas." 
"./bid, p. 19. 
".Admiralty, 	"Confidential Memorandum on the 
Strategic Conditions Governing the Coast Defence of the 
United Kingdom in War as Affected by Naval 
Considerations", March 1902, P.R.O., Adm 1161900B. 
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After elaborating the principles outlined in 
Custance's memorandum Selborne turned to the specific 
proposals for a new naval agreement with Australia and 
New Zealand. He announced that the Admiralty were 
prepared to base five modern second-class cruisers in 
Australian waters similar to H.M.S. Challenger, a 5,880 
ton vessel carrying eleven 6-inch guns. In return 
Australia and New Zealand were asked to pay an annual 
maintenance and depreciation charge of £367,000; 
£304,515 to be paid by Australia and £62,485 by New 
Zealand." Selborne also proposed that one or two of 
the modern cruisers be manned by Australians recruited 
into the Royal Navy while the old Katoomba class 
vessels could be used as training ships for an 
Australian naval reserve. This marked a change of 
attitude on the part of the Admiralty who had earlier 
dismissed an Australian branch of the Royal Navy 
Reserve as impractical because of the higher wages paid 
to Australian seamen." Selborne, however, was well 
aware of the agitation in Australia for a local navy. 
He realized that if greater subsidies were to be 
obtained and the establishment of an Australian navy 
"."Detailed Proposals Relative to Australia and 
New Zealand", June 1902, Minutes Colonial Conference 
1902, Appendix IV, pp. 223-224. 
81 .Admiralty to Beaumont, 6 November 1900, P.R.O., 
Adm 1/7611. 
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discouraged, provision had to be made for more actively 
involving Australians in their naval defence. 'In 
setting down his feelings about a new naval agreement 
in May 1902 Selborne had cited the failure of the 1887 
agreement to draw Australians and New Zealanders toward 
the sea as 	its second major defect after the 
restriction of the ships to Australian waters." "To my 
mind", he told the Australian and New Zealand prime 
ministers at the colonial conference, "there is no 
fault greater in it [the 1887 agreement] than this, 
that the relations of the' Australasian Governments to 
the Imperial are simply that of the man who pays to the 
man who supplies . .. It does not give our New Zealand 
and Australian fellow-countrymen the sense of personal 
interest, of personal possession, 	in the British 
Navy." 83 
A sense of personal interest in the British navy, 
however, came with a price tag. The Admiralty were not 
prepared to subsidize Australian participation. Each 
locally manned cruiser would cost the Commonwealth an 
additional E26,000 per annum owing to the higher wages 
paid to Australian seamen while it was established that 
a local naval reserve of 1,500 men using two Katoomba 
82 .Selborne memorandum, 20 May 1902, P.R.O., Adm 
1/7611. 
83 .Minutes Colonial Conference 1902, p. 21. 
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cruisers as drill ships would cost a further £100,000 
per annum. 84 Furthermore there was no question of 
Australian manned ships being retained in local waters 
in wartime. "This squadron", Selborne made clear, "must 
be available to fight •the opponents, the attackers of 
the Empire in whatever part of the Eastern seas their 
ships are to be found. 86 
Selborne's proposals left Australian prime minister 
Edmund Barton in a difficult position. Cabling him from 
Melbourne, Barton's deputy Alfred Deakin warned that 
even the minimum subsidy requested by the Admiralty, 
£304,515 for an upgraded cruiser squadron without any 
provision for Australian involvement, was "very far 
beyond" the present means of the Commonwealth and 
unlikely to be acceptable to parliament." On the other 
hand Barton knew that an agreement which made no 
provision for training Australian seamen and which 
relaxed the 1887 restrictions on the movement of ships 
subsidized by the Commonwealth would be immensely 
unpopular in Australia. 
84 -"Detailed Proposals Relative to Australia and 
New Zealand", op. cit. 
85 .111inutes Colonial Conference 1902, p. 21. 
86 -Deakin 	to Barton, 	4 	July 	1902, 	A.A.0.(C), 
CP103/12/B5. 
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Barton set about negotiating an arrangement which 
met as many of the contending interests in Australia as 
possible. He explained the difficulty of the 
Commonwealth's financial position. The Australian 
government, like that of Canada, was required to 
undertake expensive public works programmes which 
should be regarded as benefiting the whole empire. 
Moreover the Commonwealth's finances were limited by 
• section 87 of the constitution. 87 Barton explained that 
he had already been forced to rule out the development 
of an Australian navy because, "however strong public 
feeling may be in that direction, and there are some 
indications of support for such a proposal, I should 
find a very great difficulty in finding the money for 
the purpose." 88 
While 	emphasizing 	the 	difficulty 	of 	the 
Commonwealth's financial position Barton also rejected 
the Admiralty's claim to a completely free hand in the 
disposition of their ships. "In Australia", he 
explained, "the notion of service outside [Australian 
waters] does not happen at the time to be very 
popular."'" Australians feared that in a war the 
Admiralty would withdraw the ships leaving Australia's 
87 .Minutes Colonial Conference 1902, pp. 29-30. 
88 .Ibid, p.30. 
89 .1bid, p. 31. 
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ports and coastal trade exposed to attack. An agreement 
which did not include limitations on the operation of 
the ships, Barton warned echoing Deakin's advice, was 
likely to be rejected by the Commonwealth parliament." 
In a series of private discussions, however, the 
Admiralty made it clear that they would not accept the 
limitation of their ships to Australian waters. 01 
Nevertheless an arrangement was negotiated which took 
into account some of the financial and political 
difficulties of which Barton had spoken. The Admiralty 
agreed to base one first-class, two second-class and 
four third-class cruisers and four sloops on the 
Australia Station. One third-class cruiser was to be 
maintained in reserve and the other three were to be 
only partly manned, being used as drill ships for a 
Royal Navy Reserve of twenty-five officers and 700 men. 
In return Australia would pay an annual subsidy of 
£200,000 and New Zealand £40,000. This represented 
approximately half the annual maintenance cost of the 
squadron plus a five per cent depreciation allowance on 
the prime cost of the ships. One cruiser and one drill 
ship were to be stationed in New Zealand." In respect 
to the operations of the squadron the Admiralty agreed 
9 °.Ibid. 
91 .Ibid, p. 173. 
92 .Ibid, pp. 173-174. 
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to the restrictions they had previously established as 
their minimum requirement. While the force was to be 
based on the Australia Station its area of operations 
was to include the China and East Indies Stations 
"where the Admiralty believe they can most effectively 
act against hostile vessels which threaten the trade 
and interests of Australia and New Zealand."'" The 
agreement was to last for ten years. 
Writing to Richard Jebb, the contemporary student 
of imperial relations, after the conference, Alfred 
Deakin claimed that "Barton's native dilatoriness and 
his position in Parl[iamen]t combined to make us less 
effective in London."'" Deakin had hoped the groundwork 
for an Australian navy could have been laid at the 
conference. 95 Later writers have also seen Barton as 
unsuited to the high-pressure negotiations of the 
colonial conference. "Barton", writes Donald Gordon, 
"was of quiet temperament, unlikely to take a strong 
lead in such a gathering. His was the judicial 
disposition, and he was happier in his eventual post on 
the bench of the High Court of Australia."'" •More 
09 .Ihid. 
".Deakin 	to 	Jebb, 	n.d., 	Deakin-Jebb 
Correspondence, N.L.A., Ms 339. 
95 .Deakin to Barton, n.d., A.A.0.(C), CP103/12/B5. 
9 ° .Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial 
Defense, pp. 157-158. 
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recently Australian historians have argued that Barton, 
far 	from 	being 	pressured 	into 	accepting 	an 
unsatisfactory agreement, sympathized with the 
Admiralty's case for a single, centrally-controlled 
navy. "Despite differences in detail", Richard Norris 
claims, "Barton and Forrest got much of what they 
wanted . . In 1902 Selborne and the Admiralty were 
preaching to the converted."" 
While Norris cites some earlier public statements 
by Barton to support his assertion that the prime 
minister was sympathetic to the Admiralty's claim to 
unfettered strategic control over their ships," there 
is no evidence from the minutes of the conference to 
support this. On the contrary Barton fought tenaciously 
for the continuation of the 1887 restrictions in a new 
agreement. An astute politician, Barton appreciated 
that an agreement which gave complete power to the 
Admiralty would be bitterly criticized in Australia. He 
pressed for the retention of the 1887 limitations at 
the public sessions of the conference and it is 
apparent from comments by Lord Selborne that he pressed 
for continued limitations in the private discussions as 
".Richard Norris, 	The Emergent Commonwealth, 
Australian Federation: Expectations and Fulfilment 
1889-1910, (Melbourne, 1975), p. 133. See also Meaney, 
op. cit., p. 82. 
98 .Norris, op. cit., p. 133. 
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well." Barton also supported a move by New Zealand 
prime minister Richard Seddon to have the ships limited 
to local waters in peacetime but free to operate in the 
larger area in time of war.'" This proposal was 
rejected by Selborne who claimed that it would lead to 
confusion in the minds of the general public. A more 
likely reason for his opposition to the idea was his 
knowledge of the secret provisions of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance. Selborne did, however, accept at 
Barton's behest an insertion into the agreement stating 
that the specified force shall not be the only force 
used in Australian waters should the need arise. The 
Admiralty were happy to agree to this as it did not 
impinge on their strategic control. Barton was thinking 
ahead to how he might defend the agreement in 
Australia. Such an insertion, he explained, "would show 
not only that the Australian Squadron might be called 
away to the defence of the Empire elsewhere, but that 
the other two squadrons in the same seas might be 
equally called to assist them."'" The provisions of 
the 1887 agreement were relaxed in 1902 not because 
Barton was sympathetic toward the Admiralty's arguments 
but because the Admiralty would not, indeed could not, 
99 -Minutes Colonial Conference 1902, p. 173. 
p. 174. 
" 1 -1bid, p. 176. 
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accept the continued limitation of their ships 
Australian waters. Knowing the parameters the Admiralty 
had set for a new naval agreement with Australia it is 
unlikely another negotiator could have achieved a 
better outcome for the Commonwealth than Barton. 
While the Admiralty's attitude at the 1902 colonial 
conference was dressed in Mahanite ideology their 
objectives had as much to do with pragmatic political 
concerns as they did with strictly naval requirements. 
By 1902 changed strategic and diplomatic conditions 
meant that the Admiralty could no longer agree to the 
limitation of vessels to Australian waters as they had 
in 1887 in return for colonial subsidies and an 
assurance from the colonial governments that they would 
not construct ocean-going warships nor operate their 
harbour defence craft outside of their territorial 
waters. However, though the Admiralty's flexibility had 
decreased, the original aims of the 1887 agreement 
remained as relevant in 1902 as they had been fifteen 
years earlier. Unable to make the concessions to 
Australia and New Zealand they had made in 1887 and 
unprepared to reveal their underlying political and 
strategic considerations to the colonial governments 
the Admiralty had to depend upon the forceful 
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presentation of 'blue water' theory to obtain their 
objectives. 
The 1902 naval agreement, though not ideal from the 
Admiralty's point of view, nevertheless did satisfy 
their minimum requirements. The Australian subsidy had 
been increased, albeit by less than they had hoped for, 
the Commonwealth had been dissuaded from establishing 
its own coastal naval force and, most important of all, 
the ships of the Australian Squadron were free to be 
concentrated in China waters in accordance with the 
secret provisions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In a 
memorandum written after the agreement had been reached 
but included in the published papers of the conference 
Lord Selborne expressed satisfaction with the 
negotiations. Complimenting the colonial premiers on 
the "satisfactory result" of the conference he singled 
out the growing "appreciation throughout the Empire of 
the peculiar characteristics of Naval warfare, and of 
the fact that those local considerations which find 
their natural place in military organizations are 
inapplicable to Naval organization." Especial praise, 
however, was reserved for Cape Colony and Natal which 
"have made their offer unfettered by any conditions, a 
mark of confidence and of appreciation of the Naval 
problem of which the Board of Admiralty are deeply 
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sensible."'" Writing privately to Admiral Beaumont two 
weeks later Selborne described the new agreement as "a 
real advance" but added that he would have allowed the 
agreement to lapse if Australia had not accepted an 
expanded operational area for the ships. "I have made 
no secret of my opinion in this matter to any of the 
[colonial] 	ministers 	concerned", 	he 	told 	the 
admiral.'" 
Despite Selborne's tough stand over the need to 
concentrate the Australian Squadron in China waters the 
1902 naval agreement committed the Admiralty to 
maintaining a fixed number of vessels on the Australia 
Station and linked this with Britain's overall naval 
presence in the Far East. The principle that subsidies 
entitled the colonies to a measure of control over 
particular vessels had not been overturned. Nor had any 
allowance been made for a further deterioration in 
Britain's national position. Though to last ten years, 
within four years the Admiralty was regretting the 
agreement and looking to find a way of escaping its 
obligations. In this respect the naval agreement 
vindicates Aaron Friedberg's assertion that, contrary 
" 2 .Selborne memorandum, 7 August 1902, contained 
in C.P.P., 1903 session, Vol. II, No. 2, op. cit., 
PP. 17. 
" 3 .Selborne to Beaumont, 21 August 1902, P.R.O., 
Adm 1/7611. 
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to much recent scholarship, Britain's leaders in the 
two decades before the First World War were less than 
uniformly farsighted and that, therefore, the policies 
they pursued fell far short of lasting success. 104 
Moreover, by using strategic arguments to pursue what 
were largely political objectives the Admiralty had 
created a credibility gap which was to be exploited by 
the proponents of a local navy in Australia. As Edmund 
Barton had prophesied the agreement was not well 
received in Australia and the Admiralty was soon 
embroiled in a series of bitter exchanges with the 
Commonwealth. 
'"Friedberg, The Weary Titan, p. 293. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PARSIMONY, REDISTRIBUTION AND A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE TO 
COLONIAL NAVIES, 1904-1908 
Writing to Joseph Chamberlain in February 1903 Lord 
Tennyson, who had succeeded Hopetoun as Governor 
General of Australia, declared: 
Most 	of 	the 	politicians 	of 	the 
Commonwealth have an idea that the British 
official sentiment is that the Colonies 
should practically surrender their control 
over both land and sea forces to Great 
Britain and this they will resist to the 
utmost of their power.' 
Tennyson was referring to the mounting opposition in 
Australia to the 1902 naval agreement. Barton's fear 
that the new naval agreement would be unpopular in 
Australia had proved well-founded. From 1903 to 1907 
the Admiralty and Colonial Office were pressed by 
successive Australian governments for a modification to 
the naval agreement to allow for local maritime defence 
and greater direct participation by Australians in 
their naval defence. In 1907 these objectives were 
'Tennyson to Chamberlain, 	25 February 1903, 
Tennyson Papers, N.L.A., Ms 479 S3. 
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achieved. But the Admiralty's change of heart on local 
navies was only due in small degree to Australian 
pressure. By 1907 Britain's deteriorating international 
position had undermined the agreement from the 
Admiralty's point of view. With pressing financial and 
strategic reasons of their own for securing the early 
termination of the 1902 agreement the Admiralty were 
willing to permit the establishment of a local 
Australian navy as a trade off for Australia cancelling 
the agreement and accepting a reduction in Britain's 
naval presence in Australian waters. 
There 	were two main objections to the 1902 naval 
agreement in Australia. The first was the failure of 
the agreement to make provision for the establishment 
of a distinctively Australian naval force. The 
proponents of an Australian navy declared the agreement 
a sell-out in the face of Admiralty pressure. Complete 
dependence upon hired naval forces from Britain, they 
claimed, was unworthy of the newly created 
Commonwealth, while the agreement did nothing to 
promote national self-reliance. The response of the 
Melbourne Age was typical. "To tell Australians as Sir 
Edmund Barton does", the Age declared in November 
1902, "that it is an act of wisdom to emasculate 
Australian sentiment and tie down this Commonwealth in 
its Defence policy to follow helplessly in the leading 
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strings of the British Admiralty is repugnant at once 
to the common sense, to the teachings of history, and 
to the national self-respect." 2 
The second objection concerned the extension of the 
area to which the squadron was restricted. From 
Barton's point of view this was the more serious 
of the objections for, while most Australians accepted 
his arguments that the Commonwealth could not yet 
afford a navy of its own, many were fearful that in a 
war the ships would be removed from Australian waters 
leaving their ports and coastal trade unprotected. 
Newspapers such as the Sydney Morning Herald, which 
were otherwise favourable to the agreement, expressed 
reservations about Australia's reduced control over the 
ships. 2 George Reid, who had been forthright in 
defending the limitations on the operation of the 
Auxiliary Squadron at the 1897 colonial conference, 
publicly denounced the new agreement for its weakening 
of Australian contro1. 4 
The advocates of an Australian navy seized upon the 
fear that Australia might be left without any naval 
defence in a war. They did not accept the Admiralty's 
2 .Melbourne Age, 17 November 1902. 
3 .Sydney Morning Herald, 13 October 1902. 
4 .Sydney Morning Herald, 3 December 1902 and 14 
January 1903. 
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arguments that there was no place for local naval 
defence in the colonies and they viewed with deep 
scepticism Lord Selborne's claim that there was no 
allocation of forces for the defence of British ports 
or coastal trade. "Does anyone suppose", asked West 
Australian senator A.P. Matheson in a paper to the 
Royal Colonial Institute, 
that a Government would be tolerated for 
an instant in Great Britain that avowed 
its intention to send the entire fleet on 
an offensive expedition against a foreign 
port, leaving the British coast and 
commerce in the Channel unprotected except 
by fortifications? And if local naval 
defence is desirable at Home and for the 
Mother Country, why should it be condemned 
when Australia is concerned? 6 
As we have seen Matheson's suspicion of Admiralty 
double standards was well-founded. Not able to explain 
the political motives behind their objectives at the 
colonial conference the Admiralty had been forced to 
rely upon strategic arguments to support their 
position. In doing so, however, the Admiralty had 
created a credibility gap which the proponents of an 
Australian navy were quick to exploit in their efforts 
to discredit the naval agreement. 
By the beginning of 1903 opposition to the naval 
agreement in Australia had become so strident that its 
6 .A.P. Matheson, "Australia and Naval Defence", 
Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute, Vol. 
XXXIV, (March, 1903), p. 217. 
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ratification by parliament appeared to be in doubt. The 
Commonwealth Labor Conference meeting in Sydney in 
December 1902 had resolved that money for naval defence 
should be spent on establishing a local force and the 
Federal Labor Party Caucus subsequently decided to 
oppose the agreement.e Joseph Chamberlain, perturbed by 
reports that the agreement might not gain parliamentary 
approval, told Barton: 
shall be bitterly disappointed 	if 
anything interferes to prevent the 
acceptance by the Federal Parliament of 
the arrangements favoured by you in regard 
to the naval contributions at our last 
conference. The contributions then 
suggested 	represent. a 	principle 	the 
negation of which would be disastrous.' 
Chamberlain saw the colonies as a source of men and 
money to bolster Britain's flagging power. He was 
hopeful that the colonies might yet be persuaded to 
make substantial contributions to the cost of Britain's 
expensive defence forces. In this regard the naval 
agreement was an important precedent and its 
abandonment would be a major blow to his plans. 
e.P. Weller ed., Caucus Minutes 1901-1949: Minutes 
of the, Meetings of the Federal Parliamentary Labor 
Party, (Melbourne, 1975), 8 July 1903, p. 101. 
7. Chamber1ain to Barton, 21 March 1903, Barton 
Papers, N.L.A., Ms 51 S1/587. 
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In an effort to appease some of the critics of the 
agreement Barton sought a revision of its terms. He 
hoped the possibility of its rejection by parliament 
would make the Admiralty more amenable to a local 
maritime defence force for Australia. At Barton's 
request Tennyson wrote to Chamberlain explaining that: 
The passage of the Naval Agreement is 
difficult and doubtful unless something is 
done to satisfy the strong feeling for 
local defence and to allay the fear .... 
that when the Australian Squadron leaves 
these waters, there will be no local 
defence left to deal with stray vessels of 
the enemy. 8 
Barton proposed that six locally officered and manned 
torpedo boat destroyers, one for each capital city, be 
provided by Britain in lieu of a third-class cruiser. 
Such an arrangement would not only help alleviate 
Australian fears at being left totally unprotected 
should the squadron be withdrawn but would also provide 
a role for the personnel of the Commonwealth Naval 
Force. These former officers and men of the colonial 
navies had in some cases already been left without 
ships on which to train and they constituted a 
particularly vocal section of the naval lobby opposed 
to the new agreement. Destroyers, Tennyson argued, were 
suited to the defence of the Australian coast, 
8 .Tennyson to Chamberlain, 24 April 1903, P.R.O., 
CO 418/26/15044. 
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especially along the Great Barrier Reef, and he hinted 
that George Reid, leader of the Free Trade group in the 
federal parliament, 	was willing to 	support 	the 
agreement if such a concession to local defence were 
made.° 
Barton received support for his proposal from an 
unexpected quarter. Admiral Sir Arthur Fanshawe, who 
had replaced Beaumont as Commander-in-Chief Australia 
Station, wrote to the Admiralty on 27 April urging 
their acceptance of the prime minister's plan. 
Destroyers, Fanshawe claimed, were "the recognized 
weapons for the purpose of defence" and would be "of 
assistance in repelling a raid by an enemy's 
vessels." 1 ° Fanshawe argued that the great differences 
in the rates of pay of British and Australian seamen 
would pose problems for the establishment of a 
permanent force of Australians aboard imperial ships. 
The lowest rate of pay in Australia was three times 
-  that of seaman ratings in the Royal Navy and twice that 
of artisan ratings. Moreover the destroyers, Fanshawe 
claimed, would "promote public interest in maritime 
affairs in the most popular form."" 
g.Ibid. 
I°.Fanshawe to Admiralty, 27 April 1903, P.R.O., 
Adm 1/7671. 
11 .Ibid. 
152 
Fanshawe's support for Barton's proposal included 
one proviso. Barton had hoped that the Admiralty would 
provide the destroyers in the place of a third-class 
cruiser. Fanshawe, however, argued that they should be 
completely separate from the naval agreement. "There is 
only one form in which I can understand the request for 
destroyers", he wrote to Sir John Forrest, ".... namely 
that they should be asked to supersede the obsolete 
local Defence Ships and be maintained, officered 
and manned entirely by the Commonwealth." 12 The six 
destroyers, Fanshawe claimed, would cost nearly £30,000 
a year more to maintain than the cruiser and, by virtue 
of their design, could not operate outside of 
Australian waters. "They could hardly be called a local 
defence force belonging to Australia", he told Forrest, 
"when not paid for by the Commonwealth and it is surely 
unjust to ask the already burdened taxpayer at home to 
pay for them." 13 
Fanshawe 	support for the destroyer proposal 
appears to have been based upon concern for the smooth 
running of his squadron following the decision at the 
colonial conference to recruit Australian seamen for 
service aboard British vessels on the Australia 
Station. As Commander-in-Chief Fanshawe feared that the 
12 .Fanshawe to Forrest, 29 April 1903, R.A.N.A., 
185i. 
13 .Ibid. 
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employment of Australian seamen aboard his ships at 
substantially higher rates of pay than their British 
counterparts would cause jealousy and divisiveness." 
The Australian Station was already notorious for its 
high rate of desertions, due largely to the better 
wages 	seamen 	could 	earn 	ashore." 	Fanshawe's 
correspondence indicates that he also had a good 
understanding of the Barton government's political 
difficulties over the new agreement, in particular the 
outspoken opposition of the officers and men of the 
former colonial navies who had a vested interest in 
Australia retaining some form of local naval defence. 
Fanshawe saw the establishment of an Australian 
destroyer force as a way of overcoming both problems. 
The higher paid Australian seamen would be kept apart 
from the British seamen aboard the Royal Navy squadron 
and a useful role would be created for the former 
colonial naval personnel. 
Torpedo boat destroyers, or simply destroyers as 
they were to become known, had been developed in the 
early 1890s as a counter to the new generation of 
torpedo boats equipped with the recently invented self-
propelled torpedo. From their inception, however, the 
destroyers themselves had been armed with torpedoes and 
14 .Fanshawe to Admiralty, 27 April 1903, P.R.O., 
Adm 1/7671. 
16 .John Bach, 	The Australia Station, 	(Sydney, 
1986), p. 237. 
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had the capability to launch attacks against enemy 
warships. It was in this role of sea-going torpedo 
attack craft that destroyers were to specialize. 
Fanshawe's claim that destroyers were "the recognized 
and proper weapons for the defence of harbours and 
coasts"", however, was not what the Admiralty wanted 
to hear from their highest ranking Australian official. 
Wanting to discourage the development of colonial 
navies Lord Selborne had claimed at the colonial 
conference that there was no place for local maritime 
defence. It was not surprising, therefore, that the 
Admiralty dismissed the destroyer proposal out of hand. 
Ignoring Admiral Fanshawe's support for the idea the 
Admiralty denounced the use of destroyers for 
Australian defence. "In the first place", the Admiralty 
explained, though they were already experimenting with 
destroyers as sea-going attack craft, "the sole object 
of the torpedo boat destroyer is as [their] name 
implies [the] destruction of torpedo boats. As existing 
torpedo boat bases .... are some 4,000 miles away it is 
impossible that any such boats should appear off 
Australian ports in time of war." 17 Condescendingly the 
16 .Fanshawe to Forrest, 29 April 1903, R.A.N.A., 
185i. 
'Admiralty memorandum in Chamberlain to Tennyson, 
19 May 1903, A.A.0.(C), CP78/14, Vol. I, p. 661. 
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Admiralty suggested that Barton had confused destroyers 
with torpedo boats. Having then attempted to divert the 
discussion to an entirely different type of vessel the 
Admiralty then proceeded to explain why torpedo boats 
could not provide an adequate defence for ports. 
"Assuming one boat were assigned to each capital port", 
they stated, 
[and a] hostile cruiser had evaded British 
squadrons and appeared off it [the] 
torpedo boat could do absolutely nothing 
by daylight and would only have 
opportunity by night in the improbable 
event of all conditions being favourable. 
.... Moreover this special form of attack 
being one in which safety as well as 
success largely lies in concentration of 
numbers it is clear that [the] opposition 
of one torpedo boat to one cruiser cannot 
be considered [an] effective form of 
offence." 
The Admiralty reminded Barton of his commitment to 
the agreement at the colonial conference. They stressed 
also that the agreement was tripartite. New Zealand was 
involved and prepared to ratify the arrangement. 
"H.M.'s Government", they explained, "have no 
information leading them to suppose [the] New Zealand 
Government would favour modification [of the 
arrangement] such as now suggested."" Having secured 
1 8 .Ibid. 
19 .Ibid. 
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an agreement which met most of their objectives the 
British authorities were unwilling to make concessions. 
"If the Colonial Parliament should refuse to ratify the 
Naval Agreement", C.P. Lucas, Under Secretary of State 
for Colonies, minuted, "in Mr. Chamberlain's opinion it 
would be better to reduce the Australian Squadron to 
the proportions absolutely necessary for Imperial 
purposes in connection with the Pacific islands and to 
refuse to accept as a substitute for the moderate 
contribution which is asked, a proposal that appears 
devoid of any substantial advantages. "20 Barton was 
urged to press parliament to ratify the agreement 
unchanged. "I hope that when Parliament assembles", 
Chamberlain concluded, "your Ministers will find that 
it is prepared to accept the agreement as it stands. "2 1 
Barton succeeded in having the naval agreement 
ratified by parliament. After a long and at times 
bitter debate the agreement was passed thirty-eight 
votes to twenty-four in the House of Representatives 22 
and fifteen votes to nine in the Senate." 
".Minute by C.P. 	Lucas, 	Colonial Office to 
Admiralty, 13 May 1903, P.R.O., Adm 1/7671. 
21 .Chamberlain to Tennyson, 19 May 1903, A.A.0.(C), 
CP78/14, Vol. I, p. 661. 
22 .C.P.D., 1903 session, Vol. XIV, p. 2433, 22 July 
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22 .1b1d, Vol. XVI, p. 4117, 25 August 1903. 
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In introducing the Naval Agreement Bill Barton had 
elaborated the arguments that had been set out in the 
"Memorandum on Sea Power and the Principles Involved in 
it". He had stressed the importance of fleet 
concentration and the necessity for there to be a 
single all-powerful authority to effect concentration 
in wartime. "Any separation of responsibility, any 
diminution of the power of that single authority" he 
had told the parliament, It might have the most 
disastrous consequences. "24  The comfortable majorities 
the agreement eventually received, however, were not an 
indication of general support for the principle of a 
single, centrally-controlled imperial navy. Only eight 
of the forty-eight speakers on the Naval Agreement Bill 
in the House of Representatives had favoured it without 
reservation. The remainder had been either completely 
opposed to the agreement or had seen it as a temporary 
expedient until Australia was able to establish a navy 
of its own. 
The key factor in the ratification of the agreement 
had been the Commonwealth's strained financial 
circumstances. Barton had claimed that an Australian 
navy would cost £2,500,000 to build and a further 
£1,000,000 a year to maintain. In contrast the new 
24 ./bid, Vol. XIV, p. 1778, 7 July 1903. 
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agreement would provide naval protection for Australia 
at only 15s 1/2d per head, a mere 1/2d more than they 
had paid under the 1887 agreement and a great deal less 
than British taxpayers paid for naval defence." 
Australia could not afford to embark on a naval 
programme of its own in 1903 and the naval agreement 
was ratified largely on this understanding. 
Following the ratification of the 1887 naval agreement 
by the various colonial legislatures interest in naval 
development in Australia had waned. While the Admiralty 
had from time to time been troubled by colonial 
requests for more frequent visits by imperial warships 
the agreement itself had been popular. Indeed at the 
1897 colonial conference the colonial premiers had 
vigorously opposed suggestions that the agreement be 
modified. This was not the case with the 1902 
agreement. Successive Australian governments sought to 
modify the agreement to allow for the establishment of 
a local naval force. 
There were a number of reasons for this. Australian 
navalists, Leon Atkinson has noted, in attacking the 
naval agreement in the parliament had begun to clarify 
their aims - a naval force limited in operations to the 
26 ./bid, pp. 1778-1792. 
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Australian coast to replace the Auxiliary Squadron - 
and were able to bring consistent pressure to bear on 
Australian politicians."' Alfred Deakin, prime minister 
for much of the period 1903 to 1910, was sympathetic to 
the navalist cause, while the Australian Labor Party 
had made the establishment of a local navy part of 
their political platform. Finally the Japanese victory 
over the Russian fleet at Tsushima in 1905 created a 
potentially hostile naval power in the Pacific and 
fuelled deep-seated Australian fears of Asian 
aggression. 
The first attempt to gain Admiralty support for a 
local naval force came in April 1904 with the formation 
of Australia's first Labor government. The Labor Party 
had opposed the naval agreement in the parliament and 
during the 1903 election had campaigned for a "purely 
Australian navy." 27 Andrew Dawson, the Labor Minister 
for Defence, asked the Admiralty to lend Australia - two 
or three destroyers. Unlike Barton's proposal to 
replace one of the subsidized cruisers with a destroyer 
squadron, the destroyers Dawson requested were to be 
separate from the naval agreement and along the lines 
recommended by Admiral Fanshawe. They were to be manned 
""Atkinson, op. cit., p. 213. 
27 .Sydney Morning Herald, 13 November 1903. 
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and 	maintained 	entirely 	by 	Australia and 	the 
Commonwealth would pay the interest on the cost of 
their construction and contribute toward a sinking 
fund. 28 Dawson, however, had no more success than 
Barton. The Admiralty refused to provide the 
destroyers, repeating the claim that such vessels were 
unsuited for Australian defence and adding, in the hope 
that this would end the matter, that there were in any 
case no destroyers available for loan." 
The return of Alfred Deakin as prime minister on 7 
July 1905 heralded a new and more determined bid to 
establish an Australian naval force. In an interview in 
the Melbourne Herald on 12 June 1905 Deakin had 
expressed concern at Australia's existing defence 
arrangements in the light of changing international 
circumstances. "The march of events during the last few 
years", he claimed, "has revealed the striking growth 
of three new naval powers - the United States, Germany 
and Japan. The condition of their fleets, and the 
condition of those fleets which were previously in 
28 .Lord Northcote, Governor General, to Alfred 
Lyttleton, Colonial Secretary, 22 June 1904, P.R.O., 
C0418/31/2221. 
29 .Admiralty memorandum, 8 August 1904, C.A.0.(M), 
B168 1902/245. 
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existence, oblige us to review the whole situation in 
the light of the possibilities now presented." 3 ° 
For Deakin the most important changes affecting 
Australia resulted from the Japanese victory at 
Tsushima. "What we have to estimate for the future", he 
stated, is that instead of two fleets in the China Seas 
belonging to separate - even opposing - powers, we 
shall now have one fleet, only it will probably be as 
strong as the two former fleets, and will operate under 
one flag."' Deakin emphasized the consequences of this 
situation for Australia. "The Pacific Ocean, as it 
covers two-fifths of the surface of the globe itself", 
he explained, "offers the amplest field for future 
naval developments. The most efficiently equipped, 
supported, and protected naval bases are those to the 
north of China - those in Japan and now at Port 
Arthur." 32 Japan was singled out as the nation posing 
the greatest menace to Australia. "Japan", Deakin 
continued, "is the nearest of all the great foreign 
naval nations to Australia. Japan at her headquarters 
is, so to speak, next door, while the Mother Country is 
".Melbourne Herald, 12 June 1905. The interview 
was subsequently printed as C.P.P., 1905 session, Vol. 
II, No. 31, "The Defence of Australia. (Statement by 
the Honorable Alfred Deakin, M.P.) - Return to Order". 
32.Ibid. 
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many streets away and connected by long lines of 
communications." 33 
To Deakin's mind existing Australian defences were 
"inadequate in numbers, imperfectly supplied with war 
material and exceptionally weak on the naval side." 34 
The British squadron, he argued, was not by itself 
sufficient defence for Australia. Though "our best 
protection" it was part of a fleet head-quartered in 
the China Seas and consequently "may have to perform 
its duties at a great distance from the Commonwealth." 
Australia, Deakin explained, had a coastline from 7,000 
to 8,000 miles in length and it was "unreasonable to 
expect" that the squadron could protect more than a 
portion of this. Moreover, Deakin argued, in the event 
of the squadron being called away to face an enemy 
fleet, Australia's coastal shipping "must be open to 
attack by any cruiser or cruisers operating 
independently of the hostile squadrons." 35 
While Deakin did not propose that Australia acquire 
ocean-going warships he did recommend Australia obtain 
submarines, torpedo boats and destroyers for local 
defence. The necessity for some form of local naval 
33 .Ibid. 
34 .Ibid. 
36.Ibid. 
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defence appeared to newspapers such as the Melbourne 
Age and the Sydney Morning Herald to have been 
reinforced by the events of the Russo-Japanese War. 
"Long after the main Russian fleet was 'bottled up' in 
Port Arthur and Japan had complete control of the sea", 
the Age proclaimed, "the Japanese nation lost as much 
as £150,000 a day from the trade paralysis caused in 
the north islands by the sallies of Russian raiding 
cruisers from Vladivostock"" To the Age this was "the 
very least part of the evil that would happen to us if 
we were visited by raiding war ships". Australian 
trade, they warned, would be "completely dislocated and 
palsied" while "we should also have to fear bombardment 
from a safe distance of many of our ports." 37 To the 
Sydney Morning Herald the "illustration afforded by the 
Port Arthur incident" also made the need for coastal 
defence more apparent. "Coastal defence", they argued, 
"cannot be provided for in a day . . It is clearly 
better to weigh the question now, while we have time 
than to be driven to act in a hurry under the influence•
of a scare." 38 
In August 1905 Deakin seized upon comments by 
Admiral Fanshawe as a pretext for requesting a revision 
of the naval agreement. Fanshawe had taken up the 
"'Melbourne Age, 17 October 1905. 
37 .Ibid. 
38 .Sydney Morning Herald, 15 February 1905. 
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Australia command in January 1903 and, with a new naval 
agreement recently concluded, had not received the 
detailed instructions his predecessor had been given on 
being sent to Australia. As a result the hapless 
Fanshawe was not aware of the subtleties of the 
Admiralty's Australian policy. He had already earned 
the disapproval of his superiors at the Admiralty over 
his support for Barton's destroyer proposal. In May 
1905 he further embarrassed the Admiralty by publicly 
claiming that Australian cities were "comparatively 
naked to an invader who might risk the enterprise of 
capturing them."" Hoping to encourage a greater 
subsidy from Australia, Fanshawe had used an Empire Day 
speech to argue that, as only the British fleet stood 
between Australia and this threat, the Commonwealth 
should at the very least double the "beggarly" £200,000 
a year promised under the naval agreement." Did the 
Lords of the Admiralty, Deakin inquired, share Admiral 
Fanshawe's apparent dissatisfaction with the 1902 - 
agreement?" 
Having established a pretext for changing the naval 
agreement only two years after its inception, Deakin 
".Melbourne Age, 26 May 1905. 
40.  Ibid. 
41 .Deakin•to Northcote, 28 August 1905. C.P.P., 
1906 session, Vol. II, No. 98, "Naval Agreement with 
Australia and New Zealand. (Correspondence between the 
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proceeded to claim that it "is not, and never has been, 
popular in the Commonwealth. "42 The agreement, Deakin 
argued, had been "approved only in default of a better 
means of indicating our acceptance of Imperial 
responsibilities." Furthermore, apart from the 
provision for the training of a handful of Australian 
seamen in the squadron, there was "no visible evidence 
of our participation in the Naval Force to which we 
contribute .... there is so far nothing naval that can 
be termed Australian, or even Australasian. No 
Commonwealth patriotism is aroused while we merely 
supply funds that disappear in the general expenditure 
of the Admiralty. The Imperial sentiment languishes 
too, since the squadron is rarely seen in most of our 
ports, and then only by a small proportion of the 
population." According to Deakin "what is really 
required is that any defences, if they are to be 
appreciated as Australian, must be distinctively of 
that character."'" 
Deakin put forward two proposals for a new 
arrangement. "The Admiralty", he asserted, "probably 
desires naval and coaling stations in Australia other 
than those already or likely to be hereafter 
established at such of our seaports as may be defended 
by local works." These the Commonwealth could provide 
42 . Ib i d. 
Ibid. 
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as a contribution to imperial defence. 44 Appreciating 
that such works "might possibly be criticized as 
devices for the spending of money upon our own shores, 
or for local benefit only", Deakin also suggested that 
the money currently provided under the naval agreement 
be used to subsidize a number of swift steamers running 
between Australia and England which could be converted 
into armed merchant cruisers in time of war. "There can 
be no doubt", Deakin claimed, "but that an agreement of 
this character would be immensely more popular than 
that which forms the schedule to the Act of 1903. The 
ships would be always in evidence, their value would be 
felt and their purpose a matter of pride. The Naval 
Forces of the Empire would be at least as much 
strengthened as by the existing arrangement, quite 
apart from all the commercial and other advantages of 
the present proposal. "4 6 
Despite Deakin's claims the proposals had clearly 
been structured for Australia's advantage. The 
Admiralty had no wish for further bases in Australia 
and Deakin had no cause to believe that they had. The 
whole cost of the Australian squadron would once again 
be borne by British taxpayers and Australia would be 
making no contribution to imperial naval forces. As for 
the subsidized merchant cruiser plan, Australia was 
44 .Ibid. 
45 .Ibid. 
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already paying £120,000 a year to the Orient Company 
for a fortnightly mail service under an agreement that 
was due to expire in 1908. Any new naval arrangement 
providing a similar service in lieu of the existing 
naval subsidy would therefore more than likely be a net 
saving to the Commonwealth. 
The financial benefits of Deakin's proposals for 
Australia did not go unnoticed in London. "Australia", 
Under Secretary of State for Colonies, Sir Montagu 
Ommanney, minuted, "would get all she now has and a 
subsidized mail and passenger service in addition. "48 
At a time when Britain was experiencing a financial 
crisis and was urging her colonies to bear a larger 
part of the burden of imperial defence Deakin's 
proposals were seen as self-serving and ungrateful. 
Ommanney's assistant, Bertram Cox, slammed Australia's 
lack of imperial sentiment. "For the Empire as a 
whole", he claimed, "... [Australians] care little when 
it comes to paying for its expenses & the amount they 
contribute is but a drop in the ocean." 47 To Cox, 
Deakin's complaints were an excellent excuse for 
scrapping the agreement altogether. The size of the 
Australian Squadron, Cox argued, was "ridiculous" and 
Minute by Sir Montagu Ommanney, Under Secretary 
of State for Colonies, P.R.O., CO 418/37/32514. 
47 .Minute by Bertram Cox, Assistant Under Secretary 
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"contrary to naval strategic principles and common 
sense. . 48  The agreement should be cancelled and the 
squadron reduced, the few remaining ships presumably 
being maintained at Britain's expense. 
Bertram Cox's suggestion that Deakin's criticisms 
of the 1902 agreement should be used by Britain as an 
excuse for scrapping the agreement and reducing the 
number of warships stationed in Australia was related 
to the dramatic change in the naval situation in the 
Far East following Tsushima. With Russia no longer a 
naval power in the Far East Britain did not need to 
maintain the same level of naval forces in the Pacific. 
This was recognized in a revised alliance with Japan, 
concluded on 12 August 1905, which dropped the secret 
naval provisions of 	the 	first 	alliance." 	Soon 
afterwards all five British battleships based in China 
were withdrawn to reinforce the fleet in home waters. 
"The annihilation of the [Russian] Baltic Fleet by 
Japan, single-handed", the Admiralty explained in 
justification of this decision, "plainly proves that 
the Anglo-Japanese naval strength in the Far East was, 
even before the 27 May, amply sufficient [while] 
under existing circumstances, the Anglo-Japanese fleet 
48 .Ibid. 
"'Nish, op. cit., pp. 323-358. 
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in the Far East is unnecessarily and preposterously 
strong."" The Australian Squadron was included in this 
assessment, it being regarded as part of Britain's Far 
Eastern forces when the relative balance of naval 
strength in the Far East was calculated. 51 
It might be expected that the Admiralty would have 
enthusiastically embraced Cox's suggestion. As the 
memorandum quoted above indicates the Admiralty 
believed 	Britain's 	naval 	forces 	in 	the Pacific 
following Tsushima were far stronger than was 
necessary. The Russian defeat cleared the way for a 
further major rationalization of the Royal Navy along 
the lines initiated by Lord Selborne four years before. 
The naval agreement with Australia and New Zealand 
stood in the way of this process. While the Admiralty 
were free to reduce their China based forces they were 
committed to maintaining a fixed squadron on the 
Australia Station. The Admiralty, however, did not 
adopt Cox's proposal. On the contrary, in their 
official response, not despatched until June 1906 nine 
months after Deakin's original correspondence and well 
after changes to their other naval forces in the 
Pacific, the Admiralty rejected all suggestions that 
50 Admiralty memorandum, "The Balance of Naval 
Power in the Far East", The Papers of Admiral Sir John 
Fisher, ed. P. Kemp, (London, 1964), Vol. II, p. 81. 
51.Ibid. 
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the naval agreement should be either altered or 
cancelled. They desired to "dissociate themselves 
absolutely from any expression of dissatisfaction with 
the terms of the Agreement." 52 Deakin's proposal to 
replace the Australian contribution to the Royal Navy 
with a subsidized merchant cruiser scheme was also 
dismissed. "Experience of this method of supplementing 
the war strength of the Fleet", the Admiralty stated, 
"has proved that it is not only of extremely limited 
efficacy, but costly in its operation." 52 
Within a year of the Admiralty expressing total 
satisfaction with the naval agreement they were to 
desire its termination. Indeed in August 1906, only two 
months after coming out in support of the agreement, 
the Admiralty informed the Commonwealth government 
that: 
It may at once be admitted that if the 
Board of Admiralty were free to determine 
on purely strategic grounds the class and 
number of ships on the Australian Station, 
as they are in every other quarter of the 
globe, they would not maintain the 
Squadron at its present strength, but set 
free the ships and men for service in 
waters where they are more required. 54 
52 .Lord Elgin, Secretary of State for Colonies, to 
Northcote, 8 June 1906, C.P.P., 1906 session, Vol. II, 
No. 98, op. cit., p. 3. 
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Why then did the Admiralty dismiss Colonial Office 
recommendations that the naval agreement be terminated 
in 1906? And why had this attitude changed so 
dramatically by 1907? The Admiralty Papers, contain a 
wealth of material relating to Australian naval defence 
in this period, much of it only superficially 
examined." It is to this material and to events within 
the Admiralty that we must turn to seek answers to 
these questions. 
As was mentioned above the Japanese victory at Tsushima 
changed overnight the naval situation in the Far East 
and with it the strategic and political requirements 
upon which the 1902 agreement had been based. The 
Admiralty's jubilation over the Japanese victory is 
best illustrated by their own words. "The crippling of 
Russia's naval strength", an Admiralty memorandum 
announced in June 1905, "which in conjunction with that 
of her ally [France] had been for years a potential 
threat to us, has been a material advantage to this 
country, and Japan's success in maintaining the 
principle of freedom of trade in one of the most 
promising markets of the world, has, by safeguarding 
55 .In particular Adm 116/1241B. 
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our commercial interests, been an unmixed piece of good 
fortune for Great Britain." 56 
The Japanese victory could not have come at a more 
propitious time for Britain as it allowed the fleet 
redistribution which had been foreshadowed by the 1902 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance to be put fully into effect. 
The need for fleet reorganization had become more 
urgent as the wider implications of German naval 
developmentcame to be appreciated. Germany's expanding 
industrial and financial capacity combined with her 
limited overseas commitments meant that German naval 
expansion posed a grave threat to Britain's security. 
"The new German Navy", Lord Selborne announced on 6 
December 1904, "has come into existence. It is a Navy 
of the most efficient type and is so fortunately 
circumstanced that it is able to concentrate almost the 
whole of its fleet at its home ports." 57 
The architect of the reorganization of the Royal 
Navy was Admiral Sir John Fisher. Fisher had been 
appointed First Sea Lord in October 1904. His primary 
object was to improve the 'fighting efficiency' of the 
56 Admiraltymemorandum, "Renewal of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance", June 1905, The Fisher Papers, Vol. 
II, p. 71. 
57 •Selborne 	memorandum, 	"Distribution 	and 
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navy. Economy was also a strong motivation. 58 The naval 
estimates had continued to rise both in real terms and 
as a percentage of government expenditure and there was 
substantial pressure in Britain for their reduction. 
The desire for economy, Aaron Friedberg has shown, was 
a major factor contributing to the movement for defence 
reorganization in Britain at this time and Fisher 
readily appreciated the possibility of combining his 
desire for greater efficiency with the politicians 
demand for lower budgets." 
Fisher looked upon the dispositions of the Royal 
Navy as outdated, a relic of an era when British naval 
mastery had been largely unchallenged. Writing in the 
first volume of Naval Necessities circulated among the 
Board of Admiralty soon after his appointment as First 
Sea Lord, Fisher stated: 
The Navy and the country have grown so 
accustomed to the territorial nomenclature 
of our distant squadrons that their 
connection with the sea is considerably 
obscured and their association with 
certain lands has led to the tacit belief 
that those particular squadrons are for 
the protection of the lands they frequent, 
58 .A. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: 
The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era 1904-1919, (London, 
1961), Vol. I, p. 23. 
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and not generally for the destruction of 
the enemy's fleet wherever it may happen 
to be." 
A detailed account of Fisher's reforms can be found 
elsewhere." One of the most important, from 
Australia's point of view, was a new scheme of nucleus 
crews intended to improve the efficiency of the reserve 
fleet in Britain. To provide personnel for this scheme 
Fisher scrapped some 154 old cruisers and gunboats, 
many serving on foreign stations." The naval stations 
too were to be revised. The Pacific Station was 
abandoned. The South Atlantic, North American and West 
African stations were formed into a single, greatly 
expanded Cape Station. The Australia, China and East 
Indies stations were also to be amalgamated into a 
single Eastern command centred on Singapore." 
Though Admiral Fisher had the support of Lord 
Selborne and the Balfour government in implementing his 
'rationalization' of the Royal Navy his reforms gave 
rise to a storm of opposition. Dubbed by Fisher the 
syndicate of discontent", this opposition began to 
make itself felt from the middle of 1905. Its 
membership was broadly based and included a large 
".The Fisher Papers, Vol. I, p. 36. 
el.Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 
I, pp. 28-46. 
".Ibid, p. 39. 
".Ibid, pp. 40-42. 
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section of the navy as well as leading politicians and 
journalists." The policy of scrapping large numbers of 
cruisers and smaller vessels came in for particular 
criticism and Fisher was accused of undermining the 
traditions and capability of the Royal Navy in the 
interests of economy." In particular, it was claimed 
that the reduction in the Royal Navy's cruiser force 
would make it very difficult to protect Britain's 
maritime trade in war. Admiral Sir Reginald Custance 
was a leading critic from this perspective. A former 
Director of Naval Intelligence, Custance, it will be 
recalled, had prepared the "Memorandum on Sea Power and 
the Principles Involved in it", the Admiralty's much 
touted statement of strategic principles tabled at the 
1902 colonial conference. While he accepted that 
"command of the sea can only be decided by hostile 
fleets meeting and fighting", Custance believed that 
attacks on commerce remained a serious threat and that 
the defence of British trade required "a large number 
of small ships and not a small number of large ones."'" 
".Rhodri Williams, "Arthur James Balfour, Sir John 
Fisher and the Politics of Naval Reform, 1904-10", 
Historical Research, Vol. LX, No. 141, (February, 
1987), p. 82. 
66 .Ibid. Also Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea 
Power, pp. 493-494. 
""Admiral 	Sir 	Reginald 	Custance 	[published 
anonymously], "The Growth of the Capital Ship", 
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Vol. CLXXVII, No. 
1,087, (May, 1906), p. 596. 
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It was into this turmoil that Deakin's proposed 
revision of the naval agreement arrived in August 1905. 
The bitter in-fighting within the Admiralty and the 
wider controversy surrounding Fisher's reforms perhaps 
explain why the Admiralty were so dilatory in 
responding to Deakin's inquiries. At the beginning of 
1906 the sixty-four year old Fisher was fighting to 
retain his position. His commission as admiral was due 
to expire on 25 January and he was only spared enforced 
retirement by being made an admiral of the fleet, the 
highest rank in the service and one which carried no 
age restriction." It was one of the last acts of the 
Balfour government, the Liberals under Campbell-
Bannerman winning a landslide victory in the December 
1905 elections. 
With a new First Lord and the continuation of 
Fisher's reforms far from certain the Admiralty's 
support for the status quo in their relationship with 
Australia was understandable. Moreover it had been the 
Admiralty which had put forward the proposals which 
formed the basis of the naval agreement and it was 
based upon principles for which they had argued 
strongly in 1902. The agreement also filled the dual 
functions of deterring the development of a local navy 
".R.F. Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone, (Oxford, 
1973), p. 345. 
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by Australia and encouraging contributions by the 
colonies to the Royal Navy. These were important 
considerations to the Admiralty and it is significant 
that in reaffirming their support for the naval 
agreement they singled out comments by Deakin admitting 
the ,. paramount importance of the Navy to 
Australia" and Australia's "obligations to share in the 
general defence of the Empire."'" "My Lords", the 
Admiralty communique explained, "are glad to find from 
Mr. Deakin's despatch that the paramount importance of 
the Navy to the whole British Empire and to Australia 
is not questioned, and that the moral obligation of the 
Commonwealth to share in the general defence of the 
Empire is recognized."'" 
There is additional evidence that the naval 
agreement's role in discouraging colonial warship 
building was a key factor behind the Admiralty's 
continued support for it in 1906. Late in 1905 Vice 
Admiral Sir Wilmot Fawkes had replaced Admiral Fanshawe 
as Commander-in-Chief Australia Station. Like his 
predecessor Fawkes soon became acquainted with the 
navalist lobby in Australia and with the navalist 
sympathies of prime minister Alfred Deakin. As a way of 
86 .Deakin to Northcote, 28 August 1905, op. cit. 
".Admiralty memorandum in Elgin to Northcote, 8 
June 1906, op. cit. 
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satisfying the demand for a local Australian navy in a 
manner which would be of value to Britain, Fawkes 
proposed that the Admiralty might use Australian 
warships to patrol the waters of the south west 
Pacific. This task had hitherto been a responsibility 
of the Royal Navy. The naval agreement, which according 
to Deakin was so unpopular in Australia, could be 
cancelled and the Admiralty left free to determine the 
size of the Australian Squadron on strategic grounds 
alone." The Admiralty, however, rejected Fawkes' 
suggestion out of hand. Memories of the problems with 
colonial navies in the early 1880s came flooding back. 
The international status of colonial warships was still 
unresolved and there remained the possibility that an 
Australian government might act unilaterally against 
the wider interests of Britain. "The whole relationship 
of the ships to the colonial governments and to the 
Imperial 	government", 	the 	Director 	of 	Naval 
Intelligence noted in regard to Fawkes' _proposal, _ 
"bristles with difficulties, especially in the manner 
of the control of their movements amongst the [Pacific] 
islands."'" 
".Fawkes to Admiralty, 4 January 1906, P.R.O., Adm 
116/12418. 
71 •D.N.I. memorandum, 29 January 1906, P.R.O., Adm 
116/12418. 
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The Admiralty's opposition to colonial naval 
development was also reflected in the 1906 report on 
Australian defence requirements by the Committee of 
Imperial Defence. The C.I.D. had been established 
following inquiries into the early disasters of the 
South African War. Under the supervision of the prime 
minister and with its own secretariat the C.I.D. was 
given the role of co-ordinating the defence resources 
and strategic planning of Britain and the empire. The 
Colonial Defence Committee, which had previously served 
as the official conduit of advice to the colonies on 
defence matters, was made a sub-committee of the new 
organization. 72 
The 	C.I.D 	report 	was 	little 	more 	than 	a 
re-capitulation of the strategic arguments against 
local navies which the Admiralty had offered the 
colonial prime ministers in 1902. It differed mainly in 
elaborating a specific level of threat to Australia. At 
worst, the C.I.D. claimed, Australia need fear attack 
from only three unarmoured cruisers and a landing force 
not exceeding a thousand men." Against such a low 
72 •F. Johnson, Defence by Committee: The British 
Committee of Imperial Defence 1885-1959, (London, 
1960), PP. 49-81. 
73 .C.P.P., 1906 session, Vol. II, No. 62, "Report 
of the Committee of Imperial Defence upon a General 
Scheme of Defence for Australia", p. 4. 
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level of threat, it was argued, coastal fortifications 
and small infantry garrisons were all that was 
required. Local naval forces were unnecessary. "Having 
regard to the nature of the attack to which Australian 
ports are liable", the report explained, . the 
benefits to be rendered to the coast defence by 
destroyers appear altogether incommensurate with the 
expenditure that would be entailed by their 
maintenance."'" 
The specific reference to destroyers in the report 
was connected with a proposal by Captain Creswell for 
an Australian destroyer squadron. In 1906 Creswell, now 
officially Director of the Commonwealth Naval Forces, 
had seized the opportunity afforded by his annual 
report to the parliament to advance the case for a 
local navy. Australian trade, Creswell claimed, was 
particularly vulnerable to enemy raiders. The 
Australian Squadron was likely to be called away from 
Australian waters in war and isolation was no longer a 
protection. "With no local sea defence", he argued, 
"the most ordinary merchant steamer, extemporized as a 
cruiser, would have the whole of our coastal shipping 
at his command."'" A squadron of destroyers and torpedo 
"./bid, p. 13: 
75 .C.P.P., 1906 session, Vol. II, No. 44, "Naval 
Defence. Report of the Director of the Naval Forces for 
the Year 1905", p. 10. 
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boats, Creswell claimed, was essential - for commerce 
protection and safety of populous centres against 
raiders and commerce destroyers."'" 
Creswell's emphasis on a commerce protection role 
for an Australian destroyer squadron was opportunistic. 
Commerce protection had been the subject of much debate 
in naval circles in Britain since the late nineteenth 
century when both France and Russia had commenced 
building large cruisers specifically to wage war on 
Britain's maritime trade. Guerre de course (war of 
pursuit), as the strategy of attacking maritime trade 
was known, had become a hot political issue in 1905 
with the scrapping of large numbers of cruisers under 
Admiral Fisher's naval rationalization programme. The 
opponents of Fisher's policy claimed that the reduction 
of the Royal Navy's cruiser force would gravely expose 
British trade to attack at the outbreak of a war. 
'Blue water' theorists dismissed concern about 
attacks on Britain's maritime trade. Guerre de course, 
they claimed, could never be decisive and would 
therefore be rejected in favour of fleet concentration. 
It was a view favoured by the Admiralty." There was 
" . Ib i d. 
77 .See in particular Admiralty memorandum, "The 
Protection of Oceanic Trade in War", 31 April 1905, 
P.R.O., Cab 17/3. 
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more involved here, however, than an academic debate 
about strategic philosophy. 'Blue water' arguments 
played a central part in explaining and justifying the 
rationalization and redistribution of the Royal Navy. 
The Fisher rationalization was an integral part of the 
government's efforts to reduce expenditure and contain 
taxation, and Admiral Fisher and his supporters had the 
backing of the government because they promised to 
deliver savings in the naval estimates. 
Creswell would have been aware of the debate about 
commerce protection inspired by the naval 
rationalization programme. Numerous articles on the 
subject were published in popular journals such as 
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Cornhill Magazine and 
The Nineteenth Century in 1905 and 1906. 78 Not 
surprisingly, appearing to side with the opponents of 
the rationalization programme did not advance 
Creswell's reputation with the Admiralty or the 
government. Visiting London early in 1906 he received a 
frosty reception from British officialdom. He was 
denied access to the preliminary draft of the C.I.D. 
78 .Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, p. 
493. 
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report and was snubbed by the Admiralty.'" When finally 
released the C.I.D. report poured scorn on Creswell's 
recommendations. "The proposals", it stated in 
reference to his scheme, "appear to be based upon an 
imperfect conception of the requirements of naval 
strategy at the present day, and the proper application 
of naval force."'" The protection of Australia's 
coastal trade, however, which was central to Creswell's 
arguments for a local naval force, was largely ignored. 
"The distribution at any moment of foreign navies, and 
of all merchant vessels likely to be employed as armed 
auxiliaries", the report stated, "is known in time of 
peace [and] during the period of strained relations 
every effort will be made to keep the ships of the 
prospective enemy under observation." Despite this, the 
C.I.D. accepted that some commerce raiders might escape 
the Admiralty's eye and fall upon Australian shipping 
but their only advice was that Australia maintain a 
number of "fortified harbours of refuge" where 
79 .The Board of Admiralty left on an extended tour 
of inspection the day after Creswell had presented his 
introduction without making any arrangements for 
meeting with him. "Report of the Director of Naval 
Forces (Capt. W.R. Creswell, C.M.G.) on his visit to 
England in 1906 to Inquire into the Latest Naval 
Developments", R.A.N.A., 185i. An edited version of 
this report appears as C.P.P., 1906 session, Vol. II, 
No. 82. 
report, C.P.P., 	1906 session, 	Vol. II, 
No. 62, 	op. cit., p. 13. 
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merchant ships could remain in safety until British 
warships could be despatched to protect them." 
In rejecting the establishment of a local naval 
force the C.I.D. had ignored a request by Deakin that 
they include the provision of local naval defence in 
their scheme of defence for Australia. 82 "What", Deakin 
wrote to Richard Jebb of the C.I.D. in July 1906, "can 
one do with such people?" 88 Deakin had already decided 
to proceed with the establishment of a local flotilla 
and had hoped the C.I.D. report would provide both 
guidance and support in this undertaking. 8 4 With the 
report's rejection of local naval defence the problem 
for Deakin became one of how to proceed with his 
planswithout unduly offending the imperial 
authorities." "Self-respect, self-esteem, self-
assertion", Deakin subsequently wrote anonymously in 
the London Morning Post, "whatever name is given to it, 
a sentiment of the duty of self-defence, strong 
_ 
already, is growing stronger the more we realize our 
81 .Ibid, p. 5. 
82 .Deakin to Sir George Clarke, 8 January 1906, 
Deakin Papers, N.L.A., Ms 1540/38/461. 
82 .Deakin to Richard Jebb, 23 July 1906, Deakin-
Jebb Correspondence, N.L.A., Ms 339. 
88 •J.A. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin: A Biography, 
(Melbourne, 1965), Vol. II, p. 533. 
88 .See Meaney, op. cit., pp. 138-140. 
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strategically perilous position south of the awakening 
Asiatic peoples and as one of the two wardens of the 
Pacific Ocean. This sentiment, which the report 
mentions only to ignore, will on this point ignore the 
report."'" 
Deakin had already been accumulating information on 
the naval agreement with a view to revealing 
dissatisfaction in Australia and bad faith on the part 
of the Admiralty. Quarterly returns of fleet movements 
were requested. Deakin, one student of Australian 
defence policy has argued, hoped that the British 
authorities, under pressure, would accommodate 
Australian demands."'" In late 1905 the arrival of 
H.M.S. Powerful in Australia appeared to provide an 
instance of the Admiralty's failure to live up to the 
terms of the agreement. 
Under the terms of the naval agreement the 
Australian Squadron was to include at least one 
armoured cruiser. In accordance with this requirement 
H.M.S. Euryalus had succeeded H.M.S. ,Royal Arthur as 
flagship of the Australian Squadron in 1904. Launched 
se.London Morning Post, 6 October 1906. A. Deakin, 
Federated Australia: Selections from Letters to the 
Morning Post 1900-1910, ed. J. La Nauze, (Melbourne, 
1968), pp. 189-190. The letter was written on 20 August 
1906. 
67 .Atkinson, op. cit., p. 274. 
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only in 1901, Euryalus was a 12,000 ton vessel armed 
with two 9.2-inch and twelve 6-inch guns. More 
particularly she reflected the recent return among 
world navies to armoured cruisers - that is she had a 
belt of armour plate up to six inches thick running 
along her waterline as well as armour protection for 
her deck and guns. Her presence on the Australia 
Station was the result of Britain's commitments under 
the secret provisions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
outlined in the previous chapter. With the destruction 
of the Russian fleet at Tsushima, however, Britain no 
longer needed to maintain such a modern armoured ship 
in the Pacific. Euryalus was withdrawn to waters nearer 
home. 
Euryalus was replaced on the Australia Station by 
H.M.S. Powerful. Powerful had been launched in 1895 
following the construction of large cruisers by France 
and Russia for the purpose of attacking British 
maritime commerce. Powerful was a massive vessel, 
14,200 tons and 520 feet on the waterline, larger than 
many battleships of her day. It had not been envisaged, 
however, that Powerful, would engage armoured vessels 
and as a result she had no waterline belt of armour and 
only light armour on her deck and turrets. Powerful was 
out of place in the battle fleet. Her large size made 
her unwieldy and unsuited to fleet manoeuvres while her 
lack of armour made her a liability in a fleet 
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action." It was for these reasons that Powerful was 
sent to Australia in 1905. Lacking an armoured belt 
Powerful was officially classed as a protected cruiser 
not an armoured cruiser and it was this that Deakin 
seized as an instance of the Admiralty flaunting the 
naval agreement. 
Following questions in the parliament Deakin 
complained to the Admiralty about the apparent breach 
in the naval agreement. In reply the Admiralty offered 
Australia H.M.S. Monmouth." The weakness of Deakin's 
tactic was exposed. While not technically an armoured 
cruiser, Powerful, with her large size and great 
operational range was well-fitted for Australian 
service. Moreover she had been specifically designed to 
hunt down and destroy enemy commerce raiders, the very 
threat about which Australian navalists harped. In 
contrast Monmouth, though officially an armoured 
cruiser by virtue of a belt of armour along the 
waterline, was a smaller and less heavily armed, if 
newer, ship. Out-manoeuvred, an irritated Deakin 
reluctantly accepted the Admiralty's original decision. 
Deakin summarized his complaints on the working of 
the naval agreement in a letter to the Colonial 
88 .Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1860- 
1905, op. cit. 
89 .Admiralty memorandum in Lyttleton to Northcote, 
29 December 1905, A.A.0.(C), CP290/15/86. 
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Secretary on 26 April 1906. Though the Admiralty, he 
claimed, had pressed for payment of the naval subsidy 
from 28 August 1903 and Australia had duly paid her 
share, no increase in the strength of the squadron had 
taken place until 1904. Despatch of the second-class 
cruisers had been "marked with even less promptitude", 
it had been over two years before H.M.S. Cambrian had 
joined the squadron. Moreover, Deakin complained, the 
Cambrian had been sent on a flag-showing tour of the 
United States without the Commonwealth's approval and, 
making a reference to the Powerful affair, the 
Admiralty had not supplied vessels in strict adherence 
with the terms of the agreement." 
On 26 September 1906 Deakin announced his intention 
to proceed with the establishment of a local destroyer 
flotilla. Australia, he told parliament, would embark 
on a three year plan to acquire eight coastal 
destroyers and four torpedo boats at a cost of 
£250,000. 91 In defending this decision against the 
arguments of the C.I.D. Deakin seized upon the threat 
to Britain from the expansion of the German navy. The 
German naval programme, Deakin pointed out, had 
".Deakin to Northcote, 26 April 1906, A.A.0.(C), 
CP290/15/B6. 
91 .C.P.D., 1906 session, Vol. XXXV, pp. 5577-5578, 
26 September 1906. 
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attracted much attention in the British press and the 
Admiralty had admitted that it had far-reaching 
consequences for Britain but it had not been mentioned 
in the C.I.D. report on Australian defence. The German 
ship-building programme, Deakin claimed, would cause "a 
serious disturbance of the battleship power of the 
world and of naval influence, which depend so largely 
upon the command of battleships." For this reason, the 
prime minister explained, Australia "should develop to 
the utmost her self-dependence in our waters."'" 
In initiating a local naval programme Deakin did 
not have universal support, even from within his own 
party. Some, like Senator Playford, while not 
enthusiastic supporters of a local navy, were willing 
to go along with their leader provided the money could 
be found. Others, such as the treasurer, Sir William 
Lyne, were opposed to any abrogation of the naval 
agreement. Deakin could, however, rely on the support 
of the Labor Party in the parliament. It was Labor 
policy to establish a national navy and many, if not 
all, Laborites were prepared to accept any reasonable 
plan for local naval defence." Likewise the press were 
divided in their support for Deakin's initiatives." In 
92 .Ibid. 
93 .Atkinson, op. cit., p. 295. 
94 .Ibid, p. 296. 
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this situation Deakin merely indicated his intentions. 
Beyond that, writes Leon Atkinson, there was hesitancy 
and evasion as he awaited the outcome of the imperial 
conference due to convene in early 1907." 
Throughout 1905 and 1906 Deakin had brought pressure to 
bear on the imperial authorities in the hope that they 
would moderate their position on local naval forces in 
order to accommodate Australian wishes. At the 1907 
colonial conference Deakin's strategy appeared to have 
triumphed. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord 
Tweedmouth, announced the Admiralty's willingness: 
to consider a modification of the existing 
arrangements to meet the views of the 
various Colonies." 
While the Admiralty continued to argue that a single, 
centrally-controlled navy was the best means of 
defending the empire they were no longer insistent that 
contributions from the colonies should be in the form 
of money only. They were now prepared to enter into any 
96 .Ibid. 
".G.B.P.P., 	1907 session, 	Vol. 	LV, Cd. 	3523, 
"Colonial Conference 1907. Minutes of the Proceedings 
of the Colonial Conference", p. 130. 
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arrangements with the colonies which were suitable to 
them and which "may seem to bring advantage to the 
Navy."'" Indeed the colonies were now to be positively 
encouraged to develop local naval defence forces. "It 
would be of great assistance", Tweedmouth explained, 
"if the Colonial Governments would undertake to provide 
for local service in the Imperial squadrons the smaller 
vessels that are useful for defence against possible 
raids or for co-operation with a squadron, and also to 
equip and maintain docks and fitting establishments 
which can be used by His Majesty's ships."'" 
This was an extraordinary demarche by the 
Admiralty. While it is true, as Professor Gordon has 
pointed out," that the level of colonial participation 
in naval defence proposed by the Admiralty did not go 
far beyond the limits of the Colonial Naval Defence Act 
of 1865, their new proposals did represent a complete 
reversal from the position they had taken at the 1902 
colonial conference and, indeed, from the position that 
had been elaborated in the C.I.D. report on Australian 
defence, produced less than twelve months earlier. The 
97 .Ibid. 
98 .Ibid. 
"'Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial 
Defense, p. 210. See also "The Admiralty and the 
Dominion Navies, 1902-1914", Journal of Modern History, 
Vol. XXXIII, (December, 1961), p. 411. 
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Admiralty described this sudden change in their 
position on colonial naval defence as a concession to 
those colonies which desired distinctive naval services 
of their own. His Majesty's government, they explained, 
recognized "the natural desire of the self-governing 
Colonies to have a more particular share in providing 
the naval defence force of the Empire."'" 
It is this public explanation by the Admiralty of 
their change of policy which was behind the charges of 
Australian "particularism" which pervade so many of the 
early British studies of Anglo-Australian relations. 
Writers such as A.B. Keith, Henry Hall and W.K. Hancock 
are all critical of Australia for seeking to induce the 
Admiralty to change their position on local naval 
defence despite cogent strategic arguments against 
local navies. 101  Even Donald Gordon, writing in 1961, 
saw the Admiralty's acceptance of local colonial naval 
forces largely in terms of an accommodation of colonial 
feelings. "The devotion of the Admiralty to the 
principle of unity in imperial naval defense", he 
writes, "was diluted by a measure of understanding that 
100 .Cd. 3523, op. cit., p. 130. 
'"A.B. Keith, Imperial Unity and the Dominions, 
(Oxford, 1916), p. 333, H. Hall, Australia and England: 
A Study in Imperial Relations, (London, 1934), p. 251, 
W.K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 
Vol. I, (London, 1937), p. 37. 
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strategic principles had to yield in some degree to 
political facts. "102  More recent writers have seen the 
Admiralty's change of heart over local navies in the 
context of the withdrawal of the British battleships 
from China and proposals to reorganize British naval 
stations in the Pacific." 3 It will be argued, however, 
that the Admiralty's change of attitude on colonial 
naval defence in 1907 can not be considered in 
isolation from the wider strategic situation, or, 
indeed, 	from the domestic political situation in 
Britain at the time. It is to the wider background of 
Admiralty policy and domestic British politics that we 
must turn in order to unravel the many factors which 
shaped the Admiralty's position at the 1907 colonial 
conference. 
As has been noted above, the Admiralty had 
continued to support the naval agreement with Australia 
and New Zealand well into 1906, well after the Japanese 
victory at Tsushima and the withdrawal of the British 
battleships from China. In 1905, however, when Deakin 
first proposed changes to the agreement, the Admiralty 
had been preoccupied with internal wrangling. Moreover 
Deakin's alternative to the naval agreement, a 
102 Gordon, 	"The 	Admiralty and 	the Dominion 
Navies", p. 411. 
" 3 .Bach, op. cit., p.192. 
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subsidized merchant cruiser scheme, was impractical and 
clearly motivated by self-interest. By the middle of 
1906 the situation had changed. Admiral Fisher had 
weathered the initial storm of protest over his naval 
reform programme and, equally important, had secured 
the support of the new Liberal government. 104 
The new Liberal government, unlike its Conservative 
predecessors, was not interested in schemes of imperial 
federation. 105  This was important because it meant the 
Liberal government was not likely to oppose the 
termination of the naval agreement because of a belief 
that it was a an initial step along the road to an 
imperial Kriegsverein. Furthermore the agreement had 
lost its value as a discouragement to naval development 
by Australia. This had always been a major 
consideration in the Admiralty's support for the 
agreement. Deakin's announcement that his government 
intended to proceed with a local destroyer flotilla 
regardless of the feeling in London, however, suggested 
that the agreement was no longer effective in this 
role. The 1865 Colonial Naval Defence Act was still on 
the statute books and Australia retained the power to 
1 ° 4 .0n this see Williams, op. cit., pp. 84-85. 
166 .Rona1d Hyam, 	Elgin and Churchill at the 
Colonial Office, 1905-1908, (London, 1968), p. 317. 
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operate warships for harbour and coastal defence. A 
subsequent inquiry by the Colonial Office confirmed 
this.'" 
The Admiralty, of course, could have denounced 
Deakin's decision to proceed with a destroyer flotilla 
and refused to co-operate with the Commonwealth in 
setting it up. They had, after all, successfully 
deterred the Barton and Watson governments from 
establishing an Australian destroyer force. But when 
Barton and Watson had tried to acquire destroyers the 
naval agreement had still been of strategic value to 
the Admiralty. By 1906 the Russian defeat at Tsushima, 
the revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the 
signing of the entente cordiale had all served to 
undermine the strategic value of the agreement to 
Britain. Of even greater importance, however, was the 
way these strategic changes had altered the financial 
balance of the agreement. 
The importance of financial considerations in the 
reorganization and redistribution of the Royal Navy 
under Admiral Fisher have generally been overshadowed 
by the strategic considerations. But financial concerns 
were at the heart of the movement for defence 
1 ".Law Office to Colonial Office, 21 August 1908, 
P.R.O., CO 418/87/31190. 
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reorganization in Britain from the outset. Pressure 
from the Treasury for reductions in naval expenditure 
had been one reason behind Lord Selborne's support for 
an alliance with Japan in 1901. The Liberals, entering 
government at the end of 1905 and committed to a large 
social welfare programme, needed cuts in the defence 
estimates even more than their Conservatives 
predecessors. Liberal support for Admiral Fisher was to 
a large degree dependent upon his ability to deliver 
reductions in the naval estimates. A further sweeping 
rationalization of the Royal Navy was initiated. In 
October 1906 it was announced that the existing naval 
reserve in Britain would be reorganized into a new 
'Home Fleet'. This force would have at its centre 
battleships withdrawn from the front-line fleets (the 
Channel, Mediterranean and Atlantic fleets) and would 
be maintained on a reserve basis. The former naval 
reserve had consisted of older ships maintained in full 
commission.'" The cost savings _Fisher .effected_were_ _ 	_ 	_ 	_ 
quite remarkable and are testimony to the importance of 
financial concerns in his naval reorganization. From 
£36.8 million in 1905, the naval estimates fell to 
£33.3 million in 1906 a reduction of nine and a half 
per cent. Moreover they fell by a further 5.7% to £31.4 
'° 7 .Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 
Vol. I, pp. 71-72. 
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million in 1907 and did not return to their 1905 level 
for a further five years.'" 
Under pressure to cut naval expenditure the 1902 
agreement appeared an increasingly onerous burden to 
the Admiralty. The changed strategic situation in the 
Pacific following the destruction of the Russian fleet 
at Tsushima and the rewriting of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance had turned the 1902 naval agreement into a net 
drain on the Admiralty's contracting financial 
resources. Whereas before 1905 Australia and New 
Zealand had been subsidizing ships which would in any 
case have had to been based in the Pacific to fulfil 
Britain's obligations under the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, now the opposite was true. Because the 
Australasian subsidy did not meet the full cost of 
operating the ships the Admiralty was paying to 
maintain vessels in Australian waters which they 
believed were above requirements. 
Not surprisingly Admiral Fisher, committed to 
delivering substantial reductions in the naval 
estimates, was particularly concerned by this change in 
the financial balance of the agreement. In a letter to 
the Commander-in-Chief Australia Station (Admiral Sir 
Wilmot Fawkes) in August 1906, Fisher drew especial 
'° 8 .See Appendix A. 
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attention to the financial side of the agreement. The 
annual subsidy of £240,000, he pointed out, covered 
less than half the annual maintenance cost of the 
squadron. 	"In 	any 	communications 	therefore", 	he 
instructed Fawkes, "which you may have with public men 
in Australia on this subject you should do your utmost 
to disabuse their minds of any belief that the Mother 
Country in general or the Admiralty in particular has 
any selfish interest in the retention of the present 
system."'" Fisher summed up his feelings about the 
naval agreement in a marginal note on a letter from 
Deakin. "Never was there such an extravagant waste of 
money, ships and men", he wrote, "as this agreement 
entails on the Admiralty. ”110 
One other factor appears to have influenced the 
Admiralty's change of heart over local navies in 1907. 
At the colonial conference Lord Tweedmouth, having 
announced Admiralty support for the establishment of
colonial navies, recommended the colonies acquire 
destroyers and torpedo boats. Tweedmouth described 
these vessels as "useful for defence against possible 
'°°.Fisher to Fawkes, 17 August 1906, P.R.O., Adm 
116/12418. 
'"Marginal note by Fisher on a letter from 
Deakin. Deakin to Fisher, 12 August 1907, P.R.O., Adm 
116/12418. 
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raids 	or 	for 	co-operation with a 	squadron". 111 
Previously the Admiralty had dismissed such craft as 
being of no value for defence and a misuse of money and 
resources. Tweedmouth's advice that the colonies should 
concentrate their naval efforts on destroyers and 
torpedo boats has generally been regarded as an attempt 
by the Admiralty to minimize the difficulties colonial 
navies would cause. Small vessels like destroyers and 
torpedo boats could be commissioned under the 
provisions of the existing 1865 Colonial Naval Defence 
Act and, because they could not operate far from the 
shores of the colony, would pose the least danger of 
causing an international incident. If colonial navies 
were to be developed then it was the view of the 
Admiralty, to quote Professor Gordon, that they should 
be made "as harmless as possible". 112 
There is some evidence, however, that Tweedmouth's 
support for local destroyer and torpedo boat flotillas 
at the colonial conference reflected a genuine change 
of attitude toward local naval defences on the part of 
the Admiralty. By 1907 the Admiralty was being pressed 
by the War Office and the Colonial Office to review the 
defence requirements of the outer empire in the wake of 
British naval rationalization and reorganization. The 
111 .Cd. 3523, p. 130. 
112 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial 
Defense, p. 217. 
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Admiralty was reluctantly forced to admit that local 
naval forces would be of value to defend places such as 
Australia until reinforcements could be sent from 
Britain. The evidence for this comes from inter-
departmental correspondence connected with the 1909 
imperial conference and will be discussed at greater 
length in the following chapter. 
Within the Admiralty the lead in developing a new 
policy toward colonial naval defence was taken by the 
Naval• Intelligence Department, and in particular its 
Director, Captain Charles Ottley. The N.I.D.'s efforts 
to develop a new policy are revealed in a series of 
confidential memoranda which have received surprisingly 
little attention from historians. On 18 October 1906 
Captain Ottley wrote to the Colonial Office expressing 
the growing dissatisfaction within the Admiralty with 
the naval agreement.'" Ottley cited two objections to 
the agreement: 
1. The agreement compelled the Admiralty 
to maintain 	naval forces in Australian 
waters above what they now believed to be 
necessary. 
2. The agreement compelled the Admiralty 
to 	enlist 	and 	train 	colonial 	naval 
reserves who were paid higher rates of 
wages than more fully trained British 
seamen. 
113 •D.N.I. to Colonial Office, 18 October 1906, 
P.R.O., Adm 116/12418. 
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The only reason that the Board of Admiralty had not 
publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the naval 
agreement so far, Ottley claimed, was because of "an 
earnest desire to promote a cordial understanding 
between the Australasian Colonies and the 
motherland. "1 1 4 
In February 1907 Ottley outlined at length the 
arguments against the naval agreement. He dealt firstly 
with the criticism of the agreement in Australia. "The 
Colonies desire, and rightly desire", he stated, "to 
preserve their autonomy, and a purely dependent 
position in regard to naval power is incompatible with 
their healthy development as semi-independent 
states."'" Ottley then turned to the Admiralty's 
objections. Referring to the strategic situation in the 
Pacific following Tsushima, he drew particular 
attention to the change in the financial balance of the 
arrangement from the Admiralty's point of view. "The 
British tax-payer", he explained, "is compelled to pay 
for the support of a squadron in Australia part of 
which could be better employed nearer home."'" 
116 .D.N.I. memorandum, 	"Admiralty Views on the 
Working of the Australian Naval Agreement", 27 February 
1907, P.R.O., Adm 116/1241B. 
1 " .Ib id. 
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Ottley also drew attention to the Admiralty's 
commitment under the naval agreement to train colonial 
naval reserves. At the 1902 colonial conference this 
aspect of the agreement had been hailed by the First 
Lord as an important advance, a way of engendering in 
the colonies a "sense of personal interest" in the 
Royal Navy. But Australian seamen were paid higher 
wages than their British counterparts and, as Admiral 
Fanshawe had forecast in 1903, this had caused 
divisiveness among the men of the squadron. Moreover 
the Australian response to the naval reserve scheme had 
been disappointing. Of the 879 active and 725 reserve 
places provided for colonial seamen under the scheme 
only 600 of the former and 351 of the latter had been 
Ottley remarked wistfully that if only 
Britain could be sure that none of the colonies would 
ever desire to sever their ties with the mother country 
it would be far better for Great Britain to alone bear 
the cost of naval defence in exchange for a pledge from 
the colonies to provide military forces to assist the 
British army in the protection of imperial interests 
throughout the world. 118 
Having outlined the objections to the naval 
agreement - political, economic and strategic - Ottley 
recommended that the agreement be terminated and the 
117 .Ibid. 
118 .Ibid. 
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Australian squadron reduced. The Australian and New 
Zealand subsidies, he argued, should cease and those 
colonial seamen currently embarked in Royal Navy ships 
should be made liable for service in any part of the 
world, the amount of their wages above the standard 
British rates to be paid to them only upon completion 
of their service. 119  The Commonwealth government's 
proposal for a reconsideration of the terms of the 
agreement and their stated intention to develop a local 
destroyer flotilla, Ottley claimed, provided the 
Admiralty with an ideal opportunity to effect the 
termination of the agreement. "Notwithstanding the many 
objections to the Agreement of 1902", Ottley stated, 
"the Admiralty have always tried to make the best of it 
and are prepared, if necessary, to continue to fulfil 
their obligations until its expiration in 1913, but 
.... their Lordships would offer their opinion that the 
Agreement of 1902 . is incapable of satisfactory 
modification. 1 2 0 
In essence what Ottley was proposing was a trade 
off of Admiralty support for local colonial navies in 
return for Australia terminating the naval agreement. 
Ottley appreciated that the sanctioning of local naval 
forces was a major turn about turn by the Admiralty. 
119 . Ibi d 
120 .Ibid. 
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"It must be plainly understood", he stressed, "that 
this policy is a diametrical volte-face from the 
attitude of the Board accepted at the last Colonial 
Conference. "121 It was important to the Admiralty, 
however, both in terms of domestic politics and 
imperial relations, that moves to effect the early 
termination of the agreement appeared to result from 
colonial dissatisfaction rather than from 
dissatisfaction with the agreement within the 
Admiralty. By trading off the termination of the 
agreement for support for local navies it would appear 
that Australia was responsible for the failure of the 
agreement with the Admiralty merely bowing to colonial 
pressure. 
Captain Ottley left the Admiralty shortly before 
the colonial conference to replace Sir George Clarke 
as Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence. 
Captain Edmund J. W. Slade was appointed Director of 
Naval Intelligence. Slade was less enthusiastic about 
the Admiralty endorsing the development of a local 
Australian navy in exchange for the Commonwealth 
terminating the naval agreement and accepting a 
reduction in the size of the Australian squadron. There 
was, Slade believed, no reason for any sort of 
121 .Ibid. 
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"pleading" from the Admiralty. 122 If not openly stated, 
however, Ottley's proposed trade off of local navies 
for an end to the naval agreement was implicit in Lord 
Tweedmouth's statements at the colonial conference. No 
one, least of all Alfred Deakin, was in doubt as to the 
trade off that was being offered. Deakin, while 
expressing a certain surprise at the Admiralty's sudden 
about face on local navies, was quick to accept the 
offer. His government, he declared, would gladly 
terminate the naval agreement and release the ships of 
the squadron from the present limitations in exchange 
for Admiralty co-operation in setting up a local 
force. 123 
The 1907 colonial conference was a turning point in 
Admiralty-Australian relations. While the Admiralty's 
decision to support the development of colonial navies 
for coastal defence was a return to an earlier policy 
it also marked the end of twenty years of direct and 
indirect attempts to stifle all naval development in 
the colonies. The policy of 'one sea, one empire, one 
122 .See N. D'Ombrain, 	War Machinery and High 
Policy: Defence Administration in Peacetime Britain 
1902-1914, (Oxford, 1973), p. 227. 
123 .Cd. 3523, P. 130. 
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navy' which had dominated the Admiralty's thinking on 
colonial defence throughout the 1890s and which they 
had pressed so strongly in 1902, had been abandoned. 
It has been seen that there were a number of 
reasons for this sudden and dramatic change in policy. 
Australian discontent with the 1902 naval agreement, 
expressed forcefully through the correspondence of 
Alfred Deakin, was one factor. To this may be added the 
failure of the agreement to engender in Australians a 
sense of "personal interest" in the navy as Lord 
Selborne had hoped. Of greater importance, however, was 
the impact of the Russian defeat at Tsushima in 1905. 
With the destruction of Russian sea power the strategic 
value of the agreement to Britain was undermined. 
Moreover the change in the strategic situation meant 
that the agreement became a net drain on the 
Admiralty's resources at a time when they were under 
enormous pressure to find ways of reducing the naval 
estimates. With the election of a government which had 
little interest in strengthening the imperial 
connection this was perhaps the most important factor 
underlying the Admiralty's change of policy. 
Yet while Lord Tweedmouth's announcement at the 
1907 colonial conference signalled the Admiralty's 
abandonment of the 'one empire, one navy' policy, the 
Admiralty continued to have reservations over the 
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development of separate colonial navies. It remained to 
be seen if a way could be found to prevent a 
re-occurrence of the problems which had been associated 
with colonial navies during the early 1880s. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A NEW PACIFIC FLEET, 1909 
At the end of the 1907 colonial conference it appeared 
the Admiralty and Australia had resolved their 
differences over 	naval 	defence. 	After prolonged 
complaints from Australia about the 1902 naval 
agreement the Admiralty, Lord Tweedmouth had announced, 
was willing to "consider a modification of the existing 
arrangements to meet the views of the various 
Colonies."' The Admiralty had given their support to 
the establishment of a local defence flotilla along the 
lines proposed by Deakin and the navalists in 
Australia. But as we have seen in chapter four the 
Admiralty had accepted the establishment of a local 
flotilla primarily because they could see no other way 
of securing the termination of the agreement and a 
reduction in the size of the Australian squadron. The 
Admiralty continued to have misgivings over the 
development of colonial flotillas and the 
recommendation that those colonies wishing to establish 
local navies should concentrate on submarines and 
torpedo boats reflected this. Submarines and torpedo 
boats had limited range and sea keeping. They could 
1 .Cd. 3523, p. 130 & 469. 
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not operate outside coastal waters and there was 
therefore less chance of their being involved in an 
international incident for which Britain would be held 
accountable. 
The Admiralty's acceptance of local colonial navies 
meant a return to the situation which had existed 
before 1887. This was not what Deakin wanted. He was 
aware of the problems which had undermined the 
efficiency of the nineteenth century colonial navies 
and as he came to understand the full implications of 
the First Lord's statements at the 1907 colonial 
conference he began to press the Admiralty for a new 
form of association between the Royal Navy and the 
Australian flotilla which would enable the latter to 
keep abreast of developments in naval technology and 
strategy. The situation was transformed toward the end 
of 1908 by a naval crisis in Britain. With an increase 
in naval appropriations and the offer of battleships_ 
from Australia and New Zealand the Admiralty saw a way 
of reasserting British sea power in the Pacific. A plan 
was put forward for the creation of a new Pacific 
fleet, units of which were to be provided by the 
dominions. Though an agreement was reached between 
Britain, Australia and New Zealand the Pacific fleet 
was never completed. Only the Australian unit existed 
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in the Pacific at the outbreak of the First World War. 
Perhaps for this reason the Pacific fleet plan has 
received scant attention from historians. The Pacific 
fleet scheme, however, was the most significant 
development in Admiralty-colonial relations since the 
1887 agreement. The Royal Australian Navy was the 
direct result of the Pacific fleet idea, while 
Britain's failure to provide the ships promised in 1909 
was to dominate relations with the Pacific dominions 
down to 1914. 
At the 1907 colonial conference it appeared that 
Australia would go along with the Admiralty's plans and 
terminate the 1902 naval agreement in exchange for 
Admiralty support in setting up a local flotilla. "The 
Parliament of the Commonwealth", Deakin told 
Tweedmouth, would desire to terminate the present 
agreement, to set free the ships of the squadron from 
any obligations at present imposed, and to devote our 
funds to the provision of a local force." 2 Accordingly 
the Admiralty prepared a detailed costing for a force 
of four River class destroyers and four torpedo boats. 3 
2 .Ibid, p. 475. 
3 .Admiralty to Deakin, 18 May 1907, Deakin Papers, 
N.L.A., Ms 1540/15/1382. 
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Upon returning to Australia, however, Deakin adopted 
a different view. Rather than terminating the naval 
agreement, Deakin suggested that it need only be 
"amended". In lieu of £100,000 of the £200,000 per 
annum subsidy the Commonwealth, Deakin proposed, could 
provide 1,000 seamen for service aboard ships of the 
squadron. Of these, 400 would be used to man two 'P' 
class cruisers, "or superior", to be provided by the 
Admiralty and "retained [on the] Australian coast, 
peace or war." A further two cruisers, also to be 
provided by the Admiralty, would be used to train the 
local naval militia. Any money remaining from the 
subsidy would go toward the provision of submarines and 
torpedo boats for harbour defence. Such an arrangement, 
Deakin anticipated, would require the recasting of only 
one article of the 1903 Naval Agreement Act with minor 
alterations to a further three. 4 
The Admiralty was angered by this new proposal. It 
differed substantially from what Deakin had said at the 
conference. "The Colonies, one and all", Admiral Fisher 
wrote to Lord Tweedmouth, "grab all they possibly can 
4 .Deakin to Fawkes, 16 October 1907, C.P.P., 1907 
session, Vol. II, No. 143, "Naval Defence of Australia. 
Correspondence in Reference Thereto, Between the 
Commonwealth Government and the Admiralty)". 
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out of us and give us nothing back." 5 	The Naval 
Intelligence Department, in considering the new 
Australian proposal, however, took a more pragmatic 
view. While admitting that "it seems as if Mr. Deakin 
wants to get all that he now has without paying the 
Imperial government anything for it", the N.I.D. 
accepted that, "at the same time we cannot afford to 
throw cold water on the scheme." Lord Tweedmouth had 
after all committed the Admiralty to working out an 
arrangement which was acceptable to the colonies and 
whatever the outcome the Admiralty would have to 
maintain at least a token force in Australian waters. 
There was no consideration of a total withdrawal from 
Australia. If the Admiralty agreed to the request for 
'P' class cruisers, the N.I.D. postulated, "we shall 
not do ourselves any harm and it might simplify future 
negotiations". The legal and foreign policy 
difficulties associated with colonial warships, 
however, were uppermost in their minds and the N.I.D. 
recommended three conditions which in future 
negotiations "we must stick to at all costs"- 
e.Fisher to Tweedmouth, 1 October 1907, Fear God 
and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the 
Fleet, Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, ed. A. Marder, 
(London, 1956), Vol. II, p. 139. 
e.N.I.D. memorandum, 7 November 1907, P.R.O., Adm 
1/7949. 
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1. Absolute control 	of all 	war-like 
operations in war. This means that the 
Admiral shall have absolute command of all 
the Commonwealth ships and torpedo craft 
from the moment hostilities commence. 
2. No flag to be flown but the White 
Ensign. 
3. The Colonial cruisers and torpedo boats 
should have no right of cruising outside 
Australian waters unless they come under 
the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. 7 
The N.I.D.'s recommendations were embodied in the 
Admiralty's official response to Deakin's proposals 
sent to Australia on 7 December 1907. The Admiralty, 
Deakin was informed, "regard it as essential [that] 
complete control in time of war over local forces . 
be secured to [the] Commander-in-Chief." 8 Of more 
immediate concern to the Admiralty, however, was the 
termination of the naval agreement. With understandable 
indignation the Admiralty pointed out that at the 
colonial conference Deakin had agreed that the 
Admiralty should not be bound to maintain a specified 
force permanently in Australian waters. "So long as the 
existing agreement is not cancelled", it was explained, 
"the Admiralty is precluded from making the necessary 
strategical disposition of Naval Forces, and, 
7 .Ibid. 
8 .Admiralty to Deakin, 7 December 1907, C_P-P., 
1907 session, Vol. II, No. 143, op. cit. 
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therefore, the first condition of any new arrangement 
must be the cancellation of the agreement." 
While 	the 	Admiralty's 	objectives 	in 	the 
negotiations with Australia are straight-forward, 
Deakin's aims have been the subject of speculation 
extending beyond providing a permanent naval defence 
for Australia. A number of writers have seen in 
Deakin's efforts to establish an independent Australian 
navy a desire to advance Australia's status within the 
empire and in particular to obtain a voice in the 
direction of imperial foreign policy." Returning to 
Australia from the colonial conference in 1907 Deakin 
had drawn attention to a speech by British prime 
minister Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermen in which control 
of naval defence and control of foreign policy had been 
linked. "It implies", Deakin had stated in •regard to 
Campbell-Bannerman's comments, .... that when we do 
take a part in naval defence, we shall be entitled to a 
share in the direction of foreign policy."'" 
9 .Ibid. 
".See especially La Nauze, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 
519, Charles Grimshaw, "Australian Nationalism and the 
Imperial Connection 1900-1914", The Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, Vol. III, (May, 1958), 
p. 179 and Richard A. Preston, Canada and 'Imperial 
Defense', (Durham, N.C., 1967), p. 381. 
11 .C.P.D., 1907-8 session, Vol. XLII, p. 7512, 13 
December 1907. 
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Gaining for Australia a share in the direction of 
imperial foreign policy, however, could have only have 
been a long-term objective for Deakin in 1907. The 
naval forces he was contemplating were of a strictly 
limited capability and unlikely to lead the Foreign 
Office suddenly taking Australia into their 
confidence." Winston Churchill summed up the situation 
with characteristic acuity. Australia, he claimed, 
will never provide any ships of any 
serious value... .We might give Mr. Deakin 
a measure of control in Foreign Policy 
exactly proportionate to Australia's 
contribution to Imperial defence without 
much risk." 
Deakin's first concern in his negotiations with the 
Admiralty appears to have been ensuring that the new 
".Following the establishment of the sea-going 
colonial navies the Foreign Office did treat the 
colonies with more deference. In 1916 Foreign Secretary 
Sir Edward Grey stated that, "it was part of our 
policy, now that the self-governing Dominions have 
separate fleets and forces, to consult them on matters 
of foreign policy." Grey to Rumbold, 26 May 1916, B.D., 
Vol. VIII, p. 525. Consultation with the dominions, 
however, did not mean Foreign Office acquiescence to 
their views. On this see I. Nish, "Australia and the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1901-1911", The Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, Vol. IX, (November, 
1963), pp. 201-212. 
".Minute by Winston Churchill (Under Secretary of 
State for Colonies), 15 February 1908, P.R.O., CO 
418/52/739-40. 
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Australian navy did not suffer from the limitations of 
the nineteenth century colonial navies. Deakin had been 
a senior member of the Victorian government during the 
heyday of the colonial navies in the 1880s. He was 
aware of their shortcomings. Though the colonies had 
looked upon their navies with great pride they were 
essentially part-time forces with limited training and 
skill. As Admiral Tryon had pointed out so cogently in 
his memorandum to the Victorian governor Sir Henry 
Loch, there was no means of drafting colonial seamen 
from ship to ship, or sending them to undergo training 
in new methods or weapons, or of keeping them 
acquainted with the latest weapons of the enemy. As 
Tryon had explained, without such measures the colonial 
navies would never be truly efficient, professional 
forces. 14 
Returning to Australia from London, Deakin began to 
realize that the path sketched by Tweedmouth at the 
colonial conference would take Australia back to the 
situation which had existed before 1887. The new 
Australian navy would suffer from the same limitations 
as the nineteenth century colonial navies. It would 
certainly not be a springboard from which a sea-going 
14 .Tryon to Loch, 	27 March 1885, 	P.R.O., Adm 
1/6785. 
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Australian fleet could later be developed. "I have 
grown more and more deeply to realize", Deakin told the 
Commonwealth parliament on 13 December 1907, "the risks 
of our attempting to create a 	small force solely on 
our own."" Deakin outlined these "risks" in a letter 
to the Admiralty on Christmas Eve 1907: 
Since 	the 	vessels 	owned 	by 	the 
Commonwealth must be few and small when 
compared to those of the Royal Navy, and 
the numbers of men correspondingly 
limited, if our service were isolated, 
their opportunities for promotion and for 
keeping themselves abreast of the latest 
Naval developments in tactics, mechanical 
appliances, and instruction must be 
comparatively very restricted." 
Deakin was desperate to avoid the cul-de-sac of the 
nineteenth century colonial navies. He knew that high 
standards of efficiency and professionalism could only 
be achieved through the closest co-operation with the 
Royal Navy. Training for Australian seamen aboard 
British vessels and joint exercises were essential. As 
he had explained at the colonial conference: 
15 .C.P.D., 1907-8 session, Vol. XLII, p. 7517, 13 
December 1907. 
16 .Deakin to Admiralty, 24 December 1907, C.P.P., 
1907 session, Vol. II, No. 6, "Naval Defence. Further 
Correspondence between the Commonwealth Government 
and the Admiralty, in Regard to the Naval Defence of 
Australia". 
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We recognize that the Navy as a fighting 
machine is only kept in its condition of 
efficiency by the constant maintenance, 
even in the lowest ranks of the Service, 
of the highest state of training. We 
appreciate the discipline and training 
which our men have received in the 
squadron, and anticipate in the future 
that by similar means, by association with 
the [Royal] Navy, we shall be assisted to 
keep our local vessels, whatever they may 
be, up to its high standard." 
It was 	with 	the 	object of 	ensuring close 
association with the Royal Navy that Deakin had 
proposed the retention of British cruisers in 
Australian waters and the provision of Australian 
seamen to man them. After the Admiralty had rejected 
the request for 'P' class cruisers Deakin continued to 
press for a local flotilla that was 'keyed in' to the 
Royal Navy. He had a vision of an Australian flotilla 
which was in one sense 'colonial' and in another 
'imperial'. Its ships would be under the control of the 
Commonwealth and provide local naval defence for 
Australia, but its personnel would be part of the Royal 
Navy, circulating along the normal service paths 
between Australian and British ships. Australian 
seamen, he explained, would "serve on our local vessels 
for the usual term on this station, whatever it may be, 
and then pass elsewhere. They would remain members of 
".Cd. 3523, p. 475. My italics. 
219 
.. [the Royal] Navy in every sense . 	. being simply 
seconded for fixed terms for service under our general 
control." 18 
Deakin's proposal for an Australian flotilla which 
was both 'colonial' and 'imperial' was an innovative 
answer to the difficulties inevitably faced by a small 
navy in a world of great fleets and rapidly changing 
technology. Its sheer originality was a problem. The 
Admiralty confessed that initially they had "a 
difficulty in fully comprehending the extent of the 
scheme. "19  More important was the question of control. 
Deakin believed that ships maintained by the 
Commonwealth must be under Commonwealth control. He 
realized, however, that this could jeopardize his 
desire for a close relationship with the Royal Navy. 
"The problem for us", Deakin explained in his statement 
on defence policy on 13 December 1907, "is the 
association of our small strength with the great 
organization of fleets of the Mother Country so as to 
secure the highest efficiency and unity without 
18 .C.P.D., 1907-8 session, Vol. XLII, p. 7517, 13 
December 1907. 
1 °.Admira1ty to Deakin, 20 August 1908, C.P.P., 
1908 session, Vol. II, No. 6, op. cit. 
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sacrificing our right to the constitutional control of 
our own funds and of any flotilla built and maintained 
at our cost."" 
The Admiralty had already insisted that they 
receive complete control of Commonwealth vessels at the 
outbreak of war." Nevertheless they did accept that 
"as a general principle ... the Government of a self-
governing Colony should have the power to control in 
its own waters the movement of the local force it 
maintains, and that this force should not be moved away 
from Colonial waters without the concurrence of the 
responsible Government. "22 This was to form the basis 
of a compromise which would enable an Australian 
flotilla of the Royal Navy to be put into effect. 
In August 1908 the Admiralty sent Deakin a draft 
scheme for an Australian flotilla which, they felt, did 
not present them with any "insuperable difficulty". 23 
It was based on Deakin's earlier proposals and his 
December statement on defence policy in which he had 
2 °.C.P.D., 1907-8 session, Vol. XLII, p. 7519, 13 
December 1907. 
"—Admiralty to Deakin, 10 February 1908, C.P.P., 
1908 session, Vol. II, No. 6, op. cit. 
22 .Ibid. 
23 .Admiralty to Deakin, 20 August 1908, C.P.P., 
1908 session, Vol. II, No. 6, op. cit. 
221 
committed the Commonwealth to building six destroyers 
and three submarines over a three year period. No 
provision was made for the retention of British 
warships in Australian waters, the Admiralty having 
already rejected Deakin's request for 'P' class 
cruisers. 
The most important feature of the proposal was that 
it made provision for joint control. In keeping with 
Deakin's hopes the administrative control of the 
flotilla would rest with the Commonwealth but the 
officers and men would form part of the Royal Navy. 
Under the Admiralty scheme the flotilla would be "under 
the undivided control of the Commonwealth Government" 
while it was within Australian waters, but upon leaving 
Australian waters would automatically "become subject 
to the direction of the Senior Naval Officer as 
representing the Imperial Government." The vessels, 
however, could not be moved out of Australian waters 
without Australian approval. 24 
The persistence of the Australian prime minister 
appeared to have finally been rewarded. "The squeaky 
wheel", Donald Gordon writes in reference to the 
continuous pressure Deakin had applied on the imperial 
24.Ibid. 
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authorities from 1905, "was beginning to be heard, no 
longer with annoyance alone, but with a dawning sense 
that perhaps some grease needed to be applied." 25 
Richard Preston sees Deakin's 1907 statement on defence 
policy as the turning point. "Deakin's speech", he 
states, "forced the Admiralty's hand. "26 Explaining the 
Admiralty's acceptance of Deakin's proposals purely in 
terms of a British desire to placate Australia, 
however, has meant that the considerable advantages of 
the scheme from the Admiralty's point of view have 
tended to be overlooked. 
Back in the early 1880s Admiral Key had identified 
two principal objections to colonial navies. Being 
small they offered limited training and experience, and 
Key was therefore concerned at the prospect of colonial 
ships operating in conjunction with vessels of the 
Royal Navy. That colonial officers with only merchant 
navy qualifications might have control over British 
warships in wartime had been an associated concern. 
Under the scheme sketched by the Admiralty in August 
1908, however, the personnel of the Australian flotilla 
would all be members of the Royal Navy. The training 
standards would be maintained at an equivalent level to 
25 .Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial 
Defense, p. 214. 
28 .Preston, op. cit., p. 382. 
223 
that of the Royal Navy, personnel serving aboard both 
Australian and British warships during their careers. 
Moreover, under the Admiralty's proposal, the flotilla 
would be "administered in the same way as the Imperial 
Navy, the proper sequence of command being insured by 
every officer from the Senior Officer downwards holding 
an Admiralty commission. "27  Though not spelt out, it 
was clear from the Admiralty's letter that they alone 
would decide appointments and promotions. Under such a 
system there would be no difficulty in integrating the 
Australian forces into the Royal Navy for service in 
Australian waters, or further afield if the 
Commonwealth permitted. 
Key's second concern was the question of the legal 
status of colonial vessels. As the colonies were not 
recognized internationally as autonomous states the 
operations of colonial warships were a potential source 
of embarrassment to Britain. As we have seen in the 
preceding chapters Admiralty concern at that 
possibility had played a central role in determining 
their attitude to Australian naval defence. Under the 
new scheme, however, the chance of the Commonwealth 
using the flotilla irresponsibly was eliminated. If the 
27 .Admiralty to Deakin, 20 August 1908, C.P.P., 
1908 session, Vol. II, No. 6, op. cit. 
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vessels left Australian waters they would automatically 
come under the control of the Admiralty. To ensure this 
happened all the personnel would be subject to British 
naval discipline, while the Admiralty had the further 
comfort of knowing that for ten years at least all the 
officer positions were likely to be held by Englishmen. 
The scheme for an Australian flotilla maintained by 
the Commonwealth but whose personnel were part of the 
Royal Navy thus overcame many of the Admiralty's 
objections to colonial navies. Of course they would 
have preferred a cash contribution from Australia free 
of any conditions, but realists within the Admiralty 
had accepted that this had only ever been a pipe-
dream."' The only colony to make an unconditional 
subsidy had been South Africa and that was when war 
with the Boer states had been imminent. The 1887 naval 
agreement had established the precedent that colonial 
subsidies involved some measure of colonial_ control 
over the movement and disposition of particular ships. 
It had proved effective as a means of discouraging the 
development of colonial navies but the continuing 
decline of British sea power relative to the other 
navies of the world and the political desire to contain 
28 .Captain Ottley may be counted among these. See 
his memorandum as D.N.I. dated 27 February 1907 quoted 
in chapter 4. 
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naval expenditure meant that by 1907 it was no longer a 
practicable policy. Lord Tweedmouth's statement at the 
colonial conference signalled its abandonment and a 
return to the situation prior to 1887. 
The Admiralty had also changed their attitude on 
the strategic value of local defence forces. As late as 
1906 the Admiralty had dismissed proposals for an 
Australian destroyer flotilla as strategically unsound 
and of too little defence value to justify the cost of 
its maintenance. Now, however, the Admiralty, while 
continuing to argue that the naval defence of Australia 
was "best secured by the operation of the Imperial Navy 
distributed as the strategic necessities of the moment 
dictate", admitted that "at the same time . the 
establishment of a local flotilla would greatly assist 
the operations of the latter."" This change of 
attitude was a reflection, in the context of Australian 
defence, of a wider reconsideration of the implications 
of British naval withdrawal in Whitehall. 
The rationalization and redistribution of the Royal 
Navy after 1905 had not only caused dissension within 
".Ibid. 
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the Admiralty but had led to sustained protests from 
the Foreign Office and Colonial Office. These two great 
departments of state feared that the withdrawal of 
gunboats and cruisers from the outer empire would 
jeopardize British interests in Asia, Africa and the 
Americas and undermine the force of British diplomacy. 
"There are important British interests in distant 
seas", Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey protested in 
February 1907, "where the opportune presence of a 
British ship of war may avert a disaster which can only 
be remedied later at much inconvenience and 
considerable sacrifice."" One area from which British 
patrol vessels had been withdrawn was the seas to the 
north of Australia and the Colonial Office complained 
bitterly at their absence in the waters of New Guinea, 
Fiji and the New Hebrides." 
More important, however, were the implications for 
colonial defence of the relative decline of the Royal 
Navy and its enforced concentration in the North Sea to 
counter the growing naval power of Germany. By 1903 the 
".Grey to Admiralty, February 1907, P.R.O., CO 
537/348. 
"—Colonial Office, "Memorandum of Requirements of 
Colonial Office for Services of Imperial Navy", 1907, 
P.R.O., CO 537/348/5520. 
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Admiralty's 	pledge to protect "all British territory 
abroad against organized invasion from the sea" 32 was 
being questioned. In answer to inquiries by the 
Colonial Defence Committee and the War Office, the 
Admiralty admitted that they were no longer capable of 
protecting British bases in the Caribbean or indeed 
Canada from naval attack by the United States. The War 
Office, in what Aaron Friedberg has recently described 
as a "terrifying flash of insight . 	. to which the 
Admiralty had no real response" 33 returned: 
Unless 	the 	War 	Office 	has 
misinterpreted the plan for the 
strategical distribution of our naval 
forces the conclusion appears to be 
unavoidable that the present strength of 
His Majesty's Navy would not suffice to 
defend on the high seas the interests of 
the Empire. 34 
While this admission related to British interests in 
North America it had wider repercussions for the 
defence of the empire generally and for Australian 
naval defence in particular. 'The Principles of 
32 .C.D.C. memorandum, "The Principles of Colonial 
Defence", 19 May 1896, P.R.O., Cab 8/1/2. On the 
Defence of British possessions in North America see K. 
Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North 
America, 1815-1908, (London, 1967), pp. 359-387 and 
Friedberg, The Weary Titan, pp. 185-189. 
33 .Friedberg, ibid, p. 188. 
34 .Quoted in Friedberg, ibid. 
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Colonial Defence', the document upon which British 
advice to the dominions on defence matters had been 
based since 	1896 had 	been undermined. 	If 	the 
Admiralty's promise of protection no longer held good 
for British possessions in North America, did it still 
hold true for British possessions elsewhere, in the 
Pacific for example? The Colonial Office took up this 
question 	with 	the 	Admiralty. 	"Under 	existing 
circumstances, or circumstances that may shortly 
exist", the Colonial Office inquired in May 1909 just 
before colonial representatives were due to meet in 
London to discuss the subject of imperial defence, "can 
we guarantee the command of the sea in the Far East and 
in the Western Atlantic against possible enemies 
there?" 35 	Anticipating 	a 	negative 	response, 	the 
Colonial Office went on to state: 
If the answer is 'No', then we are surely 
bound to tell the Colonies: and it would 
seem to follow that torpedo boats etc., 
are not enough for their defence - they 
must have battle fleets if they are not 
merely to stand on the defensive for an 
indefinite period, and on the defensive 
against 'formidable defensive forces'. 3 ° 
36 .Colonial Office to Admiralty, May 1909, P.R.O., 
CO 537/571/17938. 
33 .Ibid. 
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The Admiralty replied to the Colonial Office's 
inquiries on 15 June. They cited the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance as the reason for the small force they now 
maintained in the Pacific. Should the alliance cease, 
however, and Japan join Britain's enemies, the 
Admiralty admitted that: 
it might be possible for Japan to land a 
considerable number of troops in 
Australia, and even to occupy Sydney and 
Melbourne." 
Nevertheless if Britain retained sea supremacy, the 
Admiralty argued, Australia could be regained. "We 
could cut off Japanese reinforcements", they assured 
the Colonial Office, "while pouring British troops into 
Australia", adding that "it would seem doubtful . 
whether Japan would take this tremendous risk so long 
as ultimate sea predominance is likely to rest with 
England." 33 
That it was even remotely possible that Australia 
could be invaded was a major change from the 
Admiralty's previously stated position. Hitherto they 
37 .Admiralty to Colonial Office, 15 June 1909, 
P.R.O., CO 537/571. 
38.Ibid. 
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had claimed that at most Australia would face isolated 
raids from unarmoured enemy cruisers and perhaps a 
landing party of up to 1,000 men. The Admiralty's 
reluctant acceptance of an increased risk to Australia 
appears to have been a factor in their change of heart 
over the value of a local flotilla in 1907. With the 
Royal Navy unlikely to be able to come to Australia's 
immediate assistance Australia would have to defend 
herself until British reinforcements could arrive. In 
replying to the Colonial Office the Admiralty laid 
great stress on Australia's ability to "keep up their 
end till help comes."" For this task local naval 
forces would clearly be useful, not to say essential, 
and the Admiralty conceded the need for "local 
squadrons of all types of ships which may help in 
keeping the end up. "40 
The need for an Australian navy for coastal defence 
had been elucidated in an article_ by Lieutenant A.C. 
Dewar in February 1908. Dewar was one of a group of up 
and coming young officers in the Royal Navy. His 
article is of interest because it explained the 
importance of an Australian coastal force in the 
language of 'blue water' strategy. "Control of the 
".Ibid. 
".Ibid. 
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sea", Dewar argued, 	means the control of a 
particular sea area; in other areas the command may be 
disputed, lost, or have been allowed to lapse. -41 
Britain's control of European waters, Dewar explained, 
would only give control of Australian waters if the 
latter are threatened by a power whose lines of 
communication to Australia passed through Britain's 
sphere of control in the Atlantic. "Such control", 
Dewar claimed, "would avail little if Australia was 
threatened by a Pacific power, unless our naval 
strength was so predominant as to ensure command of the 
sea, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific." Pacific 
power. Britain, he believed, would never be able to 
send more than a third of her fleet to the Pacific 
because of the need to guard against the sudden 
intervention of a European power. As a consequence, 
Australia and Canada "are immediately exposed to 
oversea invasion and drop to the political portion of 
dependencies on the general equilibrium of world. • 4 2 
In Dewar's view Britain did not possess sufficient 
naval forces to secure command of the Pacific against a 
41 .A.C. Dewar, "Australia and Naval Strategy in the 
Pacific", The United Service Magazine, No. 951, 
(February, 1908), p. 445. 
42 .Ibid, pp. 445-446. 
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power." 43 It was therefore imperative that Australia 
set her house in order and provide herself with coastal 
flotillas. Submarines, mines, destroyer flotillas and 
coastal batteries, Dewar believed would at least compel 
an enemy fleet to exercise great caution in approaching 
a hostile coast. "A moderately strong army and a strong 
force of torpedo craft, particularly submarines, based 
on sufficiently protected harbours", he explained, "can 
render invasion very risky, if not impracticable, even 
if the enemy controls the sea. " 4 4 
Underlying Dewar's arguments was the rise of Japan 
as the major naval power in the Pacific. While Britain 
remained in alliance with Japan, Dewar believed, 
Australia was secure. But the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
was due to expire in 1915 and in Dewar's view Australia 
had till then to place its system of defence on a sound 
basis. 45 Other more influential figures in British 
defence circles were also concerned at- the latent 
threat the rise of Japanese sea power posed to British 
interests in the Pacific. Most vulnerable was Hong 
43 ./bid, p. 449. 
44 .1bid, pp. 446-447. 
45 ./bid. 
233 
Kong." In June 1909 the Committee of Imperial Defence 
raised the question of the defence of Hong Kong with 
the Admiralty. The First Lord (Reginald McKenna) 
accepted that Hong Kong's security rested entirely upon 
the navy. British naval forces in the Far East, the 
Director of Naval intelligence (Captain A.E. Bethell) 
claimed, could be reinforced from the Mediterranean in 
twenty-four days. 47 The Chief of the General Staff 
(General Sir William Nicholson), however, was scornful 
of such reassurances. He argued that sufficient naval 
strength should be maintained in the Pacific to prevent 
an attack on Hong Kong from being made. "If the 
Japanese", he argued, "had a month during which they 
were supreme at sea, they would not waste it by doing 
nothing. .48 
Britain's 	difficulties 	in 	the 	Pacific 	were 
compounded by the laying down by Japan of dreadnought 
battleships. The launching of H.M.S. Dreadnought in 
February 1906 had revolutionized naval technology. By 
combining steam turbine propulsion for higher speeds 
46 .0n the defence of Hong Kong see N.R. Bennett, 
"The Naval Pivot of Asia: An Examination of Hong Kong 
in British Far Eastern Strategy, 1900-1914", Journal of 
Oriental Studies, No. 7, (1969), pp. 63-75. 
47 .C.I.D. minutes, 104th meeting, 29 June 1909, 
P.R.O., Cab 2/2. 
48.Ibid. 
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with an all big gun armament Dreadnought had made all 
previous battleships obsolete, including Britain's own 
considerable pre-dreadnought fleet. The laying down of 
Japan's first dreadnought in January 1909 therefore 
posed a major problem for any rapid reinforcement of 
the Royal Navy in the Far East." While Britain had a 
large number of older battleships which could be sent 
to the Pacific these would be totally outclassed by the 
new Japanese dreadnoughts. 
A crucial element in these discussions was the 
feeling that in the longer term Japan could not be 
trusted as an ally. The growth of German naval power in 
the North Sea left Britain increasingly reliant upon 
Japan's goodwill in the Pacific and in 1911 the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance was extended for a further ten years. 
Because of this it is easy to assume that the British 
authorities took the continuation of the alliance for 
granted. The discussions in the C.I.D., however, 
suggest that this was not the case and in that 1909 at 
least the extension of the alliance was by no means the 
certain. Britain, Lord Crewe argued, could not 
implicitly rely on the treaty with Japan to safeguard 
her interests in the Far East. Moreover he warned, "it 
".Japan's first dreadnought battleship, Settsu, 
was laid down on 18 January 1909. Her sister ship, 
Kawachi, as laid down on 1 April 1909. Both ships were 
completed in 1912. 
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is possible that, in her dealings with China, Japan 
might behave in such a manner as to cause us to refuse 
to identify ourselves further with her as an ally."" 
Crewe further suggested that in the event of war with 
Germany public opinion in Britain would not allow a 
large fleet to be detached to the Far East while, 
should relations with Japan become strained, Britain 
might hesitate to reinforce her fleet in the Pacific 
for fear of precipitating hostilities." 
The Committee of Imperial Defence concluded that 
while the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in force 
Britain's possessions in the Far East were secure. In 
the circumstances there was little else they could do. 
Britain did not possess sufficient forces in 1909 to 
strengthen her presence in the Pacific had it been 
decided that they were at risk from Japan, yet British 
leaders were not prepared to admit that as far as the 
Pacific was concerned Britain was an endangered power. 
Indeed Admiral Fisher told the C.I.D. that the 
Admiralty did not believe that they had given up local 
command of the sea in the Far East. Britain's lack of 
forces there, he claimed, was "due purely to our 
present relations with Japan" and he assured the 
50 .C.I.D. minutes, 104th meeting, 27 June 1909, op. 
cit. 
6 1. Ib i d. 
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Committee that the fleet in the Pacific would be 
increased before the treaty with Japan expired. 52 
Admiral Fisher was quick to elaborate on his pledge 
to strengthen Britain's naval forces in the Pacific 
before the alliance with Japan was due to expire in 
1915. Within a month of the C.I.D meeting the Admiralty 
had announced plans to create a new Pacific fleet. At 
its heart were to be three new dreadnought battle 
cruisers, each one the nucleus of a self-contained 
'fleet unit' of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. 
The 'fleet unit' idea was itself a novel approach at a 
time when navies were organized in squadrons of like 
vessels; battleship squadrons, cruiser squadrons, 
destroyer squadrons and so forth. It foreshadowed the 
'task force' organization of the Second World War and 
had first been proposed in 1908 by Admiral Sir Reginald 
Bacon in a paper read at the Institute of Naval 
Architects where it had attracted much criticism from 
those naval officers who had been present." 
Of the three 'fleet units' that were to make up the 
new Pacific fleet one was to be entirely Australian. 
The Admiralty's 1908 recommendations for an Australian 
52 .Ibid. 
52 .Feakes, op. cit., p.167. 
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coastal flotilla were completely reversed. Destroyers 
and submarines were no longer preferred. 	"Such 
flotillas", the Admiralty now 	explained, "cannot 
co-operate on the high seas in the wider duties of 
protection of trade and preventing attacks from hostile 
cruisers and squadrons." Moreover they argued, "a 
scheme limited to torpedo craft would not in itself ... 
be a good means of gradually developing a self-
contained fleet." At the very least, the Admiralty now 
argued, Australia must construct a 'fleet unit' with a 
dreadnought battle cruiser at its heart. 54 
The Admiralty's plan to create a new Pacific fleet 
raises a number of questions. The proposal came on the 
heels of the greatest naval scare in Britain since the 
nineteenth century. In late 1908 information that 
Germany was secretly accumulating materials such 
as nickel, which were essential in battleship 
construction, and had increased its production of heavy 
gun mountings, had led the Admiralty to believe that 
Germany was about to accelerate its battleship 
54 .Admiralty memorandum, 20 July 1909, G.B.P.P., 
1909 session, Vol. LIX, Cd. 4948, "Correspondence and 
Papers Relating to a Conference with Representatives of 
the Self-Governing Dominions on the Naval and Military 
Defence of the Empire", p. 21. 
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programme. They estimated that if the Germans built to 
their maximum capacity they would achieve superiority 
over Britain in the all-important class of dreadnought 
battleships by 1912. 55 Faced with the possibility of 
losing naval supremacy in the North Sea why did the 
Admiralty commit themselves to establishing a greatly 
increased fleet in the Pacific? And where were the 
extra ships to come from? While it was planned that 
some ships of the new Pacific fleet would be provided 
by the dominions, a battle cruiser, six cruisers, 
twelve destroyers and six submarines were to come from 
Britain." Moreover in the midst of the crisis 
Australia and New Zealand had offered to donate a 
dreadnought to Britain for service in the North Sea. 
Why then did the Admiralty choose to recommend that 
Australia establish a fleet unit? The Admiralty had 
always claimed that contributing to the Royal Navy was 
the most effective way for the colonies to assist in 
their naval defence. They could have accepted the offer 
of a dreadnought free of any limitations and left 
Australia to proceed with the establishment of a local 
flotilla. After having sought for so long to keep 
55 .Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 
I, p. 21. 
5 °Cd 4948, pp. 25-26. 
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colonial naval development to a minimum the Admiralty's 
proposal for sea-going colonial fleets indeed seems 
hard to understand. 
These questions have not been satisfactorily 
answered. The Admiralty described their new proposals 
as a response to colonial feeling. "The various 
circumstances of the oversea Dominions have to be borne 
in mind", they stated, ".... their history and their 
physical environment have given 'rise to individual 
national sentiment for the expression of which room 
must be found." 57 As we have seen, however, this was 
the standard explanation the Admiralty provided for 
changes in their position on colonial naval defence. 
Invariably there were other motives. 
Historians have concentrated on events in the North 
Sea to the exclusion of events in the Pacific. The plan 
to create a Pacific fleet rates only a couple of lines 
in the voluminous writings of Arthur Marder while it is 
not mentioned at all in the recent biography of Admiral 
Fisher by Ruddock Mackay. Richard Preston, in his book 
Canada and 'Imperial Defense', sees the Pacific fleet 
proposal as an extension of Anglo-German naval rivalry. 
"The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the current belief 
57 ./bid, p. 21. 
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that war with the United States was improbable meant 
that there was no potential enemy naval power in the 
Far East",, Preston writes, "Is it not possible that 
McKenna and Fisher saw the Pacific fleet units as 
reserves that might pass without being counted in the 
current naval race?" 58 Moreover Preston suggests that 
the Pacific fleet's battle cruisers may have been 
intended as a counter to German battle cruisers should 
they reach the Pacific. "Admiral Fisher", he claims, 
"may not have anticipated that one of the Australian 
battle cruisers would soon be assigned to home waters, 
but he knew that they would relieve the Admiralty of 
concern if the new German battle cruisers got loose in 
the Pacific." 58 
There seems little reason, however, for believing 
other than that the Pacific fleet plan was a serious 
proposal by the Admiralty to strengthen Britain's naval 
forces in the Pacific or that Japan was the naval power 
it was intended to counter. As we have seen above, the 
extension of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was far from 
certain in 1909 and the concern being voiced in British 
defence circles at the growth of Japanese sea power 
belies Richard Preston's claim that Britain did not see 
any potential enemy naval power in the Pacific. The 
58 .Preston, op. cit., pp. 399-400. 
""Ibid, p. 400. Fisher's italics. 
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Admiralty was under considerable pressure to reinforce 
Britain's naval presence in the Far East. Admiral 
Fisher had pledged to increase Britain's naval forces 
there before the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was due to 
expire in 1915. For this to be honoured ships would 
have to be laid down under the 1910 and 1911 
programmes. Capital ships took several years to build. 
A battle cruiser laid down under the 1910 programme, 
for example, could not be expected to be operational 
before 1913. 
Fisher's private correspondence also supports the 
belief that the Pacific fleet was an attempt at 
reasserting British sea power in the Pacific. "The keel 
is laid", he wrote jubilantly to naval journalist 
Gerard Fiennes in April 1910, ".... of that great 
Pacific Fleet, which is to be in the Pacific what our 
Home fleet is in the Atlantic and North Sea - the 
Mistress of that Ocean, as our Home Fleet is of the - 
Atlantic"." Moreover Preston's suggestion that the 
Pacific fleet was intended to counter German battle 
cruisers should they ever reach the Pacific suggests an 
unclear understanding of the German naval programme. 
German capital ships were designed for operations in 
the North Sea in accordance with Admiral Tirpitz's 
famous 'risk theory'. According to this theory the 
German battlefleet was to be strong enough to threaten 
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the overall maritime supremacy of the Royal Navy. 
Should Britain attack such a fleet it ran the risk of a 
Pyrrhic victory, losing so many ships that it became 
liable to attack and defeat by other naval rivals." 
The German battlefleet was concentrated in the North 
Sea, where it served as a deterrent to British naval 
attack and posed the greatest threat to Britain's 
maritime predominance. Not expected to operate in 
rougher oceanic waters German capital ships had 
relatively low freeboards and limited range which made 
them unsuitable for operations in the Pacific, while 
their crew accommodation was so limited that when not 
at sea their crews lived in barracks ashore. 
It may therefore be accepted that the Pacific fleet 
proposal was a serious attempt by the Admiralty at 
strengthening Britain's position in the Far East in the 
face of growing Japanese sea power. But the question 
remains as to where these additional forces were to 
come from at a time when Britain was in a neck and neck 
struggle with Germany for the command of the North Sea. 
While few historians have considered the motivations 
""Fisher to Gerard Fiennes, 14 April 1910, Fear 
God and Dread Nought, Vol. II, p. 321. 
"—On Tirpitz's 	'risk theory' 	see especially 
Kennedy, "Strategic Aspects of the Anglo-German Naval 
Race", op. cit. 
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behind the Pacific fleet plan, fewer still have tried 
to explain how the Admiralty believed they could 
provide the ships needed to meet this new commitment. 
Rather, the scheme has been dismissed as a flight of 
fancy by the First Sea Lord. "It seems probable", 
writes Neville •Meaney, "that 'The Pacific Fleet' was 
Fisher's bright idea and that it was his eloquent 
advocacy which in a decisive moment committed the 
British government." But, Professor Meaney continues, 
"Fisher's enthusiasm for the first time had outrun his 
judgement."'" 
Events were to prove that the Pacific fleet was 
indeed beyond Britain's resources. The vessels promised 
by Britain never materialized and within only a few 
years the British government wanted even the dominion 
units for service in the North Sea. Though the Pacific 
fleet plan was hastily conceived and not adequately 
thought out a careful examination of the circumstances 
surrounding its conception does offer an explanation as 
to why the Admiralty felt they could establish a new 
fleet in the Pacific by 1913. The explanation surely 
lies in the course of the naval crisis in Britain 
during 1908 and 1909. 
62 .Meaney, op. cit., p. 186. 
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The 1909 crisis has been detailed elsewhere, 
notably in the works of Arthur Marder and more recently 
Peter Padfield." Briefly, it centred on the number of 
dreadnought battleships that should be laid down in the 
fiscal year 1909-10. While some members of the 
government believed that four new dreadnoughts would be 
sufficient, claiming that the German threat had been 
exaggerated, the Admiralty requested six, and the 
press, demanding that the superiority of the Royal Navy 
be put beyond any doubt, mounted a vociferous campaign 
for eight new ships. On 24 February 1909 a compromise 
was worked out. The Cabinet agreed to lay down four 
new dreadnoughts in 1909 and a further four, should 
events prove they were needed, by 1 April 1910. In this 
way British superiority over Germany in 1912 would be 
assured. 
The Admiralty was confident that the weight of 
public opinion would force the government to order all 
eight battleships regardless of what the Germans did. 
"I can't make out the Prime Minister", Admiral Fisher 
wrote to a friend in March 1909, "as he keeps quibbling 
about the 8 Dreadnoughts, and yet he knows we are going 
".Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 
I, p. 150 ff. Peter Padfield, The Great Naval Race: 
Anglo-German Naval Rivalry 1900-1914, (London, 1974), 
p. 194 ff. 
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on with them! "64 Fisher used his connections with the 
press, in particular his close friendship with J.L. 
Garvin, the editor of The Observer, to ensure all eight 
battleships were ordered. "We have engineered 8 
Dreadnoughts this year", he wrote to Garvin on 20 
March, "They can't be prevented! We have engineered the 
great radical majority into an obedient flock."" 
Whether the Germans had planned to accelerate their 
building programme, and the extent to which the crisis 
was manipulated by Fisher, is a matter of some dispute. 
Arthur Marder is not convinced of a German plot."' E.L. 
Woodward, though not able to show positive proof, 
thinks that the Germans had planned to accelerate their 
programme but were deterred from doing so by its being 
revealed." Whatever the case the German acceleration 
in 1909 did not happen though all eight British 
dreadnoughts were authorized. With eight new 
dreadnoughts under the 	1909-10 	programme 	Fisher 
".Fisher to Arthur Davidson, 20 March 1909, Fear 
God and Dread Nought, Vol. II, p. 209. 
65 .Fisher to J.L. Garvin, 20 March 1909, cited in 
Alfred M. Gollin, The Observer and J.L. Garvin 1908- 
1914: A Study in Editorship, (London, 1960), p. 75. 
""Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 
I, pp. 177-178. 
".Woodward, op. cit., pp. 203-252. 
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believed he had secured a breathing space in the naval 
race with Germany. "We shall have 22 Dreadnoughts in 
March 1912", he told close friend Arnold White, "and 
the Germans will only have 11! This is an absolute 
fact! But as I've often told you, 'the truth is we 
don't want anyone to know the truth' •"68 
Fisher's conviction that he had secured a breathing 
space in the naval race with Germany is crucial to 
understanding the Admiralty's Pacific fleet proposal. 
As early as December 1908 Fisher had begun to doubt 
whether the Germans were really about to accelerate 
their battleship programme. By the summer of 1909 it 
was known for sure that the suspected German 
acceleration had not been translated into ships." The 
perception of the crisis in the dominions, however, 
lagged well behind events in Britain. The New Zealand 
offer of a dreadnought was not made until 22 March 
1909. A fortnight later the governments of New South 
Wales and Victoria also offered to provide a 
dreadnought for the Royal Navy but a similar offer by 
the Commonwealth was not made .until May, after the 
""Fisher to Arnold White, 19 January 1910, Fear 
God and Dread Nought, Vol. II, p. 321. 
""Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone, p. 410. 
247 
Labor government had been replaced by a new Deakin 
ministry." 
The extent to which the emergency in Britain had 
faded, even by March when the New Zealand offer of a 
dreadnought was made, can be seen from the British 
government's initial response to the New Zealand gift. 
Rather than immediately accepting the battleship the 
British government held it in promise for the future, 
"in view of the uncertainty that exists as to the 
character and extent of the demands which may be made 
on the national resources in the following years."" 
"So far as the coming financial year is concerned", 
Lord Crewe explained, "the provision and powers for 
which sanction is being asked in the Naval Estimates 
now before Parliament afford ample security."'" 
The 1908 naval scare had yielded the Admiralty four 
additional battleships under the 1909-10 programme. The 
offers of dreadnoughts by New Zealand and later 
Australia were a further windfall for the Admiralty. It 
7 °.Lord Plunket (Governor of New Zealand) to Lord 
Crewe (Colonial Secretary), 22 March 1909. G.B. Simpson 
(Acting Governor of New South Wales) to Crewe, 4 April 
1909, Lord Dudley (Governor General of Australia) to 
Crewe, 4 June 1909, Cd. 4948, passim. 
"''Crewe to Plunket, 24 March 1909, ibid. 
72 .Ibid. 
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was perhaps this surfeit of battleships which led the 
Asquith government to initially reject the New Zealand 
offer. But Britain had for a long time pressed the 
dominions to make a greater contribution to imperial 
defence and the government's response to the New 
Zealand offer was seen as counter-productive and much 
criticised." Under pressure to harness the upsurge in 
imperial sentiment in the dominions which had followed 
the naval crisis the government decided to convene a 
supplementary imperial conference solely on defence. 
The invitations were issued at the end of April." 
The Pacific fleet programme was the result of the 
Admiralty having gained a number of 'windfall' 
dreadnoughts at a time when they were under pressure to 
reinforce Britain's naval strength in the Far East. The 
first mention of the Pacific fleet is in a secret 
Admiralty memorandum dated 13 July 1909. 76 The best 
evidence for it being a sudden decision, made to 
exploit fortuitous circumstances, is in the 
correspondence of Robert Muirhead Collins. Australian 
Secretary for Defence, Collins was in London for 
discussions with Admiralty officials over the planned 
73 .Austen Chamberlain, Politics from Inside: An 
Epistolary Chronicle 1906-1914, (London, 1936), p. 168. 
74 •Circular despatch by Crewe, 30 April 1909, Cd. 
4948. 
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Australian coastal flotilla. Writing to Prime Minister 
Andrew Fisher early in April 1909, Collins noted the 
Admiralty's 	satisfaction with the plans 	for an 
Australian coastal defence force. The First Lord, he 
reported, "looks upon the torpedo boat destroyers as a 
good class of vessel for the local flotilla."'" By 
July, however, the Admiralty had decided to develop a 
Pacific fleet and an Australian coastal defence force 
was no longer favoured. Collins observed the change. 
"It is extraordinary", he wrote on 15 July, "how naval 
opinion has gone around in this country to favour the 
creation of an Australian squadron. Almost every 
Admiral I meet seems to be in favour of it."" 
The provision of surplus dreadnoughts at a time 
when the Admiralty was being urged to strengthen 
Britain's naval position in the Far East explains the 
'why' and 'how' behind the Pacific fleet but it does 
not explain the Admiralty's sudden conversion to 
ocean-going dominion 'fleet units'. The decision to 
recommend 'fleet units' in 1909 rather than simply 
accepting the dreadnoughts being offered by Australia 
"'Admiralty memorandum, 13 July 1909, P.R.O., Cab 
38/5. 
"'Collins to Andrew Fisher, 2 April 1909, N.L.A. 
Andrew Fisher Papers, Ms 2919. 
"'Collins to Deakin, 15 July 1909, C.A.0.(C), CRS 
A2819. 
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and New Zealand was tied up with moves in Britain to 
find a way of securing a greater long-term involvement 
by the dominions in imperial defence. 
From the latter decades of the nineteenth century 
Britain had pressed the wealthier colonies to increase 
their contribution to the cost of imperial defence. As 
Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain had pleaded with 
the colonial leaders for greater assistance in this 
expensive undertaking but to little avail. In 1904 a 
"large and influential deputation" organized by the 
Imperial federation (Defence) Committee had met with 
Prime Minister Arthur Balfour to impress upon him the 
"desirability of inviting the self-governing Colonies 
to take a larger share of the growing burden of 
Imperial defence."'" With the announcement of a special 
imperial conference in 1909 to discuss defence issues 
the government was again urged to seek greater 
assistance from the dominions even if this meant 
Britain making concessions to the dominion governments. 
"A note that wants striking hard" Lord Esher, a 
permanent member of the Committee of Imperial Defence 
""The Times, 12 December 1904. 
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and one of the most influential figures in British 
defence circles, told Balfour in 1909, 
is that Great Britain is the heritage of 
these people [in the dominions] as well as 
ours .... Relatively we grow weaker, and 
they grow stronger as their population and 
wealth increase .... Is it not time to 
consider what sacrifices they are ready to 
make. Sea-power is the base upon which the 
Empire rests and it should not be beyond 
their wit and ours to discover a practical 
method by which the burden of Empire can 
be apportioned." 
Securing greater assistance from the dominions held 
considerable advantages for British governments. Naval 
forces could be increased without the recourse of 
increased taxation on British voters. Alternatively 
social welfare programmes could be expanded without the 
need to slash defence expenditure. The Admiralty's 
misgivings over the development of separate colonial 
navies and their desire for complete strategic control 
over all imperial naval forces, however, had worked 
against a greater involvement by the colonies in 
imperial defence. Deakin's plan for an Australian 
flotilla that was at once both 'colonial' and 
'imperial' overcame many of the Admiralty's objections 
to separate colonial navies and cleared the way for a 
79 . Lord Esher to Arthur Balfour, 9 June 1909, 
Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher, ed. 
M.V. Brett, (London, 1934), Vol. II, p. 392. 
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substantial increase in colonial participation in the 
wider defence of the empire. 
The one drawback to the plan, from the Admiralty's 
point of view, was the possibility that the dominions 
might not put their navies at Britain's disposal in 
wartime. The Admiralty at first hoped to overcome this 
drawback by insisting that all colonial warships 
automatically came under their control upon the 
outbreak of war." This plan, however, was rejected by 
the Colonial Office. "It is out of the question to ask 
the Dominions for any pledge to put automatically their 
naval forces at the disposal the Imperial 
authorities in time of war", the Colonial Office had 
written to the Admiralty in May 1909, ".... It is quite 
unconstitutional to ask such a pledge." 8 ' Nevertheless 
the Admiralty could take comfort from Australian 
assurances that in a time of danger, "in almost every 
circumstance one can imagine", control of their forces 
would be handed over to the Admiralty. 82 Past 
experience supported this, the Australian colonies 
80 .Admiralty to Deakin, 7 December 1907, C.P.P., 
1908 session, Vol. II, No. 6, p. 3. 
"—Colonial Office to Admiralty, May 1909, P.R.O., 
CO 537/571/17938. 
82 .C.P.D., 1907-8 session, Vol. XLII, p. 7518, 13 
December 1907. 
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almost falling over each other in their enthusiasm to 
support Britain in a crisis. 
As pressure on the Admiralty to take a more 
flexible approach on dominion involvement in imperial 
defence mounted they began to see the wider 
possibilities of the Deakin proposal. Deakin had 
already indicated that more money would be available 
for a local force than the Commonwealth would ever 
provide by way of subsidy to the Royal Navy. 
"Parliament", Deakin had written to McKenna in July 
1908, "will not favour a further cash payment, or at 
all events will not devote anything like the amount in 
that way that it will vote for a local flotilla and 
service for harbour and coast defence." 83 Labor prime 
minister Andrew Fisher had also stressed Australia's 
preference for developing an indigenous force. In the 
midst of the clamour in Australia for the Commonwealth 
to offer a dreadnought to Britain following the lead by 
New Zealand, Fisher had advised London that: 
Whereas all the Dominions of the British 
Empire ought to share in the most 
effective way in the burden of maintaining 
the permanent naval supremacy of the 
Empire .... this Government is of the 
opinion that, so far as Australia is 
83 .Deakin to McKenna, 28 July 1908, N.L.A., Deakin 
Papers, Ms 1540/15. 
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concerned, 	this object would be best 
attained 	by 	encouragement 	of 	naval 
development in this country. 84 
The Admiralty's most important source of information on 
matters Australian, the Commander-in-Chief Australia 
Station, confirmed that more money would be forthcoming 
for a national navy than for a subsidy. "If spent in 
Australia", he wrote to the Admiralty on 28 June, "a 
larger naval expenditure may be expected than when 
sending home a money contribution. "85 
The advantages of the new concept of a joint 
colonial-imperial navy, combined with the realization 
that significant increases in colonial naval 
expenditure would only be secured through the 
establishment of indigenous navies, was at the heart of 
the Admiralty's 'fleet unit' proposals. Having accepted 
the establishment of colonial navies under the Deakin 
scheme the Admiralty now saw the possibility of the 
dominions relieving the Royal Navy of the 
responsibility of protecting Britain's wider interests 
in distant seas. "The Dominions or groups of 
Dominions", the Admiralty claimed in their secret 
memorandum of 13 July 1909, 
84 .Dudley to Crewe, 15 April 1909, Cd. 4948, p. 4. 
".Admiral Sir Richard Poore (Commander-in-Chief 
Australia Station) to Admiralty, 28 June 1909, P.R.O., 
Adm 116/1100B. 
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might 	be 	made 	responsible 	for 	the 
maintenance of a certain naval strength in 
its own sphere of interest, thus relieving 
the Imperial fleet of direct 
responsibility in distant seas. There 
would then be, in lieu of the Imperial 
Australian, Cape and North Atlantic or 
Pacific Squadrons, in future an Australian 
and New Zealand Squadron, a South African 
Squadron, and a Canadian Squadron (in the 
Atlantic and Pacific)." 
As Admiral Fisher explained to Lord Esher: "It means 
eventually Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Cape 
running a complete navy! We manage the job in 
Europe. They'll manage it against the Yankees, Japs, 
and Chinese, as occasion requires out there!". 87 
While the Admiralty were delighted to have found an 
arrangement which held the promise of greater 
involvement by the dominions in the defence of 
Britain's wider interests the dominion governments had 
yet to accept the scheme. The Admiralty put forward 
their proposals at the imperial conference in London in 
August. The way in which the proposals were presented 
suggests that the Admiralty expected some resistance 
from the dominion governments. In their secret 
memorandum for the Cabinet, quoted above, the Admiralty 
had indicated their hope that in the longer term the 
66 .Admiralty memorandum, 13 July 1909, P.R.O., Cab 
38/5. 
87 .Fisher to Esher, 13 September 1909, Fear God and 
Dread Nought, Vol. II, p. 266. 
256 
colonies might relieve the Royal Navy of responsibility 
for protecting British interests in distant seas. In 
the memorandum circulated to the colonial delegates at 
the conference, however, no reference was made to this. 
Otherwise identical to the secret Cabinet document, 
this second memorandum, dated 20 July 1909, emphasized 
the inadequacies of a purely local flotilla and the 
difficulties of manning such a force and keeping it 
always thoroughly efficient. 88 
The Admiralty had good reason to anticipate a cool 
reaction from the colonial governments. Hitherto the 
colonies had been reluctant to accept responsibility 
for imperial defence beyond the defence of their 
immediate interests. As George Reid had pointed out at 
the 1897 colonial conference, while the colonies would 
be willing to come to Britain's aid in an emergency, in 
peacetime they viewed the defence of Britain's wider 
interests as British responsibility." The initial 
reaction from the colonial delegates was indeed cool. 
Australia was represented by Colonel J.F. Foxton, 
Minister without Portfolio in the Deakin government. 
88 .Admiralty memorandum, 20 July 1909, 	op. cit., 
p. 21. 
89 .See above Chapter Two. 
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"The proposal", Foxton explained, having listened to 
the outline of the fleet unit idea, 
is a very desirable one from the Imperial 
point of view, especially when it is borne 
in mind that the Australian fleet unit 
when complete as a purely Australian unit 
and provided entirely by Australians, 
would always act in co-operation with the 
two smaller units, which together would 
form an Eastern Fleet and so give great 
strength to the Imperial Fleet in Eastern 
waters." 
But, Foxton suggested, "our immediate local needs would 
perhaps be better met, irrespective of the Imperial 
question, by a larger number of vessels of a smaller 
type."" 
Captain Creswell, Foxton's naval adviser at the 
conference, was likewise wary of the Admiralty's 
proposals. Accustomed to hostility and opposition from 
the Admiralty, Creswell had developed the case for an 
indigenous coastal defence flotilla. "There is no need 
for the purchase of a complete fleet of battleships, 
cruisers &c., the navy of a 'second-class power'", he 
had argued in 1905, "but only for the provision of 
"."Imperial Conference 1909: Notes of Proceedings 
of Conference at the Admiralty, Tuesday, 10 August 
1909", P.R.O., Cab 18/12A, p. 5. 
"."Imperial Conference 	1909: 	Minutes of the 
Proceedings of the Imperial Conference", P.R.O., Cab 
18/12A, p. 45. 
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special vessels, in this case Torpedo craft, to carry 
out a special duty."'" 	Creswell suspected hidden 
motives behind the Admiralty's .fleet unit proposal and 
feared its adoption would prevent the development of a 
naval infrastructure in Australia. The Australian 
government, he claimed, wanted to develop a fresh 
centre of naval strength in Australia. They wanted to 
build their own ships and produce locally all the 
essentials of a naval force. Australia's naval power, 
he suggested, would benefit more in the long term by 
money being spent on setting up naval schools and gun 
factories rather than on the construction of a 
dreadnought battle cruiser." 
Confronted with this unenthusiastic response the 
Admiralty began to press the Australian delegation to 
agree to their fleet unit proposal. "The question", 
Reginald McKenna explained, "was whether the 
Commonwealth Government would organize their naval _ 
forces in such a way that they would be able to afford 
us some assistance in war, or whether they would leave 
the whole burden of Imperial defence to be borne by the 
".C.P.P., 1906 session, Vol. II, No. 44, "Naval 
Defence. Report by the Director of the Naval Forces for 
the Year 1905", p. 13. 
"."Imperial Conference 1909: Notes of Proceedings 
of Conference at the Admiralty, Tuesday, 10 August 
1909", P.R.O., Cab 18/12A, p. 6. 
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British Admiralty."'" 	McKenna drew 	attention to 
Australia's geographic isolation. He pointed out that 
by 1915, when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was due to 
expire, both the Japanese and German fleets would be 
very large. If the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were not 
renewed, he claimed, Australia could be in a very 
dangerous position. "The burden of armaments", McKenna 
stated, leaving Foxton under no illusions as to the 
consequences of Australia rejecting the Admiralty's 
scheme, "was falling with increasing weight upon the 
British government, and the Admiralty might not be able 
to continue indefinitely to bear the burden of the 
heavy responsibilities now laid upon them for the naval 
defence of the Empire."'" 
McKenna's thinly veiled threat was reinforced by 
Admiral Fisher. "The Australian Squadron, as at present 
constituted", the First Sea Lord explained, "provided a 
naval force of little value for Imperial defence. In 
view of the heavy burdens thrown upon the Admiralty by 
the increase in the number of first class naval powers, 
they cannot afford to maintain squadrons except for the 
purposes of war."'" The crisis, according to Fisher, 
was expected to come in four or five years time. 
".Ibid. 
06 .Ibid. 
""Ibid, p. 7. 
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Dreadnought battle cruisers took two years or more to 
build. It was imperative, he claimed, that Australia 
immediately commence construction of a battle cruiser 
as the citadel around which the smaller vessels could 
operate. Small vessels by themselves, Fisher claimed, 
were a source of weakness rather than an addition to 
the naval strength of the empire. "It would probably be 
necessary", Fisher argued, "to detach Indomitables [the 
class of dreadnought battle cruiser the Admiralty was 
recommending Australia build] to the Australian Station 
to save the small craft from destruction by the more 
powerful hostile cruisers."° 7 In view of the impending 
crisis, Fisher implied, such assistance might not be 
forthcoming and without her own battle cruiser small 
vessels operated by Australia would be quickly 
- 
destroyed leaving her exposed to enemy attack." 
In the face of such pressure Foxton and Creswell 
accepted the fleet unit proposal. The case for 
destroyers and torpedo craft, Foxton wrote to Deakin, 
"fell to pieces" when confronted with the Admiralty's 
arguments." Australia agreed to construct a fleet unit 
comprising 	a 	dreadnought 	battle 	cruiser, 	three 
unarmoured 	cruisers, 	six 	destroyers 	and 	three 
97 .Ibid, p. 5. 
08 .Ibid. 
".Foxton to Deakin, 13 August 1909, N.L.A., Deakin 
Papers, Ms 1540/15. 
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submarines as well as necessary depot and supply ships. 
The initial cost of establishing this unit was 
estimated at £3,700,000 with an annual maintenance cost 
of £600,000. 1 " Following claims by Foxton that, though 
the Commonwealth had offered a dreadnought to Britain 
they had not anticipated maintaining the vessel, the 
British government agreed to contribute £250,000 
annually toward the upkeep of the force in lieu of the 
present costs of the Australia Station."' This British 
subsidy apart, the arrangement was, as Foxton had 
noted, a very favourable one from the imperial point of 
view. One need only glance at a table of Australian 
defence expenditure to confirm this. In 1909 Australian 
expenditure on naval defence was £329,739. By 1910, 
following the decision to construct a fleet unit, it 
had jumped to £1,465,034, an increase of nearly four 
hundred and fifty per cent." 2 
While Foxton had accepted the proposal to construct 
a fleet unit to form part of a new Pacific fleet he 
resisted renewed attempts by the Admiralty to secure 
automatic control of Australian naval forces at the 
"°.Cd. 4948, p. 22. 
"'"Imperial Conference 1909: Notes of Proceedings 
of Conference at the Admiralty, Tuesday, 10 August 
1909", P.R.O., Cab 18/12A, p. 6. The British offer to 
contribute toward the cost of the squadron was 
subsequently declined. 
" 2 .See Appendix B. 
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outbreak of 	war. 	In 	their 20 	July memorandum 
distributed to the dominion representatives at the 
conference the Admiralty had claimed that; "It has been 
recognized by the Colonial Governments that in time of 
war the local naval forces should come under the 
general directions of the Admiralty." 1 " The dominion 
governments, however, had not agreed to an automatic 
takeover of their forces at the outbreak of war and 
Foxton told McKenna and Fisher that 	such a requirement 
"would be 	regarded with 	some degree 	of objection 	in 
Australia. "104 	The Admiralty responded by 	demanding 
that, should the Australian unit not be placed under 
their authority in war, they have the right to recall 
all non-Australian personnel." 5 Despite this pressure 
Foxton remained insistent that the final decision must 
rest with the Commonwealth government though, after 
consultation with Deakin, he reaffirmed earlier 
assurances by Australia that it was certain the vessels 
would be placed under Admiralty control_ in an 
emergency. lee  
" 3 .Admiralty memorandum, 20 July 1909, op. cit., 
p. 23. 
" 4 ."Imperial Conference 1909: 	Minutes of the 
Proceedings of the Imperial Conference", P.R.O., Cab 
18/12A, p. 45. 
105 •Foxton to Deakin, 	23 August 1909, N.L.A., 
Deakin Papers, Ms 1540/15. 
" 5 .Deakin to Foxton, 19 September 1909, ibid. 
263 
The pressure brought to bear on the Australian 
delegation in 1909 far exceeded that applied by Britain 
at previous conferences. Though not openly stated, 
McKenna and Fisher had clearly implied that if 
Australia failed to undertake the construction of a 
complete 'fleet unit' the Admiralty would not be 
willing to guarantee Australian security in war. This 
was a marked contrast from the 1907 colonial 
conference. At that meeting Lord Tweedmouth had stated: 
We gladly take all that you can give us, 
but at the same time, if you are not 
inclined to give us the help that we hope 
to have from you, we acknowledge our 
absolute obligation to defend the King's 
dominions across the seas to the best of 
our ability. 107 
Precisely why such pressure should have been brought to 
bear on Australia in 1909 can only be speculated upon. 
It seems likely, however, that it was closely connected 
with the Pacific fleet programme. The Admiralty was 
under pressure in Britain both to find a way of 
involving the dominions more widely in imperial defence 
and to reinforce Britain's naval forces in the Far 
East. In 1909 a series of serendipitous events had 
provided them with a means of achieving these goals. 
These circumstances might never be repeated and the 
" 7 .Cd. 3523, p.129. 
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Admiralty, and in particular Admiral Fisher, were 
determined not to let the opportunity slip by. A hint 
of Fisher's jubilation over what might be achieved is 
to be found in his letter to Gerard Fiennes. Having 
written of "that great Pacific Fleet, which is to be in 
the Pacific what our Home Fleet is in the Atlantic and 
North Sea", Fisher had some advice for the naval 
writer. "Don't go blazing away at a want of something 
that •is truly coming", he warned, "but you can 'cocker 
it up' by judicious phrasing to keep our Pacific 
children to their task. "1 08 
The period from the 1907 colonial conference to the 
1909 imperial conference was immensely significant for 
Australian naval defence. In 1907 Australian navalists 
were finally permitted what they had long wanted - a 
local naval defence force. But it soon became apparent 
that British and Australian hopes for this force were 
very different. After initial reservations, however, 
the Admiralty came to see the imperial advantages of 
Deakin's proposal for a flotilla that was both 
Australian and a part of the Royal Navy and embraced it 
to an extent far beyond Deakin's original thinking. It 
seems certain that this new concept of colonial navies 
" 8 .Fisher to Gerard Fiennes, 14 April 1910, Fear 
God and Dread Nought, Vol. II, p. 321. 
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was an important factor in the Admiralty's decision to 
recommend ocean-going fleet units to the dominions 
1909. The Admiralty believed they had finally hit upon 
an arrangement which would encourage greater colonial 
participation in the defence of wider imperial 
interests in a way which did not compromise their 
overall control of imperial naval strategy. 
The commitment by Australia to establish a fleet 
unit around a dreadnought battle cruiser was a notable 
success for the Admiralty. As part of a new Pacific 
fleet it meant the reassertion of British power in the 
Far East while in the longer term the Admiralty hoped 
it would set the pattern for the dominions relieving 
the Royal Navy of the responsibility of defending 
British interests outside of British waters. In 
persuading Australia to embark on the construction of a 
fleet unit the Admiralty had brought considerable 
pressure to bear. Whereas the Admiralty were prepared 
to rely upon the United States, with its Anglo-Saxon 
background and population, not challenging British 
interests in the western hemisphere they were less 
willing to do so for Japan in the Far East. The 
breathing space in the naval race with Germany that had 
followed in the wake of the 1908 dreadnought scare 
provided what could well be the last opportunity for 
the Admiralty to shore up Britain's position in the Far 
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East. Realizing this they were not prepared to lose the 
chance through Australian reservations. 
Events, however, were to prove that in their 
commitment to establishing a Pacific fleet the 
Admiralty had over-extended themselves. There seems 
little question that the commitment was genuine. It was 
reaffirmed in parliament in August 1909 by the British 
Prime Minister.'- 09 Nevertheless it was not to be 
honoured. The Admiralty were unable to find all the 
ships they had promised for the Pacific fleet, 
undermining the value of the Australian fleet unit as a 
deterrent to Japanese aggression and souring relations 
between Britain and her Pacific dominions. 
1 ".G.B.P.D., 5th series, Vol. 	IX, 	p. 2311, 26 
August 1909. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE ABANDONMENT OF THE PACIFIC, 1910-1914 
At the 1909 imperial conference the Admiralty had 
persuaded the Australian government to co-operate in 
re-establishing a British naval presence in the 
Pacific. A new 'Pacific Fleet' was to be developed 
consisting of three self-contained 'fleet units', each 
one comprising a dreadnought battle cruiser, three 
light cruisers and smaller vessels. The Australian 
government agreed to abandon its plans for a local 
defence flotilla and instead construct and operate one 
of these 'fleet units'. The government of New Zealand, 
while refusing to participate in a joiritnaval programme 
with Australia, had agreed to provide the battle 
cruiser flagship of a another 'fleet unit'. The 
Admiralty had achieved less success with Canada. 
Originally they had hoped the Canadians would, like 
Australia, provide a complete 'fleet unit' to be based 
on Canada's west coast. The Canadian government, 
however, had refused to participate in the Pacific 
Fleet scheme. They argued that a navy based on only one 
coast would be unacceptable to the majority of 
Canadians and decided instead to develop local defence 
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forces stationed on both their Atlantic and Pacific 
seaboards. 1 
The Pacific Fleet was intended as a counter to the 
growing naval power of Japan following concern in 
British defence circles that the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, due to expire in 1915, might not be renewed. 
The Pacific Fleet was not intended to directly engage 
the Imperial Japanese Navy. Rather, as the First Lord 
of the Admiralty had explained at the 1909 imperial 
conference, the three Pacific fleet units, when 
combined, were to be capable, 
of so restraining the operation of any 
possible enemy that we should have, in the 
event of war, ample time to reinforce our 
Pacific Fleet by our Mediterranean Fleet 
and, if necessary, by our Atlantic Fleet. 2 
Only the Australian fleet unit, however, was to be 
completed. From 1910 the Admiralty Vcame  gradually to 
realize that their_ plans to reinforce the Pacific could 
not be achieved. In part this was because of an 
unexpected acceleration in German naval construction, 
but also because of continuing pressure in Britain to 
contain naval expenditure combined with a failure by 
the Admiralty to take into account the availability of 
'Preston, op. cit., p. 393. 
2 ."Imperial 	Conference 	1909: 	Minutes 	of 	the 
Proceedings of the Imperial Conference", P.R.O., Cab 
18/12A, p. 64. 
270 
the small ships, especially the light cruisers, when 
formulating the Pacific Fleet proposals in 1909. With 
the collapse of the Pacific Fleet programme Britain 
gradually abandoned the Pacific. It was not until 1945, 
after the defeat of Germany in the Second World War, 
that a British Pacific Fleet was re-established. 
The Pacific Fleet scheme had been hastily put together 
by the Admiralty. The 1908 naval crisis had yielded 
additional dreadnoughts and offers of assistance from 
the dominions which the Admiralty were eager to 
capitalize upon. The haste with which the Pacific Fleet 
scheme had been put together, however, had left no time 
to work out the legal and organizational arrangements 
associated with the establishment of ocean-going 
colonial navies. In 1910, with Australia proceeding 
with the construction of its 'fleet unit', the 
Admiralty moved to clear up questions over the 
operation and legal status of dominion fleets. 
In January 1910 the Admiralty wrote to the Colonial 
Office urging the establishment of an inter-
departmental committee to consider the status of 
dominion warships. 3 Three problems, they claimed, 
3 .Admiralty to Colonial Office, 4 January 1910, 
P.R.O., Adm 1/8122. 
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needed to be settled. The first was the international 
status of dominion warships when outside dominion 
waters in peacetime. The second was the extent to which 
British legislation was required in this regard. The 
third concerned the application of a uniform system of 
naval discipline throughout the dominion navies. 4 
Reaching agreement on these questions, the Admiralty 
stressed, was of "urgent importance". 5 
In the previous chapter it has been argued that 
Deakin's proposal for a joint imperial-colonial 
squadron, once its advantages had been recognized by 
the Admiralty, played an important part in their 
decision to recommend ocean-going fleet units in 1909. 
The Admiralty's submissions to the Inter-Departmental 
Committee on the Status of Dominion Ships of War, 
established in July 1910, lend weight to the thesis. 
From the outset the Admiralty's principal objective was 
securing control over the new dominion navies. They 
pressed vigorously for a recommendation favouring the 
establishment of a "United Imperial Navy" under which 
dominion ships and seamen would be part of the Royal 
Navy and upon leaving local waters subject to complete 
Admiralty control. "Unless a policy of intimate 
4 .Admiralty to Colonial Office, 	8 July 1910, 
P.R.O., 	Adm 1/8122. 
5.Ibid. 
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association with the Royal Navy is pursued", the 
Admiralty argued, "the Empire as a whole will gain 
little from the establishment of dominion Naval 
Forces." 
Central to the Admiralty's attempts to achieve a 
"United Imperial Navy" was the universal adoption of 
the British Naval Discipline Act throughout the 
dominion fleets. Legal opinions, sought by the 
Admiralty, suggested that under the Colonial Naval 
Defence Act of 1865 colonial warships serving in the 
Royal Navy would be regarded in law as "one of His 
Majesty's ships in commission". Officers and men aboard 
such vessels, however, would not be covered under the 
British Naval Discipline Act and therefore would not be 
regarded as "persons in or belonging to His Majesty's 
Navy." The Admiralty was dissatisfied with the 
provisions for naval discipline contained in existing 
Australian legislation. The existing Australian Defence 
Acts, the Admiralty claimed, provided for a naval 
disciplinary code of a "far less stringent character 
°."Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on 
the Status of Dominion Ships of War", P.R.O., Adm 
1/8122. 
7 .Law Office to Admiralty, 	13 June 1911, 	in 
O'Connell and Riordan, op. cit., p. 186. 
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than is 	considered necessary for the effective 
maintenance of discipline in the Royal Navy." 
A single system of naval discipline would make 
co-operation between colonial and British warships 
easier and simplify the inter-change of personnel. It 
would also consolidate the Admiralty's control over 
colonial warships once they had left colonial waters. 
As the Admiralty explained: 
unless there is some sanction which the 
Imperial Government can enforce, there is 
no means by which the personnel of the new 
mobile forces ... capable of voyaging 
anywhere, can be punished in the event of 
want of compliance with the orders of the 
central Government.° 
Moreover, the Admiralty's legal advice suggested that 
the dominion legislatures did not possess the power to 
create a system of discipline for their naval forces 
which they could enforce outside their territorial 
waters. Colonial seamen, though aboard warships 
commissioned into the Royal Navy, would therefore not 
be covered either by the British Naval Discipline Act 
or by the Naval Discipline Act of their respective 
Dominion." This situation acutely reflects the 
8 ."Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on 
the Status of Dominion Ships of War", P.R.O., Adm 
1/8122. 
°.Ibid. 
".Law Office to Admiralty, 13 June 1911, in 
O'Connell and Riordan, op. cit., p. 186. 
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uncertain legal position of the dominions at the time, 
existing midway between colonies and fully independent 
nation states. 
The Inter-Departmental Committee accepted the 
Admiralty's arguments. Its final report recommended the 
establishment of a 'united imperial navy' and the 
universal application of the British Naval Discipline 
Act. Consideration had been given to other 
arrangements. The creation of completely independent 
dominion fleets, the equivalent of the navies of 
independent nation states, and auxiliary dominion 
fleets, where the British Naval Discipline Act would 
only come into force once the ships had left dominion 
waters, was examined. These were rejected, however, 
because of legal difficulties or because they did not 
allow for a close association with the Royal Navy.'' 
The crucial factor determining the Committee's final 
recommendation seems to have been the continuing 
responsibility of the British government for the 
foreign affairs of the whole empire. "While the 
Dominions", the Committee concluded, 
should not either in peace or war be under 
an absolute obligation to permit active 
use of their ships, the Imperial 
Government should possess, both in peace 
"."Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on 
the Status of Dominion Ships of War", P.R.O., Adm 
1/8122. 
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and war, effective means of precluding any 
action as in their opinion would effect 
foreign relations." 
In wartime, the Committee decided, "this would involve 
the acceptance by the Dominion Governments of the 
principle that their naval forces would not take any 
action whatever without the approval of the Imperial 
Government, other than measures of self-defence within 
their own territorial waters." 13 
The recommendations of the Committee were embodied 
in a confidential memorandum for circulation to the 
dominion governments. The memorandum referred only to 
the 'united imperial navy' proposal. No mention was 
made of the other arrangements which the Committee had 
considered. This was in keeping with the wishes of the 
Colonial Secretary, who had instructed the Committee 
that only one arrangement be offered to the dominions, 
leaving them to object if they wished. 14 The memorandum 
made a strong case for a 'united imperial navy' and the 
universal operation of British naval discipline. "The 
proposed establishment of naval forces by the 
Dominions", it explained, "is unique, and there is no 
precedent in history to which an appeal can be made in 
12 .Ibid. 
13 ."Memorandum on the Status of Dominion Ships of 
War", August 1910, P.R.O., Cab 17/48. 
14 . Ib id. 
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determining their status." 18 It stressed, however, that 
as questions of international relations and of peace 
and war remained the responsibility of the imperial 
government, "therefore Imperial control over the 
Dominion naval forces in some form [was] 
unavoidable. "'° Furthermore, the report argued, the 
presence of British personnel aboard dominion vessels 
and the need for close co-operation with the Royal Navy 
made homogeneous discipline essentia1. 17 
The memorandum became the basis of discussions with 
the dominions. In Australia the main objection to the 
proposal centred on the application of British naval 
discipline. The Commonwealth took the view that 
Commonwealth laws had full force on their ships even 
when they were outside Australian territorial waters. 18 
The Admiralty, however, remained insistent that 
existing Australian legislation was insufficient for 
maintaining a high state of discipline and efficiency 
in sea-going ships. As Australia lacked the resources 
to man the squadron without the loan of personnel from 
18 ."Remarks on the Memorandum of the Admiralty re 
Naval Defence", 10 February 1911, C.A.0.(M), MP 153/11. 
Note that this view was not shared by the British Law 
Office. 
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the Royal Navy, the Admiralty had the whip hand. They 
made it clear that they would not lend personnel to the 
Commonwealth unless they were fully satisfied with the 
disciplinary code in the ships." Australia was left 
with no alternative but to accept the application of 
the British Naval Discipline Act. "The solution 
proposed", Captain Creswell wrote of the arrangement 
outlined in the British memorandum to the Minister of 
Defence in February 1911, "is probably the only one 
possible that both meets [the] . international 
difficulties and gives the Dominion Government a free 
hand to the limit of its political status and 
capabilities. " 20 
In seeking parliamentary sanction for the development 
of an ocean-going Australian 'fleet unit' and the very 
substantial increase in expenditure this involved, 
Joseph Cook, Minister for Defence in the Deakin 
government, had laid great emphasis on the threat posed 
by Japan and the role the Australian unit would play as 
part of the British force which would counter this 
"."Memorandum on Progress of Discussions with 
Admiralty Officials", 8 December 1910, C.A.0.(M), MP 
153/11. 
20 .Creswell to George Pearce (Minister of Defence), 
8 February 1911, C.A.0.(M), MP 153/11. 
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threat." The fleet unit idea, after all, had been sold 
to Australia largely on this understanding. At the 1909 
conference the First Lord of the Admiralty had drawn 
attention to the long-term problems created for Britain 
and her dominions by the rise of Japanese sea power in 
the Far East. 	Australia's representative at the 
conference, Colonel Foxton, had been led to believe 
that Australia's fleet unit would be one of three 
identical formations replacing the three existing Royal 
Navy squadrons in the Pacific. 22 It was by establishing 
a 'fleet unit' as part of Britain's new Pacific Fleet, 
the First Lord of the Admiralty had assured Foxton, 
that Australia "would be able to co-operate most 
materially in solving the whole problem of Far Eastern 
defence." 22 
As early as January 1910, however, questions were 
being raised inside the Admiralty as to whether Britain 
would be able to provide all the ships which had been 
promised to form the new Pacific fleet. At this stage 
21 .C.P.D., 1909 session, Vol. LI, pp. 3607-3636, 21 
September 1909. 
22 .J.F. Foxton, "The Evolution and Development of 
an Australian Naval Policy", Commonwealth Military 
Journal, November, 1911), p. 666. 
22 ."Imperial Conference 	1909: 	Minutes 	of 	the 
Proceedings of the Imperial Conference", P.R.O., Cab 
18/12A, p. 64. 
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Admiral Fisher, as his letter to Gerard Fiennes 
indicates, was still confident that the new fleet would 
be created. 24 Fisher's confidence appears to have 
rested on the provision of the dreadnought battle 
cruisers. As Australia and New Zealand were each 
providing a battle cruiser only a single vessel would 
have to be found by Britain. Barring a sudden increase 
in German construction, the additional ships ordered 
under the 1909-10 programme would enable the Royal Navy 
to provide the third battle cruiser for the Pacific 
fleet. But the provision of the small ships, the 
cruisers and destroyers, was another matter. It was the 
shortage of these vessels which concerned the Director 
of Naval Intelligence. 25 Under the 1909 agreement each 
'fleet unit', apart from a battle cruiser, was to 
contain three new Bristol class light cruisers, six 
destroyers and three submarines. As New Zealand was 
providing only a battle cruiser, this meant that six 
cruisers, twelve destroyers and six submarines would 
have to be provided by Britain. How, asked the Director 
of Naval Intelligence in January 1910, with the Royal 
Navy distributed for a European war, could these ships 
be spared for service in the Pacific." 
24 .Fisher to Gerard Fiennes, 14 April 1910, op. 
cit. 
26 .D.N.I. memorandum, 25 January 1910, P.R.O., Adm 
116/1270. 
26.  Ibid. 
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The Admiralty appreciated that a failure to meet 
their obligations under the 1909 naval agreement was 
likely to sour relations with the Pacific dominions. In 
a minute appended to the D.N.I.'s memorandum, the 
Secretary of the Admiralty, Graham Greene, while 
arguing that the present situation did not require the 
immediate implementation of the Pacific fleet plan, 
recommended that the Admiralty maintain their forces on 
the East Indies and China Stations at a level 
equivalent to the combined strength of the two proposed 
fleet units. A failure to do so, he warned, would be 
seen by Australia and New Zealand as "a want of faith 
on the part of the Admiralty." 27 
Apart from damaging relations with the dominions, a 
failure to establish the Pacific fleet would have 
implications for the defence of Britain's possessions 
in the Far East. As we have seen above, the plan to 
reinforce the Royal Navy in the Pacific had resulted 
from concern in British defence circles over the 
security of Britain's Far Eastern interests after the 
expiry of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1915. In 
casting doubt upon the Admiralty's ability to fulfil 
their 1909 promises the Director of Naval Intelligence 
accepted that if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance did lapse 
27 .Minute by Graham Greene (Secretary to the 
Admiralty), 4 February 1910, P.R.O., Adm 116/1270. 
281 
then a larger force in the Pacific would be required. 
In the circumstances the only course he could recommend 
was for the alliance with Japan to be extended." 
The difficulty of Britain's position in regard to 
Pacific defence was summarized by Sir Charles Ottley. A 
former Director of Naval Intelligence, Ottley was 
Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence. A sub-
committee of the C.I.D had been established to oversee 
the preparation of defence-related information for an 
imperial conference due to be held in mid 1911. In 
January 1911 he wrote to Sir Arthur Nicolson at the 
Foreign Office inquiring as to the likelihood of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance being renewed. "At present", he 
explained, 
we maintain only a small naval force in 
the Far East, relying on our alliance with 
Japan .... The Admiralty will, I expect, 
require ample warning if [the alliance is 
not to be renewed] for it is very 
desirable to effect the strengthening of 
the Far Eastern Fleet gradually so as not 
to make the change of policy conspicuous. 
One may well imagine too that the 
reinforcement of our China 	Fleet 	to 
28 .D.N.I. memorandum, 25 January 1910, P.R.O., Adm 
116/1270. Ian Nish has cited the C.I.D. sub-committee 
established in July 1910 to prepare defence questions 
for the imperial conference as the place where a 
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was first 
mooted. "Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
1901-1914", The Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, Vol. IX, (November, 1963), p. 208. The D.N.I. 
memorandum pre-dates this committee. 
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anything commensurate with the strength of 
the Japanese navy would imply an important 
increase to our building programme!29 
Ottley did not specifically mention the Pacific Fleet, 
which was due to be in place by 1913 in readiness for 
the expiry of the alliance, but his reference to the 
need for an increase in the naval building programme, 
and the exclamation mark which followed it, perhaps 
suggest that he suspected the fleet was not likely to 
be ready by the promised date. 
Far from planning an increase in naval construction 
to cover their commitment to reinforce the Pacific the 
Liberal government was hoping to reduce naval 
expenditure. At a cabinet meeting on 1 March 1911 a 
number of cabinet members including David Lloyd George 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer) and Winston Churchill 
argued that "considerable economies could, with perfect 
safety, be effected in the present Naval Expenditure on 
29 .0ttley to 	Sir 	Arthur 	Nicolson (Permanent 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), 15 January 
1911, P.R.O., Cab 17/74. The Japanese were already 
showing considerable interest in Britain's 1909 pledge 
to reinforce the Pacific. The Japanese attache, the 
Secretary to the Admiralty minuted, had called "once or 
twice at the Admiralty to enquire to the effect of the 
[Pacific fleet] scheme   upon the strength of the 
British fleet in China waters." Minute by Graham 
Greene, 14 February 1910, P.R.O., Adm 116/1270. 
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the Mediterranean, China and Pacific squadrons." 3 ° 
Indeed, with the aim of reducing the estimates in mind, 
Churchill had written to Lloyd George and Lord Crewe in 
February proposing that the Australian and New Zealand 
battle cruisers be retained in the North Sea. If these 
ships could be secured for service in the North Sea, 
Churchill claimed, then Britain need lay down only four 
new dreadnoughts in 1911 and four in 1912 rather than 
the five vessels planned for each of those years, a 
saving of £1,500,000 a year." Such proposed economies, 
reflecting domestic political concerns, indicate how 
lightly Britain took her pledge to re-establish British 
sea power in the Pacific. 
With the Pacific fleet most unlikely to be ready by 
1913 the only alternative Britain had, other than 
admitting inability to defend her interests in the Far 
East, was to extend the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Apart 
from the question of how else British interests in the 
Far East could be protected, there was a diplomatic 
motive for seeking the early renewal of the alliance 
with Japan. The alliance was viewed with suspicion by 
the United States which feared that it might lead to 
30 .Asquith to the King, 1 March 1911 quoted in I. 
Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study of Anglo-Japanese 
Relations 1908-1923, (London, 1972), p. 52. 
31 .Churchill to Crewe, 	14 February 1911 and 
Churchill to Lloyd George, 14 February 1911, cited in 
Randolf S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill. Volume II: 
Young Statesman, 1901-1914, (London, 1967), pp. 518- 
519. 
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Britain siding with Japan in a war against the United 
States. The Foreign Secretary (Sir Edward Grey) wanted 
to seize the opportunity afforded by an early renewal 
of the alliance to include in the treaty a clause which 
would prevent the alliance being invoked against a 
country with which either party had an arbitration 
agreement. At the time Britain was negotiating an 
arbitration agreement with the United States and Grey 
hoped such a clause would allay American concerns about 
the alliance." 
The early renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
however, would not be popular with the dominions, 
especially Australia. Many Australians already regarded 
the alliance with Japan as a poor substitute for a 
strong British fleet in the Pacific, and were not 
likely to be pleased by its extension in lieu of a 
promised reinforcement of British sea power there. 
Anticipating a hostile reaction from the dominions, 
Ottley recommended that they should be consulted before 
any public announcement of renewal was made. "Frankly", 
he told Sir Arthur Nicolson, "I dread any sort of 
discussion with our brethren in Australasia on these 
delicate and secret topics .... But - on the other hand 
- the last thing wanted is a howl from Australia and 
32 .See Nish, Alliance in Decline, chpts. 3-4. 
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Canada, if and when the British Government decide to 
renew the alliance." 33 
Faced with the need to renew the alliance with 
Japan in lieu of the compact, made only two years 
earlier, to strengthen the Royal Navy in the Pacific, 
the British government elected, in the words of one 
writer, to "play fast and lose" with the self-governing 
dominions at the 1911 imperial conference. 34 The 
initial British strategy seems to have been to downplay 
the level of threat to Australia and New Zealand while 
studiously avoiding any reference to the promised 
Pacific fleet. In a re-assessment of the "Principles of 
Imperial Defence" prepared by the Overseas Defence 
Committee for the conference the Admiralty's pledge to 
"protect all British territory abroad against organized 
invasion from the sea" was repeated though there had 
been a dramatic deterioration in Britain's strategic 
position since 1896 when this declaration had first 
been made.", It was admitted, however, that, due to 
33 .0ttley to Nicolson, 15 January 1911, P.R.O., Cab 
7/74. 
34 .Robert Gowen, "British Legerdemain at the 1911 
Imperial Conference: The Dominions, Defense Planning, 
and the Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance", 
Journal of Modern History, Vol. LII, (1980), p. 399. 
36 .0.D.C. 	memorandum 417M, 	"General Principles 
Affecting the Oversea Dominions and Colonies", 7 July 
1910, P.R.O., Cab 8/5. The Colonial Defence Committee 
had recently been re-named the Overseas Defence 
Committee. 
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Britain's relative decline among the naval powers, the 
navy might be "temporarily" unable to send 
reinforcements to the Pacific though how long . this 
might be was left unexplained." 
Perhaps because there could be delays in sending 
reinforcements to the Pacific in the event of war local 
defences were now acknowledged as being of value. The 
tone of the O.D.C. memorandum, however, had much more 
in common with statements made by Lord Tweedmouth at 
the 1907 colonial conference than it did with the 
picture of Pacific defence the Admiralty had presented 
in 1909. No reference was made to the Pacific Fleet or 
to the ocean-going 'fleet unit' the Admiralty had urged 
upon Australia in 1909. "The result of the 
establishment of ... local navies", it explained, "will 
be ultimately to relieve the Admiralty from the 
responsibility of maintaining ships in certain waters 
in the immediate neighbourhood of these Dominions."" 
This was a notable change of wording from the 
Admiralty's memorandum of 13 July 1909 which stated 
that ocean-going dominion navies might ultimately 
relieve the Imperial fleet of direct responsibility in 
""Ibid. 
37. Ibid. (My italics). 
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"distant seas". 38 Ominously for Australia, the upshot 
of "local navies" would be to "permit a further 
development of the policy of concentration"." 
In a companion document the comparative security of 
Australia was emphasized. "It is not reasonably 
probable", it was stated in a re-affirmation of the 
C.I.D.'s 1906 assessment of Australian defence 
requirements, "that any military attack on Australia 
more formidable than a raid by a small landing force 
will be undertaken. " 4 ° The only power considered to be 
within striking distance of Australia was Japan and 
attack from this direction was regarded as unlikely 
because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. If Japan did go 
to war with Britain, attacks on Australia were still 
considered "highly improbable" as long as Britain 
retained ultimate command of the sea." 
Such reassurances, though perhaps expedient from the 
Admiralty's point of view given the question mark 
hanging over the Pacific fleet, did not sit well with 
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir 
".See above chapter four. 
39 .0.D.C. memorandum 417M, op. cit. 
40 .O.D.C. memorandum 429M, "Australia: Scale of 
Attack Under Existing Conditions", 9 January 1911, 
P.R.O., Cab 8/5. A similar assessment was prepared for 
Canada. 
41.  Ibid. 
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William Nicholson. At a meeting of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence on 26 January 1911 Nicholson pointed 
out that in 1909 Australia had been urged to reorganize 
and strengthen her military forces. By minimizing the 
threat to Australia, Nicholson claimed, Britain was 
discouraging this development. 42 Nicholson had a vested 
interest in promoting military preparations in the 
dominions. 	With the General Staff committed to 
supporting France in a European war the dominions were 
regarded as a vital reserve of manpower for Britain. 
Nicholson asserted that the relative immunity from 
attack supposedly enjoyed by the Pacific dominions was 
"based upon a naval situation which no longer 
existed." 43 "The British fleet", he stated, "is no 
longer supreme in all waters" and to support his case 
he reminded the C.I.D. that the Admiralty had already 
admitted to the loss of sea command in the waters of 
North America. The situation in the Pacific, Nicholson 
suggested, was similar. "If we should find ourselves in 
a war with Japan", he argued, 
the attitude of Germany being uncertain or 
hostile, we might be forced to maintain a 
fleet in European waters so strong that it 
was very doubtful if we should be in a 
position immediately to dispatch naval 
reinforcements to Far Eastern waters 
42 .C.I.D. minutes, 108th meeting, '26 January 1911, 
P.R.O., Cab 2/2. 
43.Ib i d. 
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sufficient to enable us to assert our 
superiority over the fleet of Japan.44 
In a recent article Robert Gowen has claimed that 
Nicholson's criticisms in the C.I.D. of the initial 
papers prepared for the conference paved the way for 
British deception and misrepresentation in 1911. 
Nicholson, Gowen argues, became the central figure in a 
campaign to exploit the 'Japanophobia' widespread in 
the dominions, especially Australia, in order to secure 
dominion endorsement for the renewal of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance and the continuation of dominion 
defence preparations which were to prove so valuable to 
Britain in the First World War. 45 Nicholson was 
motivated by vested interest. His particularist 
concerns were clearly revealed in a later memorandum in 
which he argued that "less urgent or immediate 
importance attaches to the defence by the Navy of India 
and the Dominions [because] the danger can to a 
great extent be guarded against by the existence of 
local military forces."'" Nevertheless his criticisms 
had validity. The Admiralty had tacitly admitted that, 
in the event of a crisis such as had been premised by 
Nicholson, Britain would indeed find it difficult to 
send reinforcements to the Pacific leaving her 
44 . Ibi d. 
45 .Gowen, op. cit., p.399. 
46 .Nicholson, 	"Memorandum 	on 	the 	Strategic 
Relations Existing Between the Oversea Dominions and 
India", 29 March 1911, P.R.O., Cab 38/17. 
290 
possessions there exposed to attack. This was even more 
the case now the planned Pacific fleet had fallen 
through. 	Moreover 	Nicholson's 	criticisms 	had 
highlighted Britain's dependence upon the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, not just to protect her interests in 
the Far East from attack by a third party, but as a 
restraint upon Japan attacking British interests there. 
Nicholson's colleagues at the C.I.D. accepted the 
point he was making, especially in regard to the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance. R.B. Haldane, the Secretary of State 
for War, though claiming that Australia's strategic 
position had not changed since 1905, did admit: 
that a determination of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance would have far-reaching effects, 
and as changes in the strategic situation 
would probably develop more rapidly than 
either military forces could be organized 
or defence works constructed, it was 
desirable that the Commonwealth Government 
be encouraged to proceed with measures 
required to meet a situation which might 
arise in a few years time. 47 
Churchill and Grey agreed and the Committee finally 
recommended that the memorandum be re-drafted for the 
conference. A paragraph was to be added stressing that 
the assessment of a threat to Australia limited to a 
47 C.I.D. minutes, 108th meeting, 26 January 1911, 
P.R.O., Cab 2/2. 
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raid by a small landing force was based upon the 
assumption that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in 
existence. References to the situation that might arise 
if the alliance was allowed to lapse were also to be 
removed in favour of a general statement explaining 
that its termination would "profoundly modify" the 
strategic situation in the Pacific. 48 
	
A second paper, 	"Australia and New Zealand: 
Strategic Situation in the Event of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance Being Determined", was produced specifically 
for the Pacific dominions." This document emphasized 
the danger of Japanese aggression to Australia and New 
Zealand should the Anglo-Japanese Alliance be 
terminated. "Although the Anglo-Japanese Alliance", the 
paper explained, " 	• gives a considerable measure of 
security to Australia and New Zealand, it must be 
remembered that changes in the political and strategic 
situation may occur more rapidly than naval and 
military forces can be organized and brought to a state 
of efficiency."" Should war occur between Britain and 
Japan, then Australia and New Zealand could be exposed 
to Japanese attack before British reinforcements could 
48 .Ibid. 
49 .0.D.C. 	memorandum 442M, 	"Australia and New 
Zealand: Strategic Situation in the Event of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance Being Determined", 19 May 1911, 
P.R.O., Cab 8/5. 
80 .Ibid. 
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be sent to the Pacific. While an outright invasion of 
Australia or New Zealand was regarded as "highly 
improbable", it was claimed the Japanese might launch 
massive raids in order to upset British strategy. 
Australia and New Zealand, the paper argued, should 
develop their defence forces "without delay" for the 
likelihood of raids would be in inverse proportion to 
the "strength and efficiency of the local naval and 
military forces. "61 
"Australia and New Zealand: Strategic Situation in 
the Event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Being 
Determined" urged Australia embrace the naval programme 
proposed by Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson, in a report 
on Australia's naval defences completed only on 1 March 
1911. Formerly Commander of the British Coastguard and 
Reserves, Henderson had been invited by the 
Commonwealth government to consider the location of 
Australia's naval bases, the location and organization 
of training schools, and "any other Naval matters upon 
which you may care to express an opinion". 52 Making the 
most of his terms of reference Henderson produced a 
scheme for the development of the Australian navy over 
51 .Ibid. 
52 .C.P.P., 1911 session, Vol. II, No. 7, "Naval 
Forces. Recommendations by Admiral Sir Reginald 
Henderson, K.C.B.". 
293 
a period of twenty-two years. In four "eras" (the first 
of seven years, the remainder of five years) he 
proposed Australia acquire a fleet of eight battle-
cruisers, ten light cruisers, eighteen destroyers, 
twelve submarines and four depot and repair ships. The 
completed fleet, he estimated, would cost £23,290,000 
to construct and when full manned require a personnel 
of approximately 15,000 men." 
The scale and cost of the navy outlined by Admiral 
Henderson startled many Australians." Even the 
Melbourne Age, for long a champion of naval 
development, baulked at the "vast expenditure" 
entailed." The Minister for Defence, George Pearce, 
committed his government to only the initial stage of 
the scheme, a seven year programme from 1911 to 1918 
which involved little more than the development of the 
fleet unit already under construction and the shore 
facilities necessary to support it." Beyond this 
action on Henderson's proposals was deferred and with 
54 .Feakes (a contemporary observer), op. cit., p. 
154. 
55 .Melbourne Age, 6 March 1911. 
56 .C.P.D., 1911 session, Vol. LXII, pp. 2378-2379, 
November 1911. Even this stage was not carried out in 
full, many of the shore facilities Henderson had 
recommended not being completed. Jose, op. cit., p. 
xxxvi. 
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the outbreak of the First World War they were forgotten 
altogether. Likewise historians have for the most part 
dismissed Henderson's recommendations in a few lines 
with adjectives such as "bold", "ambitious" and, less 
charitably, "grandiose"." Yet in fairness to Admiral 
Henderson, while his proposals involved a substantial 
increase in naval expenditure, they were based upon 
appropriations which he believed were not unreasonable 
for a nation like Australia if truly serious about its 
naval defences. If Australians, he calculated, spent 
proportionally as much as Britain on naval defence then 
in 1910 the naval budget for the Commonwealth would 
have been £4,000,000 as against the £1,500,000 actually 
provided. Moreover, Henderson argued, the higher figure 
was justified on the basis of Australia's overseas 
trade. An annual appropriation of around £4,000,000, 
Henderson claimed, would be sufficient to fund the 
naval programme he had outlined. 58 
Financial 	considerations 	apart, 	Henderson had 
produced a scheme which, if carried to completion, 
would have made Australia the greatest naval power in 
57 .Lucas, op. cit., p.199, Jose, op. cit., p. xxiv 
and Gowen, op. cit., p. 405. 
	
58 .C.P.P., 1911 session, Vol. II, 	No. 7, "Naval 
Forces. 	Recommendations 	by Admiral 	Sir Reginald 
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the Pacific after Japan."' At its heart was an 
acceptance that Britain could no longer be depended 
upon to ensure Australia's security or protect her 
wider interests. In the introduction to his 
recommendations Admiral Henderson had quoted at length 
the strategic position of Australia as outlined by 
Field Marshall Viscount Kitchener who the Commonwealth 
had invited in 1909 to report on Australia's military 
needs. Kitchener had paid only lip service to the 
Admiralty's long-standing claim to be able to protect 
all British territory against organized invasion from 
the sea. This assurance, he had argued, was qualified 
by "considerations of time and space". National 
considerations, Kitchener had claimed, might make it 
necessary for Britain to concentrate her naval forces 
in one theatre of operations. "It follows", he had 
argued, "that in seas remote from such a concentration, 
the British Naval Forces may find themselves for the 
moment inferior in force to an actual, or potential 
enemy. In such a situation .... some time might elapse 
""The bulk of the United States Navy was based in 
the Atlantic. Though the Panama Canal was opened in 
1914 the U.S. Navy was not divided into two fleets, 
with its most powerful units in the Pacific, until 
1919. H. Sprout and M. Sprout, Toward a New Order of 
Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 
1918-1922, (Princeton, 1943), pp. 96-98. 
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before our Command of the Sea was definitely assured in 
all waters."" 
Such a refutation of 'blue water' naval philosophy 
as it was explained by the Admiralty and their 
supporters was perhaps to be expected from a soldier 
and, of course, it echoed the arguments for greater 
military defence being advanced by General Nicholson in 
the C.I.D. That Admiral Henderson should have accepted 
Kitchener's claims almost without qualification as 'the 
basis of his recommendations to the Australian 
government is more significant. Henderson did add by 
way of a rider that Australia's security "must still 
rest on the Sea Power of the Empire" and he made the 
traditional plea for unity of control in war, but he 
clearly set no stead in the Admiralty's public 
assurances or the assumption that while the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance was in force Australia was all but 
invulnerable to attack. 
Writing from Lucerne in September 1911 Admiral 
Fisher, who had retired as First Sea Lord the previous 
year, complimented Henderson on his scheme for the 
development of the Australian navy. "You did a splendid 
piece of work in Australia", he stated, "and I have 
reason to believe that every single item of your report 
".C.P.P., 1911 session, Vol. II, No. 7, "Naval 
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will be eventually carried through."" Fisher had 
recommended Henderson for the job after having himself 
refused the invitation to advise the Commonwealth on 
its naval defences. He had reservations about what 
could be achieved in Australia. "Kitchener and the 
Australians", he had told Lord Esher, "in drawing up 
their scheme of defence, forgot that Australia was an 
island". They had commenced all wrong and, Fisher 
explained, "it would involve me in a campaign I intend 
to keep clear of with the soldiers."'" He must have 
been delighted by Henderson's wide-ranging scheme, 
especially its plan for a core of dreadnought battle 
cruisers, the class of warship Fisher prized above all 
others. 
At the imperial conference the dominion representatives 
were treated to an outline of selected aspects of 
British foreign policy aimed principally at securing 
their support for the renewal of the alliance with 
Japan. The British cabinet at first opposed discussing 
matters of high policy with the dominions. They 
eventually agreed on the condition that the meetings 
"—Fisher to Henderson, 29 September 1911, Fear God 
and Dread Nought, Vol. II, p. 387. 
".Fisher to Esher, 27 May 1910. J.A. Fisher, 
Memories, (London, 1919), p. 199. 
298 
were held at the Committee of Imperial Defence where 
access could be limited to those dominion 
representatives directly concerned (prime ministers and 
ministers for defence) and the press excluded." The 
establishment of a separate Australian navy, and the 
prospect of a much more substantial force being 
developed, Neville Bennett has argued, was a key 
factor behind this decision. "For Britain a spectre 
arose." he writes. "Conceivably while she was engaged 
in a life-or-death struggle with Germany, Australia's 
large forces might idle in the Pacific zealously 
watching Japan which was Britain's ally. 6 4 
The most important part of Sir Edward Grey's survey 
was its treatment of the naval situation in the Far 
East and the role of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. "If 
it [the Anglo-Japanese Alliance] came to an end", Grey 
explained, It it cannot be doubted that not only 
would the strategical situation be altered immediately 
by our having to count the Japanese fleet as it now 
exists as possible enemies, but Japan would at once set 
69 .Speech by Sir Edward Grey in C.I.D. minutes, 
111th meeting, 26 May 1911, P.R.O., Cab 2/2. See also 
Nish, "Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1901-
1911", op. cit., p. 209. 
e 4 •N.R. 	Bennett, 	"Consultation or 	Information? 
Britain, the Dominions and the Renewal of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, 1911", New Zealand Journal of 
History, No. 4, (October, 1970), p. 182. 
299 
to work to build a more powerful fleet than she would 
have if the alliance did not exist."'" The consequence 
of this, Grey continued, would be that a separate fleet 
would have to be maintained in Chinese waters which 
would be at least equal to a two-Power standard in 
those waters, including in that two-Power standard 
counted possibly against us not only the Japanese fleet 
as it is at the present time, but the fleet which 
Japan would certainly build if we put an end to the 
alliance."'" Such a situation, the dominions were 
warned, would fall heavily upon them for it was they 
who would have to provide the increased naval forces 
required in the Far East." 
Grey's speech swayed the dominion representatives 
and they endorsed a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance. Had the Australians been less overawed by 
their introduction to high policy, however, they may 
have noticed some substantial differences between 
Grey's speech and what the Australian delegates had 
been told at the 1909 imperial conference. In 1909 the 
Pacific Fleet plan had been described as the way of 
"solving the whole problem of Far Eastern defence." It 
66 .C.I.D. minutes, 	111th meeting, 26 May 1911, 
P.R.O., Cab 2/2. 
66 .Ibid. 
67 .0.D.C. 	memorandum 442M, 	"Australia and New 
Zealand: Strategic Situation in the Event of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance Being Determined", 19 May 1911, 
P.R.O., Cab 8/5. 
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was to be an alternative to the alliance with Japan. 
The Pacific Fleet was not intended to counter the 
Imperial Japanese Navy ship for ship, rather its 
purpose was to restrain Japanese naval operations until 
reinforcements could be sent from Britain." Now Grey 
was claiming that, if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was 
terminated, a fleet equivalent to a two-power standard 
with Japan would need to be maintained in the Far East, 
and a two-power standard based not on existing Japanese 
forces but on those forces that Japan might construct. 
Moreover the Pacific Fleet itself had slipped almost 
unnoticed from the vocabulary of British officialdom. 
Grey made no mention of it. Nor was it referred to in 
any of the papers circulated among the dominion 
representatives. When the subject was raised by George 
Pearce (Australian Minister for Defence), in 
conjunction with a New Zealand request that the battle 
cruiser they were providing under the 1909 agreement 
spend a certain number of months in New Zealand waters, 
McKenna denied that British promises to this end 
constituted an agreement and hastily diverted the 
conversation on to the need for unity of command in 
war." 
68 .See McKenna's speech at the 1909 imperial 
conference quoted above. 
".C.I.D. minutes, 	112th meeting, 29 May 1911, 
P.R.O., Cab 2/2 
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In the most recent study of the 1911 imperial 
conference the British leadership, especially Grey, 
Nicholson and McKenna, have been reproached for their 
use of deception and misrepresentation to secure 
dominion conformity to British political and strategic 
imperatives. Britain's exploitation of the Pacific 
dominions' fear of Japan has been singled out for 
particular criticism."' Yet such tactics were hardly 
new. The Japanese bogy had been employed very 
successfully by Britain in 1909 to ensure Australia 
adopted the Admiralty's proposal for an ocean-going 
fleet unit. Moreover the encouragement of dominion 
defence preparations was not unjusified in view of the 
difficulties Britain was likely to experience if it did 
prove necessary to reinforce the Pacific. Not that 
Australia needed encouragement to arm against Japan. 
Despite British assurances that Japan posed no threat 
while the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in force 
Australians remained suspicious of Japanese intentions. 
Experience during the First World War tended to confirm 
Australia's misgivings far more than Britain was 
prepared to admit. 7 ' 
70 'Gowen, op. cit., pp. 405-413. 
71 .0n this see D.K. Dignan, "Australia and British 
Relations with Japan, 1914-1921", Australian Outlook, 
No. 21, (1967), pp. 135-150. 
302 
If moral judgements must be made then surely the 
most serious criticism that can be levelled at the 
British authorities in 1911 was their failure to 
inform Australia and New Zealand of the possibility 
that Britain's 1909 commitment to the Pacific fleet 
would not be met. Historians have generally seen 
Britain's failure to honour her 1909 promises as a 
consequence of the supplementary German Naval Law of 
1912. 72 This unexpected increase in German construction 
caused a crisis in Britain and necessitated a further 
concentration of British sea power in the North Sea. 
But the Admiralty documents cited above indicate that 
by January 1910 the Director of Naval Intelligence had 
serious doubts about Britain's ability to meet her 1909 
pledge. Moreover by 1911 there was considerable 
pressure both on and within the British government to 
reduce the size of the British fleet in the Pacific. It 
is clear that by the 1911 imperial conference there 
was, at the very least, a question mark over the future 
of the Pacific Fleet. 
At the naval discussions at the conference McKenna and 
George Pearce finalized the arrangements for the 
operation of the Australian navy. The Admiralty's 
72 .For example Jose, op. cit., p. xxxvi and Gordon, 
"The Admiralty and the Dominion Navies, 1902-1914", 
op. cit., p. 414. 
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proposals, based on the earlier discussions with 
Australia and contained in a memorandum carefully 
entitled "Co-operation between the Naval Forces of the 
United Kingdom and the Dominions", were tabled. McKenna 
initiated the discussions with an overview of British 
naval policy, concentrating upon the danger German 
naval development posed to the empire. He made no 
mention of Britain's commitment to establish a Pacific 
fleet. "There is only one great navy at this moment 
that could be considered as having to be taken into 
account when regarding the possibilities of warfare", 
he claimed, "and that is obviously the German Navy." 73 
Explaining that "the great mass of the German fleet is 
stationed in the North Sea and the Baltic", he went on 
to state that: 
the aggregate of our forces will have to 
be determined by the aggregate of our 
duty, and the aggregate of our duty is 
determined by the aggregate of the hostile 
fleets which we might have to meet. 74 
As McKenna had already discounted the Japanese navy as 
an enemy because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance his 
comments can be interpreted with the benefit 	of 
73 .C.I.D. minutes, 112th meeting, 29 May 1911, 
P.R.O., Cab 2/2. 
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• hindsight as a further indication that the Pacific 
fleet plan had been secretly abandoned by Britain 
before the imperial conference met. 
In considering the operation of dominion navies, 
McKenna proposed, it was important to "look forward to 
the day when . the Dominions will be able to 
maintain fleets of a size commensurate with their 
growing power and status in the world."'" Beneath such 
effusions, however, lay the Admiralty's desire for a 
'united imperial navy' and control of dominion forces 
in war. "It has seemed to us" the First Lord ventured, 
"that the proper position of the Dominion Fleets from 
the start is one of equality with the British Fleet - 
that all the fleets joined together should constitute 
one Imperial Navy."'" This meant that each fleet would 
be administered by its own separate admiralty in times 
of peace, but with a common standard of discipline and 
training so that "all the fleets, when they combine for 
the purpose of war, would be able to act immediately in 
such unity of thought and practice as a single fleet. 77 
McKenna's smooth talk, however, was not sufficient 
to allay Pearce's concern for Australian autonomy. He 
76 .Ibid. 
"-Ibid. 
77 .Ibid. 
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had two main fears. Firstly, he was suspicious that the 
Admiralty were mounting a new bid to secure automatic 
control of Australian forces on the outbreak of war. 
While repeating Australian assurances that it was 
"inconceivable" that the Commonwealth would not put its 
ships at Britain's disposal in wartime he ventured that 
a dominion might still co-operate with Britain while 
retaining control of its own fleet. "There is a feeling 
amongst the people of Australia", Pearce stated, 
voicing Australia's long-held concern for local 
defence, ".... that it might be if the whole of the 
fleet was placed at the disposal of the Admiralty, that 
the fleet might be withdrawn, leaving [Australia's 
trade] .... at the mercy of any stray cruiser which 
might elude the battle fleets of the Empire."'" 
Pearce's was also unhappy that in peacetime Australian 
vessels would automatically come under the authority of 
the Admiralty upon leaving Australian waters. He 
queried the need for the Admiralty to be informed 
whenever an Australian vessel left the waters of the 
Australia Station and cited a passage from "The Status 
of Dominion Ships of War" in which the British 
Commander-in-Chief was to assume command over 
Australian vessels outside Australian waters." 
".Ibid. 
".Ibid. 
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In response to Pearce's concerns McKenna was 
conciliatory. On the subject of control in war, he 
agreed to modify the wording of the memorandum to 
specify that only those vessels placed under the 
authority of the Admiralty by the dominion government 
would form an integral part of the British fleet, 
leaving the way open for a dominion to retain direct 
control over some of its vessels in wartime. As for 
Pearce's fear that in peacetime Australian vessels 
would be subject to Admiralty control immediately upon 
leaving Australian waters, McKenna claimed that this 
had already been changed. Notification of the movements 
of Australian ships outside Australian territorial 
waters was only required for Foreign Office purposes. 
The British Commander-in-Chief would not assume control 
over dominion warships unless he had the approval of 
the dominion government (though in matters of ceremony 
and international intercourse the motions of the senior 
officer must be followed). In foreign ports the senior 
officer would assume command but not so as to interfere 
with the orders that the commanding officer of a 
dominion ship had received from his own government." 
While Pearce's concerns led to some changes of 
wording the final arrangements for the operation of the 
Australian fleet were very much in keeping with the 
Admiralty's proposals. The Admiralty's desire for a 
80 .Ibid. 
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'united imperial navy' had been achieved. Australia had 
agreed to the application of the British Naval 
Discipline Act. Interchange of personnel was secured." 
While the Admiralty would not automatically assume 
control of dominion vessels upon their leaving dominion 
waters mechanisms were in place which would prevent a 
dominion government from using its navy in a way which 
might compromise British foreign policy. Outside 
Australian waters the commanding officer of a dominion 
ship was to obey "any instructions he may receive from 
the Government of the United Kingdom as to the conduct 
of any international matters that may arise, the 
Dominion Government being informed." 82 To ensure the 
least chance of an international incident occurring the 
size of the Australian naval station was significantly 
reduced. Under the 1887 naval agreement, where the 
auxiliary squadron was limited to operations within 
Australian waters, the limits of the station had been 
widened to include much of the South West Pacific, 
including the islands of Fiji, Samoa and French 
Polynesia. Now that Australia was responsible for its 
81 ."Memorandum of Conferences Between the British 
Admiralty and Representatives of the Dominion of Canada 
and the Commonwealth of Australia", C.P.P., 1911 
session, Vol. III, No. 12, "Imperial Conference, 1911. 
Papers Laid before the Conference: Naval and Military 
Defence", pp. 5-6. 
82.Ibid. 
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• own naval squadron the limits of the station were 
contracted to exclude all islands not under the direct 
authority of the Commonwealth. 83 
With the legal and administrative framework for the 
Australian squadron finalized the Admiralty had to 
decide who was to be its Commander-in-Chief. Clearly 
this was an important appointment. While the Commander-
in-Chief would technically be employed by the 
government of the Commonwealth and receive his 
instructions from them, he would also be the 
Admiralty's representative in Australia. Upon him would 
rest responsibility for ensuring the Commonwealth did 
not try and sidestep the limitations they had accepted 
on the operation of their fleet. For all the restraints 
built into the agreement with the Commonwealth the 
Admiralty still had reservations about the operation of 
ocean-going warships by 'irresponsible' colonial 
governments. After all, the absence of any legal or 
constitutional authority had not deterred the 
Queensland government from annexing eastern New Guinea 
in 1883. 
The man first suggested as Commander-in-Chief of 
the new Australian fleet was Ernest Gaunt, C.M.G. A 
senior captain, Gaunt would take command of the 
8 3. Ibid. 
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Australian unit with the rank of Commodore 1st Class. 84 
The proposal to appoint a Commodore to command the 
Australian squadron was an unusual one. A Commodore had 
not commanded on the Australia Station since 1885 when 
Admiral Tryon had replaced Commodore Erskine in the 
position. The Admiralty papers suggest that the 
proposal to appoint Captain Gaunt may have been 
motivated by a desire not to overshadow Admiral 
Creswell, the First Naval Member of the Australian 
Naval Board. Gaunt's appointment, however, was opposed 
by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman. 
In a letter which revealed the Admiralty's continued 
reservations at naval forces in the hands of colonial 
governments the First Sea Lord recommended that the 
Australian squadron should be commanded by an Admiral. 
"In the Colonies and especially in Australia", he 
argued, "rank carries with it in direct proportion - 
importance and influence! 	. It is of the first 
importance to us here to search out an Admiral whom we 
have great confidence in, and who we can make quite 
sure will reflect our views worthily!" 88 
The man eventually chosen was Rear Admiral George 
Patey. The son of a naval captain, Patey had entered 
84 .Minute by Rear Admiral David Beatty, Naval 
Secretary to the First Lord of the Admiralty, 25 June 
1912. P.R.O., Adm 1/8283. 
88 .Minute by Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman, First 
Sea Lord, 29 June 1912, P.R.O., Adm 1/8283. 
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the navy in 1872 and had specialized in gunnery. Prior 
to his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the 
Australian fleet unit he had commanded a unit of the 
Home Fleet, having been promoted to rear admiral in 
1911." Patey, however, was to be denied direct 
Admiralty intelligence. Despite Australian protests the 
Admiralty deemed that no intelligence information was 
to be provided directly to Australia. Rather it was to 
be sent to the Commander-in-Chief China Station who 
would then decide what the Commonwealth needed to 
know." A further reflection of the Admiralty's lack of 
confidence in their colonial brethren this was to have 
important ramifications in the First World War when 
Australia was to be denied information relating to 
anti-subversive operations by British and Australian 
warships in Far Eastern waters." 
Though the likelihood of Britain reneging on her 1909 
commitments had been successfully concealed at the 
imperial conference, it was inevitable that Britain 
would eventually be found out. The establishment of the 
""The Times, 5 March 1913. 
87 .Harcourt to Denman, 15 March 1912, A.A.0.(C), 
A6661/1348. 
88 .See Dignan, op. cit., pp. 136-137. 
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Pacific Fleet became more remote with German moves to 
increase the tempo of the naval arms race and the 
appointment of Winston Churchill as First Lord of the 
Admiralty. The German novelle of May 1912 provided for 
the construction of three battleships above the 
existing programme as well as increases in the 
destroyer and submarine fleet." Before the German 
programme had passed the Reichstag, however, Churchill 
had committed Britain to laying down two battleships to 
every ship that Germany added to her existing Navy Law. 
Dropping any pretence of building to a 'two-power' 
standard, Churchill revealed that Britain was building 
against Germany alone and would maintain a sixty per 
cent superiority over the German fleet in battleships 
and a larger superiority in lesser vessels." 
In October 1912 the Director of Naval Intelligence 
drafted a memorandum for their Lordships on the subject 
of the Pacific fleet and what might be told to 
Australia and New Zealand. The D.N.I. presented the 
Admiralty with two alternatives. They could "say 
straight out that the situation at home owing to the 
new German Fleet Law necessitates a postponement of the 
Pacific Fleet organization" or they could tell the 
89 .Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 
I, pp.276-284. 
90.Ibid. 
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dominions that "we are carrying out the Pacific Fleet 
organization, but owing to the changed position at home 
it will only be possible to send out the Bristols 
gradually."' The memorandum is of interest for a 
number of reasons. Firstly it shows the Admiralty's 
reluctance to admit their abandonment of the Pacific 
fleet agreement. The D.N.I. did not propose telling the 
dominions that the Pacific fleet had been abandoned - 
only that unforeseen circumstances had resulted in it 
being delayed. The reference to the unavailablity of 
the Bristol class cruisers also indicates the 
Admiralty's particular difficulty in finding the 
smaller vessels promised under the 1909 agreement. It 
was the shortage of these smaller ships, especially 
cruisers, which had cast doubt upon the viability of 
the Pacific Fleet plan as early as 1910. Admiral 
Fisher's fleet rationalization programme had greatly 
reduced the number of cruisers in service while the 
pressure to keep down the size of the naval estimates 
often resulted in cruiser construction being cut rather 
than reductions in the battleship vote. As a 
consequence there was a desperate shortage of these 
91 .D.N.I. memorandum, 16 October 1912, P.R.O., Adm 
116/1270. 
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vessels, a shortage which was to plague the navy 
throughout the First World War." 
The D.N.I.'s memorandum had been prepared in 
response to a New Zealand inquiry early in 1912 about 
the Pacific Fleet. In their official reply, not drafted 
until January 1913, the Admiralty explained that, 
though the 1909 policy remained unchanged, the vessels 
promised could not immediately be spared but that the 
fleet maintained in the Far East would be of equivalent 
fighting strength to the force that had been agreed 
to." An attempt was also made at claiming that 
"misunderstandings" had arisen in regard to the 1909 
agreement and that the Admiralty was not committed to 
maintaining a specific force structure. "The intention 
of the Admiralty", the Overseas Defence Committee 
lamely argued, "although not expressly stated, was not 
that vessels precisely the same as those comprising the 
Australian Fleet Unit should be maintained in China 
waters, but that there would be maintained on the China 
92 .The shortage of cruisers was attested to by 
Admiral Lord Jellicoe, Commander-in-Chief of the Grand 
Fleet and First Sea Lord. See his comments as 
representative for New Zealand at the 1927 Geneva Naval 
Armaments Limitation Conference. Records of the 
Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, 
Geneva, 20 June - 4 August 1927, (Washington, 1928), 
pp. 41-45. 
".Admiralty to Colonial Office, 17 January 1913, 
P.R.O., Adm 116/1270. 
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Station a squadron which would comprise vessels equal 
in fighting capacity to those of the Australian Fleet 
Unit."° 4 Even a cursory glance at the minutes of the 
1909 conference show that this was not the case. As it 
was the reply was not sent. 
Despite the claim of continuing Admiralty support 
for the Pacific fleet there is little doubt that the 
programme had been abandoned rather than merely 
delayed. As early as January 1912 Churchill had decided 
to ask the New Zealand government if the battle cruiser 
New Zealand could be retained in the North Sea instead 
of being sent to China as had been agreed in 1909.° 5 In 
February he had instructed the Admiralty that "it is 
not necessary to keep more ships in China than will 
suffice to contain the German squadron there."°° Even 
Admiral Fisher, who had strongly supported the Pacific 
Fleet plan in the past, had abandoned the scheme. 
Though in retirement he remained in close touch with 
events at the Admiralty and had met secretly with 
Churchill soon after the latter's appointment as First 
Lord. "The margin of power in the North Sea", he wrote 
to Lord Stamfordham in June, "is irreducible .... Is it 
94 .0.D.C. memorandum, 18 January 1913, P.R.O., Adm 
116/1270. (My italics). 
95 .See Churchill 	to Louis Harcourt (Colonial 
Secretary), 29 January 1912 quoted in Meaney, op. cit., 
p. 231 fn.96. 
".Minute by Churchill, 14 February 1912, P.R.O., 
Adm 1/8284. 
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proposed to build another fleet for the Mediterranean, 
and also perhaps for China, and so on? We cannot have 
everything or be strong everywhere. It is futile to be 
strong in the subsidiary theatre of war and not 
overwhelmingly supreme in the decisive theatre." 97 
The embarrassment of the British authorities over 
the Pacific Fleet is reflected in their reluctance to 
admit the de facto abandonment of the scheme either to 
the dominion governments or to their own 
representatives in the dominions. Requests by the 
dominion governments for information on naval policy 
were met with long delays, leading to complaints from 
Australian ministers and an official protest by the 
Commander-in-Chief Australia station (Admiral Sir 
George King Hall) in November 1912." Likewise, neither 
King Hall nor the Governor General (Lord Denman) appear 
to have been told of Britain's difficulties in meeting 
her commitments to the Pacific fleet and consequently 
found themselves out of step with the government at 
home. Denman was criticised for supporting the 
development of local navies." Admiral King Hall was 
"'Fisher to Lord Stamfordham, 25 June 1912, Fear 
God and Dread Nought, Vol. II, p. 469. 
"'Jose, 	op. 	cit., 	p. 	xxxvii. 	King Hall 	to 
Admiralty, 26 November 1912, Adm 116/1270. 
"'Minutes by Just and Anderson, Denman to 
Harcourt, 4 December 1912, P.R.O., CO 418/99/510. 
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rebuked for encouraging moves by New Zealand to 
establish a navy in conjunction with Australia.'" King 
Hall, Churchill later claimed, was inclined to "mix 
himself up in the big questions of naval policy without 
instructions from the Admiralty."'" 
In November 1913, more than twelve months after the•
D.N.I.'s memorandum on possible responses by the 
Admiralty to dominion concern at the non-appearance of 
the Pacific fleet, an official explanation was sent to 
Australia. "The development of the general naval 
situation", it was stated, "has been such as to cause 
Their Lordships in the interests of the Empire to defer 
carrying the [1909] arrangements into effect in the 
precise form contemplated." 1 " Despite this, the 
Admiralty claimed, their forces in China waters had 
"been re-constituted with careful reference to the 
strength of any possible enemy force which they might 
have to meet" and that they "broadly fulfilled the 
purposes which the arrangements decided upon in 1909 
were intended to serve."'" In lieu of the two modern 
'° 0 Churchill to King Hall, 5 December 1912, P.R.O., 
Adm 116/1270. 
101 Churchill to Denman, 13 December 1912, Denman 
Papers, N.L.A., Ms 769. See further Meaney, op. cit., 
pp. 233-235. 
" 2 .Admira1ty 	memorandum, 	17 	November 	1913, 
C.A.0.(C), CP 290/15/2. (My italics). 
103 .Ibid. 
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battle cruisers promised under the 1909 agreement two 
battleships of the Swiftsure class had been sent to the 
Far East. These were obsolete pre-dreadnought vessels 
which had originally been built for Chile but acquired 
by Britain in 1904 to prevent their purchase by Russia 
at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Smaller and 
lighter than their British contemporaries and carrying 
only 10-inch guns they were not homogeneous with 
Britain's own pre-dreadnought fleet and it was this, 
rather than any consideration of likely opponents, 
which appears to have been behind the Admiralty's 
decision to station them in the Pacific. 
Not surprisingly the Admiralty's claim that the 
provision of two obsolete battleships fulfilled their 
obligations under the 1909 agreement did not satisfy 
the Australian government. In his response Prime 
Minister Joseph Cook, while accepting that the changed 
situation in the North Sea might make adjustments to 
the Pacific fleet programme necessary, argued that this 
should not cause the abandonment of the whole 
programme. Special provisions, he urged, should be made 
to meet the crisis in the North Sea. The 1909 
agreement, he explained, was intended to provide for 
"the permanent protection of British interests in the 
Pacific". Though the Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided a 
measure of protection, Australia should not be "left 
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be "left 	to depend upon the continuance of such a 
delicate security as an alliance, however desirable and 
honourable, with a great and friendly power". 104 
Probably some in the Admiralty and certainly many 
in defence circles in Britain would have sympathized 
with Cook's plea. In 1911 The Times waged a campaign 
for a strengthening of British naval forces in the Far 
East beyond even what had been agreed in 1909. While 
praising Australia on its naval preparations it claimed 
that these in no way "absolve this country from the 
duty of maintaining its supremacy in those seas. " 1 0 6 
"Three armoured cruisers of the first class", The 
Times declared, "would be a wholly insufficient force 
to represent our interests in the Pacific". Twelve 
armoured cruisers in the Pacific, it suggested, "would 
be none too many", adding that "the hope of Mr. McKenna 
that we have reached the high water in the matter of 
the Estimates seems to be much more sanguine than the 
circumstances warrant. "100 
Early in 1914 Admiral Henderson also called upon 
the British government to honour its 1909 commitments. 
By abandoning the Pacific fleet programme and 
" 4 .Cook to Denman, 28 February 1914, C.A.0.(C), CP 
290/15/2. 
" 5 .The Times, 18 March 1911. 
" 6 .Ibid, 15 March 1911. 
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discouraging the development of 	dominion fleets, 
Henderson argued, Britain was acting against her long 
term interests and hastening the breakup of the empire. 
"It is still in our power to promote and assist to 
build up navies for the Dominions", he claimed. "If it 
were done no nation or nations would dare attack us on 
the sea, and apart from fighting strength the moral and 
financial position of the Empire would be enormous. "107 
Such calls, however, were out of touch with 
political reality in Britain. The Liberal government 
was simply not prepared to fund both the naval race 
with Germany and a fleet in the Pacific. After a period 
of relative stability following Admiral Fisher's fleet 
rationalization programme the naval estimates had again 
begun to increase. As a proportion of government 
expenditure the 1912 estimates reached the 1905 
highpoint while in money terms they were nearly six 
million pounds above the 1905 figure. 108  Moreover a bid 
by Churchill to secure three battleships from Canada 
had fallen through and the First Lord was forced to 
request a record £51,580,000 in the 1914 estimates.'" 
" 7 .Ibid, 28 February 1914. 
'"See Appendix A. 
1 °°-In 1912 Churchill had persuaded Canadian prime 
minister Sir Robert Borden to have the government of 
Canada donate three dreadnought battleships to the 
Royal Navy for service in the Mediterranean. The bill 
to provide the funds for the ships was defeated in the 
Canadian Senate. See Gordon, The Dominion Partnership 
in Imperial Defense, pp. 263-265. 
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As in the past when a large increase in the naval 
estimates had been requested a Cabinet crisis ensued 
and Churchill was forced to revise his figure 
downwards, it was clear no money would be available for 
the development of naval forces in peripheral areas 
such as the Pacific.'" 
Indeed in his speech on the 1914 naval estimates 
Churchill, perhaps adopting the view that the best form 
of defence is attack, denounced Australia for retaining 
its battle cruiser in its own waters. Churchill had 
been severely embarrassed by the failure to secure the 
three Canadian dreadnoughts. In 1913 he had unwisely 
promised reductions in naval expenditure on the 
anticipation of these vessels and his criticism of 
Australian policy was to some extent a reflection of 
his frustration. "Two or three Australian and New 
Zealand Dreadnoughts if brought into line in the 
decisive theatre", he claimed, "might turn the scale 
and make victory not merely certain but complete. The 
British Navy in home waters."''' Australia, Churchill 
asserted, needed only "docks and local defence 
flotillas." Beyond that Australia's 	security 	was 
"".Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 
Vol. I, pp. 324-326. 
111 .G.B.P.D., 5th series, Vol. LIX, pp. 1931-1935, 
17 March 1914. 
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guaranteed by 	the alliance with Japan. 	Though 
Australia, Churchill declared, was "perfectly free" to 
decide the disposition of its navy, he added 
disparagingly that "it is recognized ... that time will 
be required before the principles of naval strategy are 
applied to their fullest extent in the Dominions."'" 
Though Australia continued to protest at Britain's 
failure to live up to her commitments, after 
Churchill's speech there was no longer any question of 
the Pacific Fleet only having been deferred. 
Nevertheless the Admiralty refused to accept that they 
had abandoned the Pacific. The small British presence 
in the Pacific, they argued, was justified by the 
alliance with Japan. While Britain relied upon Japan to 
safeguard her Pacific interests, Churchill asserted, 
Japan was equally dependent upon the Royal Navy in the 
Atlantic to protect her from "the great fleets of 
Europe". "In no other way", he claimed, ".... can Japan 
protect herself from the dangers of European 
interference."'" Moreover the Admiralty continued to 
believe that a British fleet could be sent to the 
Pacific if it became necessary. It was this belief 
which was behind Churchill's recommendation that 
1 12 .Ibid. 
"3.I b id. 
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Australia concentrate on building docks and local 
defences. The Second World War showed that this was a 
false belief. 
The Pacific fleet plan was a final, unsuccessful 
attempt by the Admiralty to resurrect British sea power 
in a region of great economic and political importance 
to Britain. It reflected a natural preference by the 
Admiralty for a British battle squadron in the Far East 
rather than reliance upon the goodwill of an ally. 
While the German novelle of 1912 finally put a new 
Pacific Fleet beyond Britain's resources, the shortage 
of small ships, especially cruisers, appears to have 
undermined it before then. The Pacific Fleet plan, it 
would seem, was flawed from the start. Nevertheless, 
the Pacific Fleet programme was the most important 
initiative by the Admiralty in imperial affairs since 
the 1887 naval agreement and was of particular 
significance to Australia for it resulted in the 
establishment of the Royal Australian Navy. 
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CONCLUSION 
The period from 1883 to 1914 saw major changes in the 
relationship between the Admiralty and Australia. 
Whereas in 1883 the Australian colonies had been almost 
totally dependent upon the Royal Navy for protection, 
by 1914 the Commonwealth of Australia had established 
its own ocean-going navy and assumed responsibility for 
the defence of its own waters. In explaining these 
developments, histories of British imperial relations 
have emphasized the growth of "assertive nationalism"' 
in the dominions and the efforts of the imperial 
authorities to come to terms with it. These decades, 
however, also saw the gradual decline of Britain's 
economic and naval power and attempts by successive 
British governments to rein in the naval estimates. A 
major theme of the present work has been to show how 
these broader changes in Britain's strategic and 
financial circumstances shaped the Admiralty's position 
on colonial naval defence. 
In the 	early 1880s 	a series 	of incidents 
highlighted the dangers independently-minded colonial 
3—Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial 
Defense, p. xiii. 
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governments could pose to British interests. The risks 
seemed greater if the colonies possessed their own 
naval forces and this consideration reinforced an 
aversion within the Admiralty to sharing responsibility 
for naval defence with the colonies. The upshot of 
these concerns was the 1887 naval agreement the primary 
intention of which, it has been argued, was to 
undermine the impulse for naval construction in the 
Australian colonies. 
An important part of the 1887 agreement was the 
acceptance by the Admiralty of restrictions on the 
operation of warships subsidized by the colonies. This 
was a major concession by the Admiralty for it flew in 
the face of accepted strategic thinking. The 1887 
agreement, however, was signed at a time when the Royal 
Navy was still largely unchallenged on the world's 
oceans. While the Admiralty were concerned at losing 
absolute control over some of their ships, Admiralty 
documents reveal that they did not initially see the 
restrictions on the movement of the Auxiliary Squadron 
as an excessive burden and were prepared to accept them 
in view of the dangers to British interests posed by 
colonial naval activism. From the 1890s, however,-
Britain's relative naval strength began to deteriorate. 
As the Admiralty came under pressure from the 
government to rationalize their forces and cut naval 
expenditure it became increasingly difficult for them 
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to impede the development of local colonial navies. 
While the Admiralty were pressed by Australian 
governments after 1901 to support the establishment of 
an Australian navy, it is clear that changing strategic 
circumstances and the search for economy at home played 
the leading role in forcing the Admiralty to revise 
their position on Australian naval defence. 
By 1902 the need to trim naval estimates, and the 
secret provisions of the alliance with Japan, made the 
restriction of the Auxiliary Squadron to the waters of 
the Australia Station unacceptable to the Admiralty. At 
the 1902 colonial conference the Admiralty insisted 
upon an expansion of the operational area of their 
Australian squadron. This requirement was reluctantly 
accepted by the Barton government which, because of 
constitutional restraints on its expenditure, was in no 
position to initiate a local naval programme. The 
Admiralty were at first pleased with the results of the 
1902 conference. While they had not achieved all they 
had hoped for, the First Lord expressed satisfaction 
with agreement and complimented the Australian and New 
Zealand governments on their appreciation of the 
"peculiar characteristics of naval warfare." 2 
2 .Selborne memorandum, 7 August 1902, contained in 
C.P.P., 1903 session, Vol. II, No. 2, op. cit., pp. 17. 
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The 	Admiralty's 	satisfaction 	with 	the 	1902 
agreement was short-lived. The failure of the 1902 
agreement has often been attributed to the rise of 
national sentiment in Australia and the associated 
increase in Australian pressure upon the Admiralty for 
a national naval force. "Perhaps because of the 
pressure exerted by Deakin, or perhaps in recognition 
of the political realities in some of the dominions", 
Donald Gordon has claimed, "the Admiralty's attitude 
[to colonial navies] began to change." 3 As was 
suggested in Chapter 4, however, while the Admiralty 
were not unmindful of Australian desires for a local 
navy, the policy of naval retrenchment being pursued by 
Britain's newly elected Liberal government was the 
principal factor behind the decision in 1907 to support 
the establishment of local colonial navies. The 
Admiralty wanted to escape from the provisions of the 
1902 naval agreement and reduce the size of their naval 
forces stationed in Australia. Support for local navies 
was seen as a necessary trade-off in return for the 
termination of the 1902 agreement. 
The Admiralty's 1907 decision can be explained in 
terms 	of 	pressing 	strategic 	and 	financial 
3 .Gordon, "The Admiralty and the Dominion Navies, 
1902-1914", op. cit., p. 410-411. 
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considerations. Their recommendation, two years later,- 
that the colonies establish ocean-going 'fleet units' 
as part of a new British Pacific Fleet appears to fly 
in the 	face of 
imperatives. As was 
the Admiralty had 
reasons for wanting 
the Pacific. Even 
these strategic 	and financial• 
suggested in Chapter 5, however, 
sound strategic and diplomatic 
to reassert British sea power in 
the most fervent 'blue water' 
theorists had to admit that the concentration of the 
Royal Navy in the North Sea only provided protection 
for Britain's Far Eastern possessions if they were at 
risk from a European power. The rise of the Imperial 
Japanese Navy in the North Pacific had compromised 
Britain's naval position in the Far East. The 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided a measure of security, 
but in 1909 Japan's long-term reliability as an ally 
was seriously doubted and the continuation of the 
alliance beyond 1915, when it was due to expire, far 
from certain. 
With the Admiralty under pressure to reinforce 
Britain's naval position in the Far East, a naval scare 
in Britain provided them in 1909 with a number of 
dreadnoughts above what was needed to counter the 
German fleet in the North Sea. It was the existence of 
these ships, combined with the offers of additional 
assistance from the dominions, which enabled the 
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Admiralty to propose the establishment of a new Pacific 
Fleet. The long-term viability of the Pacific Fleet, 
however, depended on encouraging the dominions to 
assume responsibility for regional, as against purely 
local, defence. Keen to exploit the situation to its 
fullest, the Admiralty dramatically revised their 
position on dominion navies. At the 1909 imperial 
conference considerable pressure was brought to bear on 
the dominions to develop ocean-going 'fleet units' 
instead of the coastal defence forces that the 
dominions, with the concurrence of the Admiralty, had 
planned to set up. 
The plan to establish a new British fleet in the 
Pacific, with one of the component 'fleet units' both 
provided and operated by Australia, marked an important 
change in the Admiralty's relations with the dominions. 
Ways were found to overcome the problems surrounding 
the legal status of colonial warships on the high seas. 
The strategic and financial strains which had forced 
the Admiralty to accept the development of colonial 
navies,, however, soon left them unable to fulfil their 
Pacific Fleet pledge. Amid bitterness and recrimination 
the Admiralty tried to return to the contributory 
system of the 1887 naval agreement. But changes in the 
relationship between the Admiralty and the colonies 
could not be reversed. Australia proceeded to construct 
its ocean-going squadron, which became operational in 
1913 as the Royal Australian Navy. 
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APPENDIX B 
Australia: Expenditure on Naval Defence 1901-1914 
Expenditure on Naval 	% of 
Defence in £ Sterling 
Total Government 
Expenditure 
1901-2 178,819 4.32 
1902-3 149,701 3.83 
1903-4 240,091 5.64 
1904-5 206,036 4.76 
1905-6 252,016 5.60 
1906-7 256,066 5.13 
1907-8 510,205 8.27 
1908-9 267,262 4.16 
1909-10 329,739 4.39 
1910-11 1,465,034 11.13 
1911-12 1,634,466 11.09 
1912-13 1,660,616 10.51 
1913-14 1,987,101 12.85 
Source: N. Meaney, The Search for Security in the 
Pacific, 1901-1914, (Sydney, 1976), Appendix 
IV, p. 277. 
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